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vPreface
Innovations in innovation: reflections on
partnership and learning
A J Hall
1
The workshop held on 6 May 2002 was part of a project funded by the Crop Post-
Harvest Programme (CPHP) of the UK Department for International Development
(DFID) that arose from a growing recognition among researchers and policy-makers
that attention needs to be given to the circumstances from which innovations
emerge.  By innovations we do not just mean new technology, but also the insti-
tutional and organizational innovations that emerge as new ways of developing,
diffusing, and using new knowledge.
The origins of this orientation in the CPHP was a series of multi-agency projects
dealing with mango export quality management systems during the period
1995–98  (see pages 82–83 of this publication for background details). During this
work it became increasingly apparent that both the effectiveness of the innovation
process and its relevance to poor stakeholders was determined to a large extent
by the nature of partnership groupings and the way the institutional environment
(the norms and working conventions among and between partners) shaped
relationships and learning.  Realizing the importance of partnerships and the
institutional context of its work (in the sense of rule sets, norms, and routines),
CPHP commissioned research to explore these aspects of the innovation process
in greater detail.  The workshop was part of that research initiative.
The workshop was intended to illustrate and explore the diversity of systems
that have emerged to generate innovations. This is reflected in its title, Innovations
in Innovation that alludes to the constant search for new ways to generate and
promote innovation, and indeed the diversity of approaches that have evolved to
do just that. The focus of the workshop and this publication was predominantly
post-harvest issues, but the underlying principles are generic to the agricultural
research sector.  At the workshop three cases of innovation were presented and
discussed.  All three have developed different modus operandi, each involves
different patterns of partners and relationships that are shaped by the specific
historical, organizational, institutional, political and technology-related contexts
from which they have emerged.  All three are relatively successful in the sense
that systems have been established that can generate innovations relevant to
poor people.
1 . University of Greenwich, UK, International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT), Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India
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Workshop modus operandi
At the workshop the three main papers were presented in the morning session
with time given for specific questions on each.  During the afternoon session
three working groups were formed where participants analyzed the presented
cases in the terms of the five questions mentioned above.
Publication contents
The papers presented at the workshop have since benefited from the working
group discussions and analyses and have used the five questions as a framework
to describe innovation and its context, and to synthesize the significance of each
case. We have taken the opportunity to collect together other relevant material
that has been added as supplementary background papers that provide more
information for interested readers, and also provide further insights to help in
the overall analysis of the workshop debate. As a way of synthesizing the
presentations, discussion and additional material, an Overview is presented that
initially develops a conceptual framework for the presentations. It then attempts
to answer some of the questions raised and suggests some of the general principles
and policy recommendations emerging from this work.
A list of workshop participants is presented in Appendix 1, a list of acronyms
used in Appendix 2, and brief bio-sketches of the authors in Appendix 3.
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Foreword
ICRISAT – an innovating organization in a
changing world
W D Dar
1
At ICRISAT, we recognize and accept that change and evolution are central
characteristics of modern human society. If science and technology is to be
effectively used to combat poverty in this changing world, one cannot stand still.
Organizations like ICRISAT and our development partners must adapt, innovate,
and evolve. I would like to share with you this morning some of the innovations
within ICRISAT that have been introduced to cope with this changing world, and
the core principles and values of partnership, trust, and excellence that the Institute
uses to keep pace with the developments which surround it.
As ICRISAT approaches its 30th anniversary it is useful to reflect on the way
the semi-arid tropics (SAT) and indeed the wider world have changed. When the
Institute was established in 1972, the successes of the seed-based technologies
of the Green Revolution were just starting to become apparent to all. Food storages
in both Asia and Africa were still a major concern for the international development
community. There was still a critical need to build capacity in public-sector plant
breeding programs and in seed production and distribution systems – particularly
for crops grown and consumed by the poor. These imperatives were reflected in
the establishment of ICRISAT as an international center of excellence in the crops
of the SAT – sorghum, pearl millet, chickpea, pigeonpea, and groundnut– with a
core competence in plant breeding and genetic enhancement.
In the intervening years much has changed. Eight features stand out:
• Firstly, in the world’s SAT, increasing food production, while still necessary, is
no longer sufficient to reduce poverty. The rural poor have developed diversified
livelihood strategies to cope with their vulnerability and to exploit new, often
market-driven, opportunities
• Secondly, international development goals have widened from merely increasing
food supply to include poverty reduction, and environmental sustainability.
As a consequence, international support for agricultural science and technology
has now to compete with a wider set of development objectives
• Thirdly, shifts to a development paradigm that seeks to build stronger
stakeholder participation, partnership, and governance, are now exerting a
major influence on approaches and priorities
• Fourthly, the public sector as the main source of technological innovation has
been supplemented by the private sector, in both the seed industry and related
areas of biotechnology in particular and in life sciences in general
1. Director General, International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT),
Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India
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• Fifthly, the role and sophistication of the non-governmental organization (NGO)
sector has emerged as a major force for rural change and innovation
• Sixthly, as the rural sector is drawn further into market-based economies, the
distinctions between pro-poor development agendas and the priorities of
enterprise and industry have become increasingly blurred
• Seventhly, the emergence of new generic technologies, particularly information
technology and biotechnology, and the possibilities and controversies that these
present
• Eighthly, the emergences of global markets and technology systems and the
threats and opportunities these offer to the poor people of the SAT.
Perhaps the only thing that hasn’t changed is the scourge of poverty that
continues to blight the lives of millions of men, women, and children in the
SAT – 40% of all those living in South Asia and 46% of those living in sub-Saharan
Africa. In the SAT alone this currently amounts to a staggering figure of nearly
450 million people.
ICRISAT has coped with this changing world by re-orientating two key features
of its operation – its programs and its approach to partnership. The first has
involved the restructuring of the entire research portfolio away from disciplinary
programs – breeding economics, pathology and so forth – by creating six broad
thematic areas, the Global Research Themes. These six themes focus on some of
the major developmental drivers of the SAT:
1. Harnessing Biotechnology for the Poor
2. Crop Management and Utilization for Livelihood Security and Health
3. Water, Soil, and Agro-biodiversity Management for Ecosystem Health
4. Sustainable Seed Supply Systems for Productivity
5. Enhancing Crop–livestock Productivity and Systems Diversification
6. SAT Futures and Development Pathways.
This new structure has shifted the focus of the Institute to a forward-looking,
opportunity-driven agenda. This agenda is still based on excellence in science,
but in a totally new framework, moving away from disciplinary contributions alone
to include developmental goals and agendas.
The second key shift is also concerned with the framework of scientific
excellence, but this time in terms of our patterns of partnership. The Institute
has always had very strong partnerships with national programs in the countries
of the SAT. During the last 5 years, however, ICRISAT has adopted a much broader-
based partnership approach. Both NGO and private-sector organizations are now
core partners in ICRISAT endeavors. This has been a direct response to the need
to have more intimate relationships with the users of technology, particularly
farmers, and the need to partner with organizations that have complementary
skills and resources. And this response has not just been about new partners, it
has been about new types of partnership and participation with stakeholders.
These generic shifts are exemplified in a number of key institutional innovations
in ICRISAT. One of my first tasks on assuming my position as Director General
was to sign an agreement with a consortium of private seed companies to fund
hybrid development research here at ICRISAT. At that time this was an almost
unique innovation in the whole of the CGIAR.
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More recently ICRISAT has entered into an agreement with a major rural
development project – the Andhra Pradesh Rural Livelihoods Project (APRLP)
supported by DFID. This project is helping to cement an entirely new type of
relationship between scientific research on watershed development and natural
resource management at ICRISAT and the developmental activities of APRLP. Such
a linkage between an international agricultural research center and a major,
long-term rural development program is a key institutional innovation, embedding
science in a new framework of stakeholder governance.
A new innovation that is still at an early stage is an initiative to develop an
incubator facility for small and medium-sized biotechnology companies. This will
create a new dynamic between ICRISAT and the life-science industry, and is
expected to generate enormous amounts of creative synergy for both us and our
partners.
These are just some of the more high-profile innovations that have taken
place. I share them with you to illustrate the way we as ICRISAT have responded
to our changing world. We have done so in ways that reflect our own history, our
core expertise in science, and our long-term commitment to reducing world poverty.
There is no blueprint for responding to the challenges of the changing world around
us, what we see today at ICRISAT is the result of a truly evolutionary process in
which we have adapted and are continuing to adapt to fit our niche in international
development.
Our partners have all adapted to the changing world in different ways, each
brings with them their own history and their own evolution. The main things that
we at ICRISAT can share with others are the principles and values that have
shaped our evolution and innovation. These include: the centrality of partnership
in our approach; the need to develop mutual trust, respect, and transparency
with our partners; and the need to maintain excellence in our science. But we
have not left the development of these principles and values to chance. In our
partnerships and teamwork we have made explicit effort to emphasize, develop,
and build awareness of our philosophy and approach. These values will take us
forward and ensure that science continues to play its role in supporting the
livelihoods of poor people in the SAT. This is the core of our credo of ‘Science with
a human face’.

Overview

1Innovations in innovation: partnership, learning
and diversity in the generation, diffusion and use
of new knowledge
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 B Yoganand,
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Abstract
The paper provides an overview and synthesis of three cases of innovation in
innovation from the post-harvest sector in India. Using the innovation systems
framework five themes are used to compare these cases, namely: context, partnership,
institutional rigidities, learning, and poverty focus. While we argue that this comparative
analysis suggests a number of general principles, it also leads us to stress that there is
no universal model or blueprint. Instead what seems to be important are interventions
that rely on and encourage the development of capabilities that allow adaptation to
local circumstances, resources and opportunities, and that relay on learning processes
as a way of finding new ways to achieve goals. The conclusion raises two cautionary
points. Firstly much greater attention needs to be given to understanding the institutional
and historical context of partnerships than was perhaps previously thought necessary
in research planning and management. Part of this task concerns monitoring stakeholder
interests during project implementation and particularly testing assumptions about the
poverty relevance of certain courses of action and the implications of decisions. Secondly,
institutional change in the agricultural sciences is long overdue and is emerging as a
serious impediment to the agricultural innovation system.
Introduction
The papers in this publication discuss the process of innovation in the post-
harvest sector. We use the term ‘innovation’ in its broad sense to cover the activities
and processes associated with the generation, production, distribution, adaptation,
and use of new technical, institutional, and organizational or managerial
knowledge. The emphasis on innovations in innovation alludes to the constant
search and emergence of new ways of generating, promoting, and using new
knowledge.
A central aim of the workshop held on 6 May 2002 was to assemble and discuss
a number of cases from the post-harvest sector that are examples of successful
innovation that emerged in quite different ways. The purpose was to demonstrate
and analyze the diversity and often highly context-specific nature of the processes
that lead to and promote innovation. The relevance of this topic is that in the
post-harvest area in particular, and in agriculture research in general, both in
India and internationally, policy attention is returning to the question of how
1. University of Greenwich, UK, seconded to International Crops Research Institute for the
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India
2 . ICRISAT
3. National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy Research (NCAP), PO Box 11305, Library
Avenue, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012, India
4 . Graduate School of Environmental Studies (GSES), Wolfson Centre, University of Strathclyde,
Glasgow G4 0NW, UK
2innovation can be encouraged and promoted and thus how impact on the poor
can be achieved.
The three workshop papers are presented in such as way that they do not
just discuss the objectives and outcomes of each of the initiatives they cover.
Instead, the focus is on the processes that were involved; the ‘hows’ of what led to
success; and the ways these ‘hows’ changed over time. Given the increasing policy
interest in improving the effectiveness and impact of research, such process
narratives of research projects and other interventions are surprisingly rare.
The first case by Sulaiman and Pillai (2003) and discusses the experience of a
large horticultural sector development program and its efforts to establish
technology development arrangements primarily with the local agricultural
university and eventually with farmers. The case provides in considerable detail
the nature of constraints to effective partnership in the prevailing institutional
environment. It also discusses the way a learning-based management approach
evolved alternative arrangements for both technology development and the wider
sphere of activities related to supporting smallholder horticultural producers.
The second case by Phansalkar (2003) deals with the partnership dynamics in a
project exploring support to post-harvest systems in Himachal Pradesh, India.
The case explains an approach that relied on establishing technology, production,
and retail systems. The approach had been successful elsewhere, but this case
discusses its novel application in the post-harvest sector. The third case by Abrol
(2003) provides an overview of the People’s Science Initiatives and provides details
of the innovation in the area of agro-process addresses. The approach described
is relatively novel in that it explicitly sets out to develop the capacity of local
technology systems. This involves building on indigenous knowledge and resources,
and strengthening networks within the local economy. The approach also links
into the formal science community when required, relying on a network of scientists
that subscribe to the overall philosophy of the People’s Science Movement.
Along with these case studies a number of supplementary papers are
presented. These include a more detailed discussion of the conceptual debate
about innovation in the post-harvest sector, as well as papers relevant to the
general topic of innovation and capacity-building in relation to international
development. These papers are not discussed in detail in this overview which
concentrates on providing a conceptual orientation for the rest of the papers, and
distils the main arguments and lessons presented.
R&D in its contemporary setting
There is now widespread concern that the conventional model of formal research
and development (R&D) as the central source of innovation needs to be replaced
by something more suited to contemporary development agendas (Biggs 1990;
Byerlee and Alex 2003; Hall et al. 2000; 2001). However, what is less clear is what
these new arrangements might be. In part this need for change relates to a shifting
development agenda, with poverty reduction and environmental sustainability
as key organizing principles for strategies that also need to improve economic
growth and international competitiveness in global markets. This shift is happening
at a time when the agriculture and rural development sector is seeing the
3emergence of new capabilities, organizations, and organizational forms, and where
partnerships are increasingly discussed as part of a new vision of agricultural
and rural innovation. Similarly, advances in modern science are offering new
opportunities, while at the same time new patterns of accountability and
governance are changing the role of scientists and their relationship with society
(Murthynja and Ranjitha 1998; Echevia 1998; Byerlee and Alex 2003).
Biggs and Matsaert (1999) argue that in the contemporary setting of
agricultural research and rural development, managers of R&D systems are often
faced with making a range of decisions for which old frameworks of analysis are
often inadequate. These old frameworks include economic rates of return, computer
simulation models and conventional monitoring and evaluation (Biggs and
Matsaert 1999). One of the ways the agricultural research community is beginning
to respond to the complex realities in which it finds itself is to plan its activities
within the context of an innovation system [Byerlee and Alex 2003, Biggs and
Matsaert 1999; Hall et al. 1998; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003 (in press)].
At its simplest an innovation system is the groups of organizations and
individuals involved in the generation, diffusion, adaptation, and use of knowledge
of socio-economic significance, and the institutional context that governs the way
these interactions and processes take place. The usefulness of this concept is
that it recognizes that the innovation process involves not only formal scientific
research organizations, but also a range of other organizations and other non-
research tasks. It recognizes the importance of linkages, making contacts,
partnerships, alliances and coalitions and the way these assist information flows.
It also recognizes that innovation is an essentially social process involving
interactive learning by doing, a process that can lead to new possibilities and
approaches. Furthermore because the process depends on relationships between
different people and organizations the nature of those relationships and its political
economy is critically important. The conventions or institutions governing the
way research and allied activities are conducted, and the role assigned to different
organizations, is a defining context of the innovation process. As all scientists
know, the nature of collaboration can make or break a research project.
Of course, in reality, agricultural research has always taken place in the
context of an innovation system. In the past, however, this wider context has
been assumed away in the planning process. The convention has been for R&D
managers to set research priorities and allocate resources within the framework
of good science. Little or no attention has been given to the need to build
relationships with partners working in complimentary fields, nor to seek linkages,
relationships and processes that would embed research in the wider innovation
system and improve its relevance to developmental agendas. Much of this social
side of innovation – the software – was assumed to be outside of the remit of R&D
managers, whose job was to deal with scientific research – the hardware of
innovation. As a result the process of networking, forming alliances and
partnerships, negotiating priorities and approaches to research and evaluation –
which everybody knows are necessary activities – took place at an informal level
with limited systematic support or planning. It is these sorts of activities and
decisions with which R&D managers are now faced. The concept of an innovation
system can act as a framework for analysis and planning in a more all-
4encompassing fashion and hence include consideration of ways of developing the
software of innovation.
Principles of innovation system analysis
Linear and systems models of innovation
As has already been mentioned the emergent view is that it simply no longer
holds true that knowledge can be independently produced in specialized research
organizations and that this knowledge can then be transferred to passive users.
Innovation, as distinct from research and invention, is a much more complex
process, often requiring technical, social, and institutional changes, and involving
the interaction of actors across the conventional knowledge producer–user divide.
Douthwaite (2002) believes that this holds true in cases of innovation ranging
from rice drying in South Asia to wind turbines in Europe and North America. He
shows how innovative success is a complex process of learning and adaptation.
Innovation and its context
An innovation systems perspective brings together thinking from a broad set of
disciplinary perspectives that view development and change in systems terms
[see Edquist 1997 for a review of this topic]. At its heart lies the contention that
change – or innovation – results from, and is shaped by, the system of actors and
institutional contexts at particular locations and points in time. A related
recognition is that knowledge production and use is a highly contextual affair.
This has many analytical implications: the need to consider a range of activities
and organizations related to research, particularly technology users, and how
these might function collectively; and the need to locate research planning in the
context the norms, culture, and political economy in which it takes place – i.e.,
the wider institutional context. As already discussed the convention in R&D
planning has been largely to ignore this context.
Similarly, it is no longer useful to think of institutional and organizational
arrangements for research as fixed or optimal – clearly these must evolve to suit
local circumstances. In the same way, the evaluation of innovation performance
also becomes much more context-specific relating to the perspective of
stakeholders and current imperatives, rather than either scientific peer review
or economic justification alone.
Innovation systems thinking – origins and principles
The origin of innovation systems thinking can be traced to the idea of a ‘national
system of innovation’ proposed by Freeman (1987) and Lundvall (1992). The
concept, which build on empirical observations of best practice in different national
and sectoral settings, states that innovations emerge from evolving systems of
actors involved in research and the application of research findings. Lundvall
identifies learning and the role of institutions as the critical components of these
systems. He considers learning and knowledge production to be an interactive
and thus socially embedded process that cannot be understood without reference
to its institutional and cultural context, usually in a national setting.
5The innovation system concept therefore provides a framework for: 1. exploring
patterns of partnerships; 2. revealing and managing the historical and institutional
context that governs these relationships and processes; 3. understanding research
and innovation as an interactive social process of learning; and 4. thinking about
capacity development in a systems sense. On this last point, Velho (2002) observes
that national systems of innovation, made up of actors who are not particularly
strong, but where links between them are well developed, may operate more
effectively than another system in which the actors are strong but links between
them are weak.
Innovation themes for analysis
Flowing from this discussion of the concept of innovation systems five themes
present themselves for analysis of our workshop cases. The themes and the
questions they imply are:
• Context. What were the key contextual factors that shaped each case, i.e.,
both the historical context that shaped approaches and relationships and the
opportunities, resources, and capacities that were specific to the case and
influenced its form and direction?
• Partnerships. What were the critical partnerships involved, how were they
established, and what led to the relative success or failure of these
partnerships? What were the roles of partners and what essential/comple-
mentary skills/resources did they bring with them? How were roles negotiated?
and What were the formal and informal rules that governed the partnerships?
• Institutional rigidities and change. What were the rigidities encountered in
the organization or practices and norms of partners or wider structures
(particularly public bureaucracies) and how did the nodal organizations cope
with these rigidities or induce change?
• Learning. How do organizations learn and build up skills on partnering? Are
processes intuitive and ad hoc, or do they have specific learning mechanisms?
How could these be strengthened? What other types of competencies do
organizations build up that help to generate innovations?
• Poverty. What specific steps were used to ensure that a poverty/technology-
user perspective influenced the outcome of partnership processes? Has this
been verified either internally or independently?
Innovation and poverty relevance
This last theme on poverty relevance needs special attention since the policy
agenda is not just seeking ways to improve innovation performance in a general
sense, but doing so in pro-poor ways. A useful framework for making a judgment
of this kind is to explore the poverty relevance of interventions, an approach used
by, for example, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to classify
all its development projects. The approach involves sorting projects into one of
three categories that describe the main way in which they address the poverty-
reduction aim (see Underwood 2002 for an example of the application of this
approach in the post-harvest sector). It is recognized that all categories are
important and that choices will depend on specific circumstances and the strategy
6adopted to support poverty reduction. The three categories of poverty relevance
are:
1. Enabling. Addresses an issue that underpins pro-poor economic growth or
other policies for poverty reduction that leads to social, environmental, and
economic benefits for poor people. Examples are:
• Access/rights to resources/assets
• Safeguarding environment
• Reforms to regulatory, incentive, and institutional frameworks
• Promotion of small-scale enterprises
2. Inclusive. Addresses an issue that affects both poor and non-poor, but from
which the poor will benefit equally (given economies of scale). Examples are:
• Pest and disease control
• Improved extension services
3. Focused. Addresses an issue that directly affects the rights, interests, and
needs of poor people primarily. Examples are:
• Improvement for crops grown mainly by the poor – reduction of losses/
vulnerability
• Adding value to crops produced by the poor
• Increased market access/diversification opportunities for the poor
While this framework is relatively simple, it at least allows us to move beyond
a rhetorical engagement with poverty in relation to the innovation process. In
terms of the analysis of the cases presented here it helps us consider which
innovations in innovation are relevant to the poor specifically, and which will
only assist rural communities in a more general sense. This is an important
distinction for innovation policy. For further discussion on policies for pro-poor
innovation see Berdegue and Escobar (2002).
Cases of innovation in innovation
Kerala Horticultural Development Programme (KHDP): a learning-
based approach to technology development and promotion and
rural innovation
This case describes KHDP a project supported by the Commission of European
Communities and Government of Kerala. This pilot program started field
implementation in November 1993 with the objective of developing replicable
models. The major objective was to improve the overall situation of vegetable and
fruit farmers of Kerala by increasing and stabilizing their income through reduced
production costs and by improving the marketing system. The KHDP interventions
included R&D, provision of planting materials, extension service and demonstration
plots, training, credit package, marketing support and processing unit. KHDP
organized self-help groups of farmers. A critical partnership in the project was a
contract research arrangement with the Kerala Agricultural University (KAU).
While this arrangement faced many challenges and ultimately failed, the case
provides a useful illustration of the way learning and experimentation with
approaches can underpin programme success. This was a general philosophy of
KHDP management and was implemented across the Programmes’ activities. The
other notable feature about this case was that partnerships of various kinds
7were critical to the success of this program. However, the instance of the
relationship with KAU suggests that partnerships can only work when they exist
in an institutional environment that supports flexibility, transparency, trust and
shared objectives and values.
Evolving technology through collaboration and partnership: the
case of IDE(I)’s work with tomato packaging in Himachal
Pradesh, India
This case discusses a project implemented by International Development
Enterprises, India [IDE(I)] with funds received from the Crop Post-Harvest
Programme (CPHP) of the DFID. A UK-based international non-governmental
organization (IntNGO) was chosen as the project leader. The IntNGO contracted
IDE(I) to carry out field work connected with identifying the specific post-harvest
stage for intervention. IDE(I) also undertook technology identification, sourcing,
and adaptation. IDE(I) identified tomato as the main crop for intervention and the
development and commercialization of suitable cardboard box packaging as the
main task. The project was implemented in partnership with another NGO based
in the region. Scientists from the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
(IIMA) and manufacturers of the boxes became project partners during the
technology development and design phase. While the partnership between the
IntNGO and IDE(I) was formalized through an agreement, other partnerships were
not. The partnership with the IntNGO ultimately failed. The case suggests a number
of issues about the partnership process: 1. inclusion of a partner for formal, legal,
or stylistic reason alone may not lead to a productive partnership; 2. the existence
of prior personal rapport between key individuals seems to lead to effective
partnerships; 3. partners need to evolve mutual roles and responsibilities while
remaining sensitive to mutual concerns rather than formalize such roles in a
memorandum of understanding (MoU) or other written agreement.
People’s Technology Initiatives (PTI): embedding technology in
community-based production systems
This case discusses an alternative paradigm of science and technology (S&T) and
rural development promoted by PTI. The approach emerges out of the broader
People’s Science Movement in India, itself a backlash against what was viewed as
the weak governance of science and its failure to meet the needs of the poor and
to enhance their productive capacities. The elements of the PTI philosophy reflect
these contextual origins with an approach that seeks to build technology systems
around local knowledge, resources, and economies – rather than visa versa as is
the case with conventional models of technology development. This is explained
in the case by giving examples of the application of the approach to developing
rural agro-processes based co-operative enterprises. Networking and building
partnership has been a very important component in the PTI – both in terms of
individual initiatives as well as in terms of promoting and supporting the approach.
Notable also is the capacity development focus of the PTI. This is capacity
development not only in terms of enhancing the skills and technologies of poor
people, but also capacity development in the sense of linking the poor to sources
8of S&T and thus enhancing the capacity of the local technology system. The
evolutionary characteristics of this capacity development are typical of such a
learning-based approach. This case perhaps presents a rather radical alternative
to mainstream S&T and rural development initiatives; however it contains
principles of partnership and learning that others could adopt. The other notable
feature of the PTI is that out of the three cases discussed at the workshop, this
was the only one was designed specifically to focus on the poor.
Innovation system analysis
The three case studies presented here give considerable detail about the nature
of the innovation process with which they each deal. Before discussing them its
useful to point out that all of them have been successful in the conventional
terms of technologies adopted, production and incomes increased (details can be
found in the papers). More importantly, however, the projects have been successful
in terms of the innovation capabilities that they have created. Innovations in the
innovation process have strengthened the innovation systems involved. Put in
another way, each intervention represents incremental improvements in the
software of innovation in their own particular sphere of influence.
Rather than attempting to summarize the lesson from each case the following
synthesizes the general principles that emerge from across the three cases. The
five innovation themes of context, partnership, institutional rigidities, learning
and poverty focus are used to organize this synthesis (a summary of which is
presented in Table 1).
Context
All three cases quite clearly demonstrate the way interventions, programs and
projects are shaped by geographical, institutional, and historical contexts. The
technology development strategy of KHDP was shaped by the fact that the
institutional context of its main partner, the KAU, made it virtually impossible to
conduct farmer-relevant research in collaboration with a formal research body.
Learning from this KHDP developed its own arrangements to conduct farmer-
participatory technology development.
All of the cases illustrate the way in which novel approaches to innovation
were developed based on the philosophy or culture of different organization. For
example, IDE(I) pursues a marketing-based approach that depends on establishing
retail systems that deliver technology to the poor. Many of their staff have a
marketing background and the approach had been developed successfully in the
small-scale irrigation sector. This context was enormously influential in the way
IDE approached its post-harvest project – as with the small-scale irrigation sector
it approached post-harvest with the aim of improving input supply systems.
The PTI is shaped by an entirely different philosophical context. It is an
approach that emerged from a leftist critique of development and relies on
developing technology systems around co-operatively managed agro-processing
enterprises. An important feature of PTI is the way that it recognizes that these
systems have to be tailor-made to local circumstances, using a system design
group to achieve this.
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Partnership
Institutional
rigidities
Learning
Poverty
relevance
Table 1. Summary of the key feature of the three cases of innovation in
innovation
KHDP IDE(I) PTI
• KHDP was purposely
established outside
the administrative
structure of the State
government. This
allowed it to operate
in a context where
flexibility and
experimentation were
possible
• The focus of KHDP on
horticulture reflected
specific livelihood
constrains in the
socio-economic and
agro- climatic context
of Kerala
• The partnership with
the agricultural
university was
thought to be the
most important in
term of technology
development. This
proved to be
unworkable
• Partnerships with
farmers groups were
important not just for
technology
development but also
for a range of other
activities
• Research conventions
in the university
system
• Coped by developing
its own arrangements
for participatory
technology
development
• Intuitive as part of
management
philosophy
• Preventative
Targeted small-scale
farmers with the
rationale of preventing
them falling into
poverty
• No systematic
assessment
• The approach developed
from IDE(I)s experience of
establishing technology
supply systems for
irrigation equipment
• The geographic focus of the
project and selection of
local NGO partners built on
existing activities and
relationships of IDE(I)
• A formal partnership,
required to access funding,
failed due to unequal roles
in decision-making and
accessing resources
• Informal partnerships built
on joint history and trust
and shared objectives
succeeded
• Efforts were made to
nurture these successful
relationships as these
partners formed the supply
chain being developed
• Partner identification was a
key skill
• Some public-sector
research organizations not
willing to work with an
NGO
• Coped by by-passing
unhelpful organizations
• Intuitive as part of
organizational culture of
sharing results and ideas
• Inclusive and enabling
Targeted a commodity that
was imported to the poor,
but which was also
important to the non-poor
• Helped the poor and non-
poor cope with
environmental policy
changes
• No systematic assessment
• The approach was
shaped by dissatisfaction
with conventional R&D
and economic
development models and
the emergence of science
and technology
voluntary organizations
as an alternative
• Specific rural production
context shapes
technology system design
for each intervention
• Involves partnerships
with rural households,
scientists and scientific
organizations, govern-
ment agencies and
donors.
• The approach is built on
the development of
strong rural networks of
partners.
• Partnership also
important in promoting
the PTI approach in
mainstream research
and rural development
domains
• Difficulties encountered
with donors and their
fixed ideas about how
projects should be
organized and monitored
• Coped by seeking
financial independence
• Intuitive through a
tradition of debate and
self-analysis
• Focused
Targeted landless
households through
non-farm rural
employment, the
rationale being that only
the non-poor benefit
from land-based
activities
• Assessment only through
donor monitoring
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KHDP also has its own organizational context. It was originally going to be a
program with the State government of Kerala. However, a senior bureaucrat had
the foresight to advocate for its establishment as an autonomous agency. This
gave KHDP the freedom to do many things that would simply not have been possible
as part of a large public-sector bureaucracy, such as failing and learning.
All of these approaches have thus been quite different for the very good reason
that they emerged from different contexts. The fact that they approached post-
harvest innovation in different ways does not make any of them better or worse.
Instead it highlights the fact that the approaches adopted were the right ones for
the circumstance being addressed and that they built on existing strengths,
organization cultures and lessons learned along the way. A general principle for
designing innovation interventions therefore seems to be the need to recognize
the importance of organizational histories and cultures and building upon these
(or finding ways of coping with them) rather than pretending that they do not
exist or matter. This would also seem to support the general observation that
externally developed blueprints rarely work.
Partnerships
All the case studies illustrate the importance of partnership of various types in
the innovation process. All three cases used partnership for technology
development including partners from scientific organizations as well technology
users and farmers as partners. KHDP and IDE(I) used partners to assist with
technology and information dissemination. In the case of KHDP this involved farmer
groups and master farmers to spread information on production and post-harvest
technology as well as market information. IDE(I) used partnerships with both a
local NGOs and with local entrepreneurs to establish its technology supply system.
PTI used partnership with rural communities as a way of designing locally
relevant technology systems as well as a way of developing the capacity of these
systems, i.e., by identifying local artisans with specific skill and linking them into
the system. Both the IDE(I) and the PTI allude to a partnership with sponsors of
their program that is both important and needs to be managed. A final type of
partnership that the PTI discusses is networks to spread advocacy for an new
approach. The network of science and technology voluntary organizations have
been a powerful way of raising the profile of PTI in mainstream debates and
interventions
Both the KHDP and the IDE(I) cases included formal contractual relationships
with partners. Both of these partnerships did not last the duration of the project.
In the case of KHDP the institutional context of the partner, the State agricultural
university, made it impossible for it to deliver its contribution to the partnership.
IDE(I) case was slightly different in that it was a partnership that was to some
extent forced on them by conventions of the donor at that time. The weakness of
this partnership was compounded by an earlier history between the two partners
that was characterized by skewed power dynamics, a lack of trust between them,
and a good deal of resentment. Again, the contribution of IDE(I)’s partner, IntNGO,
was less than expected and the partnership dissolved.
Conversely both the IDE(I) and the PTI case illustrate the way successful
partnerships emerge from longstanding relations where trust has been established
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and where interests, philosophies, and organizational cultures overlap. Both
organizations, having recognized the importance of partners, have developed skills
and devote efforts to identifying partners and strengthening relationship with
them. A related observation is that KHDP, IDE(I), and PTI seem to play a nodal role
facilitating and coordinating the relationships required to promote innovation
through the cluster of organizations with whom they partner.
A number points flow from this. As already discussed partnerships and the
relationship they involve often emerge from institutional and historical context
and this can define the nature and effectiveness of them. This context needs to be
revealed and managed if innovation systems are to be strengthened. A related
point is that partnerships don’t emerge overnight. Time and resources need be to
spent identifying new partners and exploring and mapping relationships and
linkages that need to be strengthened and nurtured. It is important that those
seeking to promote innovation recognize their role as systems coordinators and
mangers, helping to make the right connections between the right partners.
Institutional rigidities
All three of the cases discuss the institutional rigidities encountered in dealing
with public- sector research organizations. The PTI case explains the way its has
coped with this by identifying scientist working in the formal research system
who sympathize with the PTI and who might, for example, be members of science
and technology voluntary organizations themselves. This approach has been
described as ‘science organizations without walls’. One could speculate that in
the long term, if enough of these types of scientist are identified and involved in
the PTI and allied approaches, it may start to alter the organizational culture of
the formal research system. But there is clearly a long way to go.
The KHDP and the IDE(I) illustrate a more worrying phenomenon whereby the
institutional context of public-research organizations is so rigid and unhelpful
that they simply get by-passed and alternative arrangements are made. The KHDP
case is probably the most dramatic illustration of this. Not only does it document
the institutional obstacles to conducting farmer-relevant research, it also reveals
that even though scientist working in the university realized the weaknesses in
the set-up, there was no way that changes could be implemented, or even
discussed. In other words the system had no capacity to learn and evolve. This is
a major restriction to developing stronger links between scientific organizations
and others involved in innovation systems.
What is all too clear from this is that institutional learning and change will be
required in the Indian agricultural innovation systems and particularly the
institutional arrangements that govern the way science is conducted in public-
research organizations (Hall et al. (2003) discuss the nature of institutional change
required in detail, see pages 123–146, this publication). A useful starting point
might be to legitimize the discussion of failures in research organizations, and
develop skills of scientists in the areas of reflection and learning.
Learning
A key feature of all the cases discussed is that the organizations involved have
approached them in an experimental fashion. That is to say that none of the
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organizations approached innovation with a set plan, but instead had principles
and guidelines that were tested and developed by trial and error. In other words
each organization accepted that failure was a learning opportunity that helped
develop more effective strategies. In the case of IDE(I), its approach had developed
over nearly a decade of experience in the small-scale irrigation sector. The case
discussed is about a project to experimentally apply this approach a new sector –
post-harvest.
All of the cases allude to the fact that learning was an important aspect of
their strategy and that their approaches are evolutionary and dynamic. What is
much less clear, however, is the precise nature of the learning process. One gets
the impression, perhaps unfairly, that learning is an intuitive ad-hoc process
that takes place because the organization’s culture encourages or legitimizes this
process. None of the cases illustrate a purposeful mechanism by which learning
takes place in a systematic fashion.
One can draw a number of conclusions from this apparent paradox. Firstly,
learning processes are chiefly intuitive and tacit and that given a suitable
organizational culture lessons from past and on-going experience can help
organizations adapt and enhance performance. The second conclusion is that
there is scope to enhance learning and make it a more systematic activity. Those
seeking to promote innovation could usefully devote resources to building learning
capacities in project staff, including scientists, as well as ensuring that the
organizational culture is conducive to the constructive discussion of both
successful activities as well as those conventionally viewed as failures.
Poverty relevance
Of all the three cases only the PTI indicated that it was explicitly designed to
support the livelihoods of the poor. The KHDP case had a less-focused agenda,
seeking to improve the livelihoods of small-scale horticultural producers, the
rationale being that this would prevent them falling into poverty. This does not
fall into the poverty relevance categories discussed earlier, but perhaps it
represents a new category – preventative. The IDE(I) approach did make specific
efforts to target its intervention on households with limited land-holdings. It did
this by using a needs assessment study to identify the crop which was most
important to the livelihoods of small scale producers. The intervention thus became
inclusive of the poor, as non-poor households also produced this crop.
In the PTI case, the philosophy of the organization determined that the
intervention would focus on landless households only, and that it would therefore
concentrate on creating rural non-farm employment. The rationale was that all
land-based interventions benefit the non-poor to a greater extent than they benefit
the poor. The other aspect of this intervention is that PTI sought to increase the
ability of the poor (as a collective group) to compete with organized entrepreneurs
in the market. PTI highlights this as being important as it says this prevents the
usual patterns of events whereby agro-process interventions cause competition
between different groups of poor people.
All three cases made assumptions about what the poverty relevance/livelihood
outcome would be at the beginning of their interventions, but, certainly in the
KHDP and IDE(I), these assumptions were not revisited periodically during the
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intervention. One might perhaps find this surprising given the emphasis now
placed by sponsoring agencies on poverty relevance. One conclusion here is that
innovations systems could be strengthened if more attention were given to
monitoring assumptions along the way. This is not an issue of undertaking
conventional impact assessment, but rather being aware that some processes
and decisions during projects are going to affect outcomes on different stakeholder
groups and that this needs to be monitored. Similarly critical assumptions need
to be challenged as events unfold during a project.
The PTI case suggests that targeting non-farm rural employment maybe a
better way of focusing specifically on the poor. This is certainly laudable as it
breaks out of the often rhetorical discussion of the poor as farmers, and the
accompanying conventions this imposes on agricultural research as a means to
increasing productivity and safeguarding household food stocks. Developing rural
agro-processing enterprises and the innovation systems to support them has
therefore many attractions in terms of using science creatively to support the
poor. The same caveat, however, remains. Namely that the assumptions about
poverty relevance need to be monitored and that this needs to part of the capability
of the innovation system put in place.
Emerging issues
Flowing from the discussion are a number of points that warrant emphasis and
which need to be drawn to the attention of practitioners, research mangers, and
policy-makers.
The first point is that emphasis seems to need to shift from supporting research
that delivers a stream of technology products, but instead also concentrates on
developing the capacity of innovation systems. Research products are still
important. But in rapidly evolving circumstances supporting the continuous
development of the innovation systems seems to be an equally important part of
this task. This suggests an innovation coordination manger role for nodal agencies.
It also suggests that program and other interventions need to be evaluated in
different ways that also appreciate this capacity-development function.
The second point relates to the importance of allowing locally relevant
approaches and arrangements to develop and evolve. While recognizing the
administrative attractions of devising widely replicable intervention models,
innovation systems and their development have to be context-specific.
 The third point is about the need for tools and strategies to understand
institutional contexts and histories and to map and monitor relationship. All the
cases pointed to the fact that it is these issues which provide the foundation of
strong innovation systems and that unless these contexts are revealed and
managed, failure is likely to occur. Tools are available, but are probably not yet
made sufficient use of, particularly by R&D managers, for example, stakeholder
analysis (Grimble and Wellard 1997) and the actor-linkage matrices (Biggs and
Matsaert 1999; 2003). The action research tradition is also useful in this regard.
The fourth point concerns the need for institutional learning and change in
agricultural innovation systems and particularly the institutional arrangements
that govern the way science is conducted in public research organizations. The
side-stepping or by-passing of public research organizations should be seen as a
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warning sign that unless somebody grasps the nettle of institutional change vast
science and technology resources that a country such as India possess will be
become irrelevant.
Conclusion
The cases presented at the workshop amply illustrate that in India, scientists
and rural development practitioners are being enormously creative in the way
they approach innovation. A diversity of approaches exists and it is hoped that
this publication will bring these experiences to the attention of a wide audience.
The cases highlight the fact that partnership and learning are at the heart of the
innovation process. However these experiences raise two cautionary points. Firstly,
much greater attention needs to be given to understanding the institutional and
historical context of partnerships than was perhaps previously thought necessary
in research planning and management. Part of this task concerns monitoring
stakeholder interests during project implementation and particularly testing
assumptions about the poverty relevance of certain courses of action and the
implications of decisions. Secondly, institutional change in the agricultural
sciences is long overdue and is emerging as a serious impediment to the agricultural
innovation system.
Endnote
This paper is the output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom Department
for International Development (DFID). The views expressed are not necessarily those of
DFID [R7502: Crop Post-Harvest Programme].
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Abstract
The Kerala Horticultural Development Programme (KHDP) is a project supported by the
Commission of European Communities and the Government of Kerala. This pilot project
started field implementation in November 1993 with the aim of developing replicable
models. The major objective was to improve the overall situation of vegetable and fruit
farmers of Kerala by increasing and stabilizing their income through reducing the cost
of production and improving the marketing system. The KHDP interventions included
research and development (R&D), provision of planting materials, extension service
and demonstration plots, training, credit packages, marketing support, and a processing
unit. KHDP organized self-help groups (SHGs) of farmers. A critical partnership in the
project was a contract research arrangement with the Kerala Agricultural University
(KAU). While this arrangement faced many challenges and ultimately failed, the case
provides a useful illustration of the way learning and experimentation with approaches
can underpin project success. This was a general philosophy of KHDP management
and was implemented across the program’s activities.
Introduction
This case study explores issues associated with technology development in a state-
wide program for horticulture promotion – the Kerala Horticultural Development
Programme (KHDP). The significance of the case is that it demonstrates that the
success of partnerships in technology development is determined to a very large
degree by the wider institutional environment in which these initiatives take place.
Furthermore, it makes the case that learning by doing or a trial and error approach
to establishing arrangements is the key to success. Another element of this story
is that the technology development components of the initiative needed to be woven
into a broad-based set of activities that included organizational development at
the village level, and the creation of new marketing and credit arrangements.
Once again a learning-based approach was important in the establishment of
these arrangements. We believe that these experiences hold many lessons for the
post-harvest research sector in particular, and for agricultural research and
extension efforts in general. The KHDP case was neither research alone, nor was
it only technology transfer. Similarly, it was more than simply community
mobilization. On the contrary, it was an initiative that transcended these
institutional distinctions and organizational mandates and, we believe, this was
the reason for its evident success.
1. National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy Research (NCAP), PO Box 11305, Library
Avenue, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012, India
2 . Attapadi Hill Area Development Society (AHADS), Agali PO, Palakkad 678 581, Kerala, India
20
The paper begins by providing the background to KHDP and the range of
partnerships that were involved. The main part of the paper provides a detailed
account of the history and evolution of KHDP’s experience of entering into a
partnership with Kerala Agricultural University (KAU). This partnership was of a
contract research type. The case is important for two reasons. Firstly, it reveals
some of the realities of establishing partnerships between research and non-
research organizations in the area of production and post-harvest technology. In
particular, it highlights implications of existing institutional arrangements in R&D
at a State agricultural university. The following sections analyze these experiences
in terms of the five areas of interest of the workshop: 1. context; 2. partnerships;
3. institutional rigidities; 4. learning; and 5. poverty reduction. The conclusion
draws out some of the general principles and lessons from this case.
Background to KHDP
Kerala is an agricultural state with 74% of its land under cultivation. Smallholder
and marginal farmers dominate the production sector, where 92.56% of holdings
are marginal (<1 ha) and 5.19% are small (1–2 ha). Average yields of vegetables
and fruits are low. Local production of vegetables and fruits meet only 15–25% of
the total volume being handled by the market, the rest come from out of state.
Demand for vegetables exists all year round but 60–70% of the local production
takes place in a span of 4–6 months.
The KHDP is a project supported by the Commission of European Communities
and the Government of Kerala. This pilot program started field implementation in
November 1993. It aimed to develop replicable models. The major objective was to
improve the overall situation of vegetable and fruit farmers of Kerala through
increasing and stabilizing their income by reducing the cost of production and
improving the marketing system. The KHDP interventions included R&D, provision
of planting materials, extension service and demonstration plots, training, credit
packages, marketing support and a processing unit. KHDP organized self-help
groups (SHGs) of farmers. Each SHG included 15–20 vegetable and fruit growers.
All activities of the project converge at the SHG level. By the end of 1998, the
KHDP had about 1630 SHGs, with a total membership of 34,381 farmers.
In setting up the project it was clear that many forms of partnership would be
necessary to ensure its long-term sustainability. And so it has proved. There are
partnerships with farmers (seed growers) to multiply good quality breeder seed
materials. Another type of partnership is that formed with financial institutions,
for example, KHDP has made arrangements with banks to provide credit to lease-
land farmers by developing an appropriate credit plan. Partnership with farmers
was established through SHG formation. From each SHG, three master farmers
were selected and trained to facilitate three different activities, i.e., production,
credit, and marketing. To ensure farmers have a dependable source of income
through processing produce, KHDP established a modern fruit-processing factory
with farmers as shareholders. Today the produce from the factory is traded in
both domestic and international markets. Other important partners are the traders
dealing in agricultural produce. As most of the fruit and vegetables are produced
and marketed by small-scale producers without any grading or processing, the
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traders were deciding the prices unilaterally and there was much exploitation in
weighing and price-fixing. But through the establishment of farmers’ markets,
this exploitation has been considerably reduced.
However, it is the partnership with KAU with its headquarters at Trichur that
provides the main focus of this paper. The discussion concentrates on this
partnership as it illustrates in extensive detail the challenges faced by
organizations who wish to access the considerable science and technology
resources of the Indian public sector. KHDP needed research services if it was to
assist farmers, but as we shall see this required a flexible approach on the part of
KHDP in efforts to negotiate and design R&D arrangements that contributed
effectively to this task.
History and evolution of contract research between
KHDP and KAU
In view of the high costs of vegetable cultivation in Kerala, farmers required a
package of agricultural practices that would reduce costs and lead to high yields
and longer shelf-life. KHDP did not wish to spend its resources on establishing a
separate research infrastructure that would duplicate the activity of KAU, and so
KAU was contracted to implement an adaptive R&D project to make improved
practices available to KHDP for wider promotion among the farmers.
Institutional context
KAU has 8 colleges and 28 research stations spread throughout the State and
approximately 670 scientists work in these units. The university receives financial
assistance mainly from the State government (about 73% in 1997/8). The Indian
Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR) and other agencies contribute around
12% of KAU’s budget. The co-ordination, direction, and administration of research
activities in KAU are vested with the Director of Research. KAU has a Faculty
Research Committee (FRC) which scrutinizes research proposals received from
different coordinators and reviews the progress of research periodically. In addition
to this, there are project co-ordination groups that are authorized to critically
examine research proposals received from Project Leaders/Principal Investigators
and to review their progress.
Signing of contract
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between KHDP and KAU in
March 1993 through which KAU agreed to undertake for KHDP R&D on production
of vegetable breeder seed, supply of improved fruit planting materials, and provision
of facilities for training extension officers. The MoU was to be valid for 6 years. The
total budget approved was Rs.20,688,000 (approximately US$ 0.7 million at
1993/4 conversion rate) from 1994–99.
The important features of this agreement were:
• The principle of ‘payment linked to results’ would be followed for each line of
research activity
• The main emphasis would be on on-farm research at identified sites in pilot
project areas to demonstrate R&D results and activities to farmers effectively
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• The project would have a Research and Development Management Committee
with equal number of representatives from KHDP and KAU, and the Vice-
Chancellor of KAU as its Chairman.
Initial phase of ‘accommodation’
KAU identified scientists who were to be associated with the project and efforts to
prepare a detailed research program were initiated. The Year 1 work plan (October
1993–March 1995) was approved in October 1993. A full-time Project General
Coordinator was appointed by KAU in January 1994 and KAU took several steps
to arrange for redeployment of its scientists and to provide infrastructural support
(buildings, vehicles, etc.) immediately.
The R&D unit started functioning in KAU by March 1994 and by June KAU
scientists presented detailed research plans for KHDP’s approval. Even though
KHDP had requested KAU to provide details of planned field experiments, KAU did
not provide these plans until they were approved by the FRC in October 1994.
KAU experiments were mostly concentrated at its two large campuses, Trichur
and Trivandrum (about 300 km apart). The General Coordinator, who was vested
with authority to take decisions, was functioning from the Trichur campus. At
the request of KHDP, KAU identified one scientist at each campus and instructed
them to take decisions in the absence of the General Coordinator. KAU also
constituted a diagnostic team for each of the two pilot districts of KHDP.
The Programme Director of KHDP made a critical review of R&D activities in
August 1994 expressing his doubts about the utility of some of the on-going
experiments and his fear that results might not emerge before the close of the
Project. He passed on his comments to his Horticultural Unit. But they were not
communicated to KAU for comments or necessary action. The Programme Director
and his Horticultural Unit had different perceptions of the progress of research
done by KAU. For instance, in the first R&D Management Committee meeting
held in November 1994, his colleagues from KHDP appreciated the progress of
work. These differences in perception on research performance became clear in
subsequent instances, especially when payments were to be released to KAU in
March 1995 and January 1996. However, concerns about the need for the R&D
project to become more farmer-oriented (with emphasis on field problems) and
about the need to initiate measures that could reduce delays, were highlighted by
KHDP.
Monitoring problems
Towards the end of Year 1, quarterly progress reports were coming late, and KHDP
realized that it was impossible to monitor the progress of R&D based on qualitative
reports from KHDP. A format was devised by KHDP so that each experiment was
divided into activities such that the number of activities completed in each quarter
might be reported. The problems did not end there. According to the agreement,
the payment had to be linked to results emanating from the Project. This was not
possible through activity reports. The only way to do it was by examining the
findings/results of the experiments funded by KHDP. But this was not forthcoming
after the completion of Year 1 because: firstly, there was undue delay in statistically
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analyzing data collected from experiments to arrive at meaningful conclusions;
and secondly, the General Coordinator of the R&D project did not have powers to
pass on findings directly to KHDP. According to the practice and norms of KAU, all
research findings were reported only once a year through the Director of Research.
Under these circumstances, the only way to link payment with results was by
making available interim trend reports of experiments. This would also help KHDP
to use findings to modify the package of practices – thereby assisting farmers.
During the second R&D Management Committee meeting held in July 1995, KAU
agreed to provide KHDP with informal and provisional recommendations from
experiments conducted under the KHDP framework (though this was not practiced)
and also agreed to expedite the official approval of the projects included under
the second work plan. On transfer of findings/results to KHDP for early
dissemination to farmers, KAU was not, however, willing to speed up the process
before completion of farm trials considering the involvement of risk (releasing
unscientifically validated information). According to KAU, the only way forward
was to have more informal meetings between KAU scientists and KHDP officials to
understand and share the ad-hoc findings.
It is interesting to reflect here on two points. Firstly that scientists involved
could clearly see the paradoxical situation whereby they were contracted to conduct
research for an external body but were prevented from reporting the results in a
timely fashion by the norms of their own organization. Though informal reporting
of results resolved this impasse, the research management of KAU was not willing
to review the clause that was hindering the progress of a contracted research
project. Equally, there was a genuine perception of risk among scientists about
reporting results in an informal way thus transgressing the norms of the scientific
organization in which they worked.
The middle phase of ‘criticism’
By Year 2, KHDP realized that even after considerable amounts of research had
been conducted, definite results were not forthcoming and KHDP were finding it
increasingly difficult to provide technological solutions to farmers. Even ad-hoc
results were not provided although KAU has agreed to do this earlier. KHDP was
also unhappy about lack of progress on many other activities which it had funded
(for example: results from catalogue fields laid out by KAU with farmers’ varieties
made available by them to KAU; establishment of pest and disease monitoring
stations; and development of pesticide residue detection kits). As a result KHDP
decided to make a substantial cut in the budget for Year 2. This was objected to by
KAU who wanted reimbursement for expenditure incurred during the first 7 months
of the project, irrespective of the comments made by the Mid-Term Review Mission
(MTRM) in October 1995.
MTRM the ‘turning point’
The MTRM made several remarks about the functioning of the project, which
were selectively projected by both parties to argue their points of view. The following
observations made by MTRM were highlighted by KHDP to show the non-utility of
funding many of the on-going experiments of KAU:
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• Some of the experiments conducted by KAU under the KHDP contract R&D
were not in line with the objectives of KAU, or with the objectives of KHDP, and
hence may not lead to the outputs envisaged in the work plan
• Results of the experiments should be made available to farmers immediately
• There is a need for more on-farm research
KAU was clearly not willing to read between the lines and appreciate the full
meaning of these comments. They quoted the following observation of MTRM to
prove their point. “Many of the experiments conducted by KAU would prove valuable
to the development of horticulture in the State, especially those related to fertilizer
application and integrated pest and disease management.” Moreover, they argued
that all the experiments had been approved by KHDP initially and in the FRC of
KAU, and also by the R&D Management Committee.
KHDP then made a serious review of ongoing experiments and found that
most of them were not going to be completed in the foreseeable future, some would
not lead to useful technical advice, and some were either redundant or not need-
based. KHDP wanted KAU to re-orient its research and emphasized that those
experiments, that did not satisfy KHDP objectives should be abandoned or
concluded immediately. KAU agreed to the early conclusion of experiments, which
were not in tune with KHDP objectives, but insisted on reimbursement of
expenditure incurred in Year 2. (Some experiments were discontinued by KAU by
the end of Year 2). Though the Programme Director was not willing to continue
this type of funding, his own Horticultural Unit expressed satisfaction at the
progress of the R&D project and recommended release of funds to KAU immediately,
keeping in view the preparation for the Year 3 work plan. The report of the auditors
on KAU’s booking of certain expenditure that was not related to meeting project
objectives also caused some mistrust between the two parties.
An important point here is the divergent options of what constitutes good
science. Quite clearly KAU and KHDP had different perspectives. The former took
a long-term perspective bounded by notions of the generic value of scientific
knowledge and the norms that validate this. KHDP on the other had had quite
different perspectives and was much more interested in short-term goals,
specifically the utility of research findings in the context of farmers’ production
and post-harvest systems.
Review, reorientation and the introduction of participatory
technology development approaches
Before the end of Year 2 (February 1996), the Programme Director expressed his
strong reservations on the progress of R&D funded by KHDP. He observed that the
routine procedures of the university are time-consuming, that they affect the
ability of scientists in responding quickly to field-level concerns, and that they
adversely affect starting experiments and releasing results. He gave several
suggestions for a revised approach to R&D in the years to come so as to address
the issues that arose and to improve the effectiveness of R&D funded by KHDP.
These included revised research questions, field research orientation to address
farmers’ real concerns, i.e., more on-farm trials and a participatory technology
development (PTD) approach, and a new approach to research wherein the
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technical staff of KHDP and KAU scientists would work as a team in the field, with
each performing some common and some specific responsibilities.
This is possibly a crucial point of learning. Namely that having realized that
the conventional research approach of KAU and the norms that govern it were
not delivering, KHDP looked for a different research approach. Indeed they chose
an approach that engaged directly with the problems of farmers and involved
them in technology development and testing. Needless to say this did not require
the approval of research committees to validate results, or at least it made such
arrangements meaningless.
To facilitate this approach, KHDP suggested the idea of deputing KAU scientists
to KHDP and KHDP paying rent/service charges to KAU for such infrastructure
facilities as field and laboratory facilities etc. KHDP made it clear to KAU in March
1996 that no advance payment would be made from then onwards, and that
payment would be linked to results received at the farm level. KHDP also made
efforts to educate the KAU R&D team on the PTD approach. The scientists expressed
their willingness to re-orient on-going research efforts to match this approach,
but pointed out some operational constraints such as travel support, to which
KHDP agreed.
By this time, the relationship between KHDP and KAU top management had
deteriorated considerably. KAU, in March 1996, objected to all the above
suggestions made by KHDP to improve the interface and decided not to provide
even ad hoc recommendations based on R&D until conclusive results were
obtained. This meant effectively returning to the items in the MoU signed with
KHDP in 1993. Based on the MTRM’s comments and its decision to endorse a PTD
philosophy, KHDP in April 1996, terminated 60 experiments out of the 84 proposed
(including on-going experiments) with immediate effect and asked for details of
the remaining experiments before committing further funding. KAU did not provide
these details to KHDP in the next 9 months, arguing non-receipt of that particular
letter. KHDP also made it clear to KAU that from Year 3, KHDP would provide
greater emphasis to PTD and funds earmarked for on-station experiments would
be negligible.
Even though five KAU scientists participated in a PTD training project and
the scientists were willing to experiment with the PTD approach, KAU officially
communicated to KHDP that on the PTD approach, KAU was yet to take a firm
decision. Issues related to re-imbursement of expenditure already incurred by
KAU were settled by mid-1997 through negotiations. The number of experiments
was reduced to 17 in 1996/7. It was also decided to review each experiment
individually to arrive at a decision. The number of scientists in the R&D unit was
brought down to 6 from 14. The R&D unit continued functioning until 1998/9 on
a limited scale.
Outcomes, learning, and impacts on the research
approach adopted by KHDP and KAU
According to KHDP, the contract research with KAU did not contribute much
towards generation of suitable technological recommendations in line with the
objectives of KHDP even after extensive on-station research conducted between
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April 1994 and September 1999. The second MTRM (2000) of this project noted
that the completion of 48 experiments resulted in 24 promising research findings,
of which 15 were considered ready for field adoption. The MTRM further noted
that the KAU research in the initial years was mainly focused on increasing
productivity (or reducing costs) and not sufficiently focused on the marketability
of fruits and vegetables, including consumers’ preferences (tastes and color) and
perishability, as a factor in research.
The procedural delays in initiating experiments and releasing research results
had also affected the outcome of the project. But KHDP valued the cooperation
and expertise of the KAU scientists and was still interested in getting their support
albeit definitely in a different mode of contract. The KAU scientists who were
involved in the project felt that many of these delays could have been avoided if
KAU had shown greater flexibility rather than sticking rigidly to existing procedures,
that were not in tune with the demands of a contract research framework. But
they also felt that a lot of good work was done in the R&D project with KHDP.
Though serious differences existed between the management of both organizations,
the relationship between KAU scientists, KHDP field officers, and farmers was
very cordial.
KHDP valued the professional skills of KAU scientists in terms of diagnosing
field problems and as resource persons and facilitators for its PTD and farmer-
training programs. For KAU scientists, this provided greater opportunities for wider
interaction with horticultural growers, helped them to learn more about actual
field problems in various locations, and to obtain direct feedback on the
performance of their technologies.
KHDP and KAU have now realized the limitations of the earlier contract
arrangement and are in the process of identifying and institutionalizing better
contractual arrangements. The mode under consideration is the competitive grant
framework followed by ICAR. The future areas of cooperation identified include:
supply of foundation seeds, screening local germplasm collections, support in
PTD experiments, training and extension, and long-term on-station experiments.
The emphasis on PTD since 1996 subsequently gained momentum. This led to
enhanced capacity building of staff working with participatory approaches, the
establishment of a core PTD team within KHDP, and the promotion of active
participatory research with SHGs, also to addressing problems related to pest
and disease management and (low-cost) production inputs.
Wider activities undertaken by KHDP
KHDP’s interventions were not restricted to the development and transfer of
production and post-harvest technology. KHDP facilitated horticultural farmers
to access all other support services including access to:
• Good-quality planting materials (promoting seed producers and establishment
of a seed producing plant)
• An efficient office-less extension service (through its own recruitment of young
graduates and post-graduates in agriculture and allied fields working with
SHGs, who in turn facilitate the development of master farmers trained in
production, credit, and aspects of marketing)
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• An innovative credit package that allows even lease-land farmers to access
credit from commercial banks
• A unique credit-linked crop insurance package that also covers losses due to
pests and diseases
• Market information on price and volume of fruit and vegetable traded in
important markets in Kerala and nearby states through establishment of a
market intelligence network
• Unexploitive markets offering transparent transactions, higher prices and
proper weighing (by the development of group marketing through field centers
that bulk the produce of member growers belonging to 10–15 SHGs).
To ensure a dependable source of income to farmers, KHDP also established a
modern agro-processing plant with farmers as majority shareholders. It finally
ensured its future by registering in 2001 as a company, the Vegetable and Fruit
Promotion Council, Kerala to provide continued support to farmers. Farmer SHGs
hold 50% of the shares in this company. The remaining shares are held by the
State government and agencies such as banks.
Lessons from the case study
KHDP acted as a link in identifying and passing on the problems of horticultural
farmers to a research organization (KAU) and in facilitating farmer experimentation
and PTD. They also had qualified manpower who could effectively communicate
the problems in the field and the inappropriateness of some of the recommended
practices to KAU scientists. However, bearing in mind the investments made in
terms of time, expenses, and human resources, the outcome was less than
satisfactory. KHDP and KAU entered into contract research without fully
understanding the institutional dimensions of the R&D process. Both parties were
very ambitious and optimistic and this could be seen from the funds committed
and the number of projects sanctioned at the beginning of the project. Institutional
evaluation on the capability of the system to deliver technology was not made
although, as this case amply illustrates, it is equally or more important than the
technical expertise of scientists. Although the project emphasized payment linked
to results, the mechanism to monitor results (in terms of objectively verifiable
indicators) was never put into place, and a mechanism to monitor activities was
put in place only much later.
The deliverability of proposed experiments could have been understood much
earlier if enough attention had been provided when the projects were proposed.
The institutional culture prevailing in KAU continues to be bureaucratic and this
is not conducive to the flourishing of contractual research arrangements. KAU
did not try to review or change its procedures with respect to managing R&D even
when it realized the limitations of the old procedures in the new environment.
The principal investigators (e.g., the KAU scientists in charge of executing the
research under the KHDP contract) of projects have only limited authority
(administrative and financial) to take decisions on implementing research projects
and have to increasingly depend on the Head of the Division/Institute for routine
activities. KHDP was bearing all the costs of KAU personnel associated with the
project (scientific, technical, administrative, and support staff) in addition to the
28
costs of recurring and non-recurring items to be used in the project throughout
the project period. It was as good as working for KHDP, but the scientists were
under the administrative and technical control of KAU. KHDP found this
arrangement very constraining and put forward a proposal for the deputation of
KAU scientists to KHDP who would pay rent/service charges to KAU for facilities
used for KHDP work. KAU did not agree, indicating the confusion this arrangement
would create. In the light of the rigidity in the functioning of KAU, this approach
could at least have been given a try.
Lack of a learning culture in KAU prevented it from experimenting, learning,
and reflecting on new approaches and opportunities to serve its clients, in this
case the smallholder and marginal farmers growing horticultural crops. This type
of finding mirrors the now widely acknowledged observation that hierarchical
institutional arrangements of centralized agricultural research are unable to deal
with the complex technology needs of farmers, particularly those of small-scale
farmers. In this case it happened even when a supportive intermediary organization
(KHDP) was helping the farmers to articulate their technological constraints.
Discussion
This case study was concerned with the recent evolution of an innovative regional
development initiative focused on small-scale farmers in Kerala. While we have
reflected more widely on its inception and subsequent relationships and activities,
the study concentrated on the attempt at a new type of partnership in the Indian
context, i.e., that between a research organization and a horticultural sector
development scheme. What then can we conclude in terms of the questions raised
by this workshop and its investigation of the innovation process on: 1. context; 2.
partnership; 3. institutional rigidities; 4. learning; and 5. poverty.
Context
The KHDP was established with the aim of increasing and stabilizing the income
of fruit and vegetable farmers in Kerala, the majority of whom are smallholder
and marginal farmers. To meet this objective, this new organization (KHDP) was
created with staff who had expertise in agriculture, business management, credit,
marketing, program implementation, etc. Most of the staff for this project originally
deputed from different organizations. For instance the human resources for field
operations came from the Department of Agriculture (Government of Kerala), for
technical research support from KAU, and for monitoring and evaluation from
the European Union. Apart from the wide range of expertise with which it was
established, KHDP also developed its own norms, procedures, and guidelines for
its operation and was thus provided with plenty of flexibility to respond, learn,
and evolve to meet new challenges.
The other defining context of this case was that of KAU and the norms and
working conventions that were embodied in the organization. This context played
an important role in shaping how KHDP tackled research support to its farmers.
What is particularly notable is that a conventional contract research arrangement
was unworkable in this context, and that alternative arrangements had to be
developed that more effectively serviced the needs of farmers.
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Partnership
A guiding principle in designing KHDP’s approach was to establish partnership
with key stakeholders. For the purposes of this case study we have concentrated
on one of these partnerships, namely that with the KAU whose projects were
designed to produce high quality planting materials, screen varieties/lines for
specific characteristics, and provide problem-solving research. There were many
others, but, it is perhaps the link with KAU that showed the most evident problems
of institutional rigidity and change, and as a result it was not possible to arrive at
a satisfactory long-term contract research arrangement.
KHDP’s partnerships with other organizations have been relatively satisfactory,
though there has been lots of experimentation with different approaches, including
partnership with: farmers through SHGs, banks through innovative credit plans,
and traders through repeated negotiations on the value of co-operating with
farmers’ markets.
Institutional rigidities
The research partnership with KAU is the area where institutional rigidities are
most notable. Despite a promising start to the contract research arrangement, a
series of problems arose that related to the procedural norms of the university
and the way these obstructed the successful execution of the research contract.
This lesson was learned over a protracted and uneasy series of negotiations to try
and arrive at adequately farm-focused research and adaptive technology
development protocols. Through experimentation (and necessity) KHDP found that
much of the envisaged formal research role of the university could be replaced by
employing graduate-level agricultural officers who were willing and able to
undertake PTD with farmers. It was found, however, that some formal research
assistance is still required. This is now contracted out for very specific and well-
defined short-term tasks.
Learning
The KHDP experimented with different approaches and brought many lessons
into its planning and implementation strategies in subsequent years. The flexibility
of its organizational design, wider professional expertise, accountability to client
groups (SHGs), strong and effective monitoring and evaluation system, and
performance- based incentives, have each added to the ability of the organization
to respond to the evolving scenario. In its early years KHDP quickly found that it
needed to organize farmers into groups, both to help promote new technology and
PTD skills and to help farmers access credit and strengthen their negotiating
power through collective marketing. The subsequent development of SHGs with
master farmers arose out of a process of trial and error, to determine the size of
groups, how they would be managed, the types of activity in which they could
engage collectively, and procedures for resolving disputes.
Initially the State Department of Agriculture, Government of Kerala was not
willing to provide young staff on deputation to KHDP. But finally through several
rounds of discussion, the Government permitted KHDP to do its own recruitment.
Again, traders were not willing to collect produce from KHDP farmers’ markets
30
and a lot of persuasion and reasoning became necessary to convince them of the
benefits they would receive in cooperating with these markets. Finally, once they
were convinced of the benefits of procuring better quality produce in large quantities
from a single place, these traders started cooperating with the farmers’ markets.
Moreover, through traders’ workshops KHDP are presently trying to balance the
production and availability of fruit and vegetables based on estimates from traders.
In the beginning, KHDP envisaged the provision of credit to farmers through
cooperative credit societies. But, on realizing the difficulties of cooperative credit
societies with respect to fund mobilization (resulting from low recovery rates) KHDP
shifted to arranging credit from commercial banks. The banks were reluctant to
provide credit to landless farmers, but KHDP’s willingness to put equivalent money
on deposit with these banks, changed the situation. Unlike the usual end of most
externally funded programs, the KHDP re-invented its future by registering in
2001 under the Indian Companies Act, in order to provide continuing support to
growers.
Poverty reduction
It is perhaps too early to pronounce a verdict on the social impact of KHDP. Certainly
the emphasis on smallholder farmer agriculture indicates a basic objective of
increasing the incomes of small-scale farmers so that they do not fall into poverty.
But relevant survey work still needs to be carried out to assess the extent of the
projects’ success. It is probably fair to say that this project with its focus on small-
scale horticulture producers benefits both poor and non-poor households. It should
also be noted that in the context of Kerala the poorest communities are tribal
people and fisherfolk and that if poverty is the main focus then these communities
should be targeted. This program never claimed to be targeting the poor, instead
it recognized that small-scale horticultural producers are vulnerable to exploitation
in the market and that declining incomes can be supported by technical and
market interventions. The evidence available suggests that the program has helped
farmers in these aspects.
Conclusions
The emerging principles can be summarized as follows:
• Partnership as the basic organizing principle. This provided the organization
with wider expertise and ability to provide a wide range of services (access to
technology, credit, markets, value addition, and organizational development of
farmers) than would normally be the case. The top and middle management of
KHDP spent a considerable amount of time and energy on building trust and
relationship with a wide range of partners, i.e., farmers, scientists, traders,
banks, State government, management institutions, etc.
• Organizational autonomy and the ability of the leadership to exercise it.
A new organization (KHDP) was created free from bureaucratic traditions and
with complete autonomy. The KHDP leadership had the flexibility and authority
to continuously improve procedures thus enhancing managerial effectiveness.
• Learning as the key management strategy. A continuous process of self-
reflection and learning whereby approaches and institutional arrangements
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could effectively adapt to deal with changing contexts, demands, and
opportunities.
• Systematic procedures for monitoring and evaluation (internal and
external) of staff and project interventions. Apart from formal monitoring
systems, the willingness of the KHDP management to quickly and effectively
respond to emerging issues also contributed to the projects effectiveness.
Endnote
This paper is the output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom Department
for International Development (DFID). The views expressed are not necessarily those of
DFID [R7502: Crop Post-Harvest Programme].
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Evolving technology through collaboration and
partnership: the case of the International
Development Enterprises (India)’s work with
tomato packaging in Himachal Pradesh, India
S J Phansalkar
1
Abstract
This paper discusses a project implemented by International Development Enterprises,
India [IDE(I)] with funds received from the Crop Post-Harvest Programme (CPHP) of the
Department for International Development (DFID). A UK-based agency was chosen as
the principal project leader. The UK agency contracted IDE(I) to carry out field work
connected with identifying the area, the issues for work, the specific post-harvest stage
for intervention, technology identification, sourcing, and adaptation. IDE(I) identified
tomato as the main crop for intervention and the development and commercialization of
suitable cardboard carton packaging as the main task. The project was implemented
in partnership with Rural Centre for Human Interest (RUCHI), an non-governmental
organization (NGO) based in the region, the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
(IIMA), and manufacturers of the cartons. While the partnership between the UK agency
and IDE(I) was formalized through an agreement, the other two were not. Analysis of
the partnership processes permits the following inferences to be made: (i) inclusion of a
partner for formal, legal, or stylistic reason alone may not lead to a productive
partnership; (ii) existence of prior personal rapport between key individuals seems to
lead to effective partnerships; and (iii) partners need to evolve mutual roles and
responsibilities while remaining sensitive to mutual concerns rather than formalize such
roles in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or other written agreement.
Introduction
This paper discusses IDE(I)’s work on the post-harvest systems of small-scale
horticultural farmers. The specific intervention concerns a project that explored
ways of introducing a new type of tomato packaging technology in Himachal
Pradesh. The project was commissioned by the Department for International
Development, UK, (DFID) Crop Post Harvest Programme (CPHP). The approach
adopted by IDE(I) builds on more than a decade of experience in establishing
technology production and supply systems that serve the poor. This experience
has been gained in the small-scale irrigation sector. A key aspect of the novel
IDE(I) approach and philosophy is that marketing principles are used to identify
the needs of the poor and to establish retail systems that will address these needs.
The rationale is that once these systems have been established, IDE(I) can then
withdraw to concentrate its efforts on new technology sectors and need.
This project was an attempt to apply such an approach to the post-harvest
sector. IDE(I) had never worked in the post-harvest sector before. However, emerging
from consultation between IDE(I) and CPHP, was the hope that the approach had
much to offer and that by adapting and innovating along the way, important
1. G-2 Lakshmikrupa Apartments, T-7 Lakshminagar, Nagpur 440 010, Maharashtra, India
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lessons could be learned that could be further promoted in the CPHP’s work. The
project therefore began as a fairly open-ended task involving establishing needs,
identifying a technology niche and then establishing the partnerships and systems
to develop, produce, and supply that technology. This paper emerges from a process
documentation exercise that was used to draw out lessons. The question of
partnership was central to the way the project evolved over time, and indeed the
success of the project was clearly a result to the importance that IDE(I) placed on
identifying the right partners and nurturing relationships that worked. A detailed
discussion and analysis of IDE(I) experience in the post-harvest sector and the
generic lessons emerging from its approach can be found in Clark et al. 2003
(in press).
Overview of project focus
The project was originally established as a partnership between IDE(I) and an
international NGO based in the UK (subsequently referred to as IntNGO). The
latter was designated the project leader, although the majority of the work was
sub-contracted to IDE(I) as the in-country partner. The project, whose work
commenced in early 2000, was phased, so that CPHP could revisit its progress
after a year.
After undertaking an assessment of different commodities and the relevance
of these to small-scale farmers in Himachal Pradesh, IDE(I) chose the tomato
crop. Through further investigation it emerged that wooden boxes, conventionally
used for packaging by farmers were seen as being environmentally unsustainable
and increasingly unfeasible because of the ban imposed on tree-felling in the
State. It was therefore decided to identify a suitable technology that would replace
wooden boxes for packaging tomatoes.
IDE(I) persuaded the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (IIMA) to
take an interest in the project. The latter then involved the largest corrugated
cardboard manufacturer in India to design and test the technology. In order to
develop an interface through which to work with the farmers IDE(I) also
collaborated with the Rural Centre for Human Interest (RUCHI), an NGO engaged
in development work in Himachal Pradesh and with whom IDE(I) had previous
association during development and demonstration of its mountain micro-irrigation
kits.
By the end of the first phase of the project in June 2001 a prototype corrugated
cardboard carton (CCC) had been developed and tested through farm-level and
transportation trials. This design know as Venture Capital (VC) VC-15 – was a
box with dimensions 363 × 192 × 373 mm made out of 5-ply 150 gsm cardboard
material with 8 ventilation holes. A review of the first phase by CPHP concluded
that the second phase should directly implemented by IDE(I). This phase envisaged
further adaptation and modification of the technology (to reduce the carton volume,
improve its moisture resistance, improve its acceptance in trade circles, and reduce
its costs) and commercialization of the technology through sustainable engagement
of local private- sector players. By early 2002, the producers had an agreement
with a manufacturer based in Delhi to produce 100,000 cartons2  with credit
2 . In actual fact only (a not insignificant) 30,000 boxes were produced as tomato production was
lower in the season.
34
arrangements with a local bank facilitated by both IDE(I) and RUCHI. IDE(I) expects
the technology to be widely and repeatedly used in future. RUCHI, the CCC
manufacturer, IDE(I), and the trade circle also expect rapid expansion of the
adoption of the CCC for packing peaches, capsicum, and other produce from this
region. The time line of relevant events is given in the Table 1.
Agencies involved
The following range of agencies was involved in the project. The key players and
their roles were:
• Crop Post-Harvest Programme (CPHP), Department for International
Development (DFID), UK. CPHP is managed on behalf of DFID by Natural
Resources International a small, private consultancy and research-
management company based in the UK. CPHP has a Regional Coordinator
based in India at the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid
Tropics (ICRISAT). The Programme commissions research relevant to the crop
post-harvest sector under an overarching mandate of poverty reduction.
• UK Agency. A division of a well-known group of development organizations
and individuals that concerns itself with collaborative evolution of appropriate
technology for use in the developing world. For this project it appointed and
outsourced relevant expertise and was itself only concerned with donor relation
and fund management.
• International Development Enterprises, India [IDE(I)]. Originally, a liaison
office of IDE (US). It became an independent Indian entity in May 2001. IDE(I)
has been engaged in the development and marketing of divisible, affordable
technology, and its commercialization through the private sector to help small-
scale farmers raise their incomes. With prior experience in irrigation, IDE(I)
was exploring the concept of a ‘mountain market-shed’ with a view to improving
the market performance and net incomes of farmers in 1997/98 using a Ford
Foundation grant. This was their first foray into post-harvest work, but they
were familiar with conditions in Himachal Pradesh. They were encouraged by
CPHP to apply their methodology of mass marketing and the understanding of
a ‘market-shed’ to the post-harvest theme.
• Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (IIMA). Arguably the best-known
management institution in India, IIMA has a specialized division working on
agriculture. Rather than a formal institutional partnership, what seems of
greater relevance to this project is the collaboration with one specific faculty
member at IIMA in this division. He had previously worked on food packaging,
and had assisted Gujarat farmers to adopt to CCCs.
• Rural Centre for Human Interest (RUCHI) is an established NGO that works
in Solan district, Himachal Pradesh on a range of development issues including
watershed development, earthquake-proof housing, promotion of horticulture,
and micro-credit. RUCHI has created a network of self-help groups (SHGs) in
over four dozen villages in Solan. RUCHI had collaborated with IDE(I) in
demonstrating its micro-irrigation equipment around the same time. Due to
the personal rapport of the Chief Executive Officer of RUCHI with a key
functionary of IDE(I), the two organizations developed a mutually supportive
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Table 1. Time line of relevant events
Event/stage
IDE(I) association with RUCHI
Initial discussions with CPHP
Initial familiarization study
Ban on tree felling in Himachal
Pradesh
Agreement between IntNGO and
IDE(I)
Study as per SRL formats
Contact with IIMA
Design and lab testing, initial
discussions on VC-15
Himachal Pradesh government
begins seizing all outbound
vehicles carrying fruit in boxes
made from prohibited species
Visit of UK food packaging
expert
Transportation trial of VC-15
Phase II starts, exit IntNGO
project links IDE(I) directly with
CPHP
Modification and evolution of
gen. 2, 3, 4 packs
Farmers discussion with adtis
for scaling up of CCC packaging
Linking SHG to bank for
financing of CCCs
Large-scale adoption of CCCs
Partnership process study
Started
1997
June 1999
May 1999
August 1999
March 2000
Febuary 2000
October 2000
May 2001
June 2001
June 2001
Jan 2002
March 2002
Exp. June
2002
April 2002
Ended
-
August 1999
October 1999
May 2000
Continues
May 2001
Dec 2001
On-going,
formal meet in
March 2002
On-going
April 2002
Remarks
For work on micro-irrigation kits
and mountain market-shed
study
Continuation of market-shed study
On-going, initially a transportation
subsidy for wood imported from
Haryana was given, now
withdrawn
Retrospective, from Jan 2000
Concluded with crop tomato,
intervention about replacing
wooden box with CCC
Serendipity, IDE(I) happened to see
Professor Girija Sharan’s paper
Packages given free, no guarantee
for tomato, transport cost borne by
IDE
Involvement of a Delhi box
manufacturer
Decision to shift to CCC by
members of 4 SHG of RUCHI in
Shargaon
Facilitated by IDE/RUCHI IDE(I)
offers a 20% promotional incentive
It is hoped that 100,000 CCCs will
be used for packing 1500 t of off-
season tomatoes in summer
2002
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relationship. RUCHI looked to IDE(I) as the source of new and beneficial
technology and provided them with access to farmers, and local support.
Three other organizations were also involved. The Indian Institute of Packaging
(IIP) in Delhi, a public agency concerned with research, development and testing
of packing materials supported by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR). IDE(I) approached IIP and explored the possibility of collaborative
development work. Eventually, IIP did help by testing prototype CCCs for a fee.
The two other agencies were manufacturers of CCCs. One of them Core Emballage
Ltd. (CORE), the largest manufacturer in India is based in Ahmedabad. The top
management of CORE there had live and vibrant relations with IIMA, which they
cherished. The second manufacturer is based in Delhi and has commercial
interests in the success of the CCCs. The interests and competencies of the various
agencies are summarized in Table 2.
Process in brief
Following formal agreements between CPHP and IntNGO on the one hand, and
IntNGO and IDE(I) on the other, IDE(I) undertook a detailed study in Himachal
Pradesh using the Sustainable Rural Livelihoods (SRL) framework.3  They studied
four communities in Solan district with the intermediation of RUCHI, and four in
Kullu district mediated by a private sector agricultural input dealer. IDE(I) did not
embark on the research with a pre-conceived notion that its work would be
concerned with tomato packaging. However, during its research it discovered that:
• It was much easier for the researchers to interact with farmers when they
worked in collaboration with RUCHI than when they went through the input
dealers. RUCHI had a presence in villages through Watershed Committees or
SHGs, it had credibility and enjoyed the trust of the people. Farmers interacted
freely and with confidence with IDE(I) personnel. The input dealer could make
primary introductions of researchers to his clientele, but since his own equation
with them was only commercial, he had little influence on relevant social
processes.
• Farmers in both locales had expressed grave concern about the likely impact
of the Government ban on tree felling on packaging, and hence on the potential
profitability of their produce, because using wooden packaging provided them
with access to high-value markets.
• Farmers in villages serviced by RUCHI had acquired access to irrigation for
growing off-season tomatoes through RUCHI’s watershed development work,
and had quickly grabbed the initiative to cultivate. Tomatoes are grown by
small-scale and marginal farmers who could deploy their family labor
cultivating, harvesting and post-harvest packing the crop.
3. The SRL framework is an approach to analysing the circumstances of rural people that
recognises the complexity of their livelihoods. It explores the different types of resources or
capital that poor people have, and the way these are used to generate livelihood outcomes.
Similarly it looks at the factors which make these livelihoods precarious or vulnerable and the
way policy and institutional arrangements can change people’s circumstances for the better
(or worse). For details see Carney (1998).
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Table 2. Agencies and their interests
Agency
IDE
IntNGO
IIMA
RUCHI
CORE
Supreme
Main
mandate
Evolving
divisible,
affordable
technology
and marketing
it to benefit
farmers
Adaptive
research on
appropriate
technology
Premier
management
teaching and
research
institute
Comprehensive
rural
development
in the Solan
district
For profit
manufacturers
of CCCs
For profit
manufacturers
of CCCs
Competency
Marketing,
supply chain,
adaptive
research,
coalition
building
Network with
donors
access to
experts on
diverse fields
Credibility,
access to
government,
large and
expert faculty
pool, special
focus on
agriculture
Strong network
with farmers,
close
observations
and knowledge
of local issues
Carton design,
development,
testing and
manufacture
Carton design,
development,
testing and
manufacture
Short-term
interest in
CPHP project
Funds available
for supporting
work
Accessing
funding
Seeing the
research work
being actually
implemented
Furthering
interests of
farmers
Supporting
development
work of IIMA
Establishing
links with users
Establishing
links with users
Long-term
interest in
CPHP project
Broadening of
product portfolio
Strengthening
network in Indian
subcontinent
Strengthening
rural/agricultural
research portfolio
Protection of
environment
Commercial
interest in a
growing segment
Commercial
interest in a
growing segment
Remarks
Had very good
rapport with
erstwhile IDE(I)
Country Director
Involvement
restricted to one
faculty member
Had earlier
collaborated with
IDE(I)
Its mandate tends to
be influenced by
farmers served
Was involved in the
process by IIMA
Located in Delhi,
hence closer to
Himachal Pradesh
• Two traditional forms of packaging – the kilta (a type of woven basket carried
on the back) and wooden boxes, and one relatively new form – plastic crates,
were being used. Of these, wooden boxes were used for tomatoes sold in the
Delhi market, often subsequently transported beyond the market. This form of
packaging was the one affected by the ban on tree felling. Since the Delhi
market was the most lucrative, farmers perceived the ban as a major threat to
their income in coming years.
• Packing in wooden boxes was labor-intensive. Wood had to be first procured
and then boxes prepared by nailing pieces together in the prescribed style.
Men, women, and children would all be busy making the boxes one day ahead
of the predetermined time for harvesting and sending the material to Delhi.
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• Farmers reported that if they could not make enough boxes ready by the time
the fruit was ripe then even top-quality produce would have to be sold at a
discount in the local market. An alternative was thus sorely needed.
• The IDE(I) team identified packaging tomatoes as an important issue. In the
parlance of the SRL framework, this was expected to lead to ‘reduced
vulnerability’ for rural farm households. Searching for leads, they came across
a paper by Professor Girija Sharan, a faculty member in IIMA on the very same
subject and promptly co-opted him into the research. He was enthusiastic
about the research programme because he saw an opportunity to apply his
own research in a practical setting, and the potential to solve an important
issue. In fact, this involvement and interest was sufficiently strong that beyond
meeting out-of-pocket costs, the IIMA team never mentioned reward for their
work. The IIMA team used their good offices and designed a CCC at CORE in
Ahmedabad. CORE top management has close contacts with IIMA, and saw a
possibility of being able to contribute to development by this association. They
also saw a potential business opportunity.
IntNGO was kept informed of the whole process at periodic intervals. They
operated through the agency of a UK-based consultant they appointed for this
purpose. No staff from IntNGO, or their consultant visited India at any point. The
IntNGO dealt almost exclusively with the tasks of donor relations and providing
leads and contacts in the UK. As a part of this work, the IDE(I) team visited UK
and completed a formal literature review and technology scan. IntNGO also
identified a food-packaging specialist who visited India towards the end of 2000.
Having interacted with IIMA faculty, he suggested to IDE(I) that they were on the
right track and confirmed that they needed to continue work in that direction.
A thorough transportation trial of the CCCs was undertaken in the summer
of 2001. IDE(I) paid for the cartons for this trial and bore the cost of transportation.
The ownership and the risk of the tomatoes remained with the farmers who agreed
to participate in the trial. The trial proved that CCCs could indeed be a viable
alternative to wooden boxes. Around this time, after all this work had been
completed, a consultancy firm, Economic Development Associates (EDA) Rural
Systems, was contracted by IntNGO as part of the project to conduct a socio-
economic assessment of the region. EDA concluded that while tomato was an
important crop for the farmers, packaging was not the most important issue. This
clearly contradicted the findings of IDE(I) and indeed the rationale for the ongoing
work on CCCs.
Later, IDE(I) and the IIMA team effected design changes in the CCC after
considering the performance parameters (capacity, stacking height and strength,
bursting strength, moisture resistance and so on.) and also consulting RUCHI,
farmers, trade channels and local manufacturers. By 2002, there had been five
rounds of redesigning and by the summer of 2002, the product was ready for
commercialization. The local manufacturer and farmers together negotiated the
terms of supply. The manufacturer insisted on advance payment of half the cost
of the CCCs. Since farmers obtain wooden boxes or box material on credit, this
seemed to pose a roadblock. RUCHI stepped in to suggest that they would facilitate
the financing of the CCCs by way of a loan from the local bank to the SHGs and
then on-lent to the farmers. This arrangement was sweetened by IDE(I) offering to
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make an incentive of 20% in the form of CCCs, i.e., farmers would not have to pay
for 20% of the cartons they ordered.
The commission agents in Delhi market are kingpins in tomato marketing for
these farmers and they saw their interests being adversely affected. Hence, they
tried to oppose the new form of packaging. However, concerted action from farmers
has since seen them back down. This arrangement between farmers, bank, RUCHI,
the manufacturer, and IDE(I) is unwritten and informal. It is hoped that once the
first lot of 100,000 CCCs are sold, demand from both farmers and market players
will make marketing the new product sustainable.
Interestingly, different stakeholders identified and defined the problem being
addressed in different ways. The IDE(I) team viewed it as an issue of technological
redundancy (the disappearance of tomato boxes) and the potential this had to
jeopardize farmers access to high-value markets. RUCHI saw the regeneration of
tree cover in the region as the task to be addressed by the project – presumably
by facilitating the shift away from wooden boxes. Farmers saw reduced drudgery
and expenses incurred in obtaining the CCCs as the key benefits. (While making
wooden boxes, nails had to be hammered into wooden planks, and most men and
children working on the task would end up with bleeding hands.) Choosing to
address a post-harvest problem thus perhaps coincidentally addressed all these
concerns. Clearly, unless a new technology effectively addresses genuine but
possibly differing concerns of all the parties involved, it may not be acceptable.
Analysis of the partnership processes
Any organization works with a whole network of agencies or organizations in its
task environment. In fact, organization theorists identify five classes of
organizations and entities in the task environment. These are: suppliers, buyers,
competitors, regulators, and the organs of the society/community within which
the focal organization works. Some or all of these actors in the task environment
may be organizations pursuing their own objectives and goals. All the exchanges
between the focal organization and those outside it in the task environment cannot
be called partnerships. For example, an organization buys a computer from, say,
IBM, but this act does not become a partnership. To amplify this example, the
same company may work jointly with a computer consultant for six months to
install an enterprise resource planning (ERP) system. Yet this will still not be
called a partnership. To amplify even further, the computer consultant may
represent the focal organization in equipment purchase and still this may not
become a partnership. In all the three activities, the computer seller and the
consultant are essentially providing a service for a specific consideration. Their
interest is limited to the consideration and the impact on their image of a good or
a bad performance by the installed system.
It is thus useful to differentiate between partnership or organizational
collaboration on one hand, and the highly specific and focused work achieved by
the joint co-operation of two agencies. A partnership between two agencies can be
defined as an arrangement in which both the agencies, primarily motivated in
coming together by their commonality of interest in the shared objective, work to
achieve it. Keeping IDE(I) as the focal organization, four partnerships/
organizational collaborations are of importance in this whole process.
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These are:
• IDE(I)–CPHP
• IDE(I)–IntNGO
• IDE(I)–RUCHI
• IDE(I)–IIMA
The process variables of interest can be stated as:
• Pre-partnership relationship, if any
• Personal rapport between key persons
• Mutual assessment of ability, standing, competence, etc.
• Existence of a formal agreement
• Perception about ownership of the tasks
• Frequency and nature of contacts
• Transparency and mutual accountability
• Irritants if any, and how are they sorted out
• Social distance
• Centrality of financial relationship
The process outcomes can be stated as:
• Trust
• Enhanced mutual respect
• Enhanced sensitivity to the other’s concerns
• Willingness/ability to continue relationships beyond project period
IDE(I)’s partnership with CPHP has been very productive and has led to
significant mutual satisfaction. CPHP has been very supportive of the work IDE(I)
has done and has actively taken steps to ensure that the work on this project is
facilitated. IDE(I) was especially appreciative of the supportive role of CPHP’s South
Asia Coordinator (Dr A J Hall). CPHP’s involvement has been at more a strategic
level and not at the level of carrying out detailed tasks. An attempt is made to
characterize the remaining three operational partnership processes in terms of
process variables and process outcomes in the tables below:
Inferences
The following inferences seem to be possible from Tables 3 and 4 and from the
process described earlier.
• Inclusion of a partner into the process for formal, stylistic or legal reasons
alone is unlikely to make for a great partnership. In India we have plenty of
experience of this. State agencies involved in specific facets of a development
process are often included as partners in the process for such reasons. Their
interest in the task at hand is tepid and their participation perfunctory. On
the other hand, they have disproportionate say in the structuring of the
partnership and the tasks, and this creates tensions. IntNGO was included
because, “normally a UK agency becomes the principal contractor for a UK
donor”, as noted by an earlier process documentation exercise notes.4
4 . Subsequent to this project CPHP made a significant policy shift that emphasised the development
of locally lead projects. This was a response to the desirability of embedding research in local
relationships and institutional contexts. The case of the IDE(I) project admirably demonstrates
why this should be so.
41
Table 4. Process variables
IDE(I) Partnership with organization
Process variable
Pre-partnership
relationship
Personal rapport
between key
individuals
Mutual assessment of
abilities and standing
Formal agreement
Ownership of the task
Frequency and nature
of contacts
Transparency and
mutual
accountability
IntNGO
Existed in connection
with micro irrigation (MI)
project. IDE(I) was
unhappy about the
relationship which was
felt to be paternalistic
Rapport existed with
ex-Country Director of
IDE(I) and the Director
of IntNGO
Assessment of role to be
played by IntNGO proved
to be incorrect in
implementation.
Yes
IDE(I) owned the task,
IntNGO in fact deployed
none of its own staff
Periodic contacts on the
phone
Fairly high
RUCHI
Informal association in
demo of MI kits.
Mutually satisfying
Rapport existed between
the RUCHI Executive
Director and a key
senior manager in IDE
Clear assessment of
mutual strengths
None
Between them IDE(I) was
the owners, but for the
farmers, the lines
between the two were
blurred
Frequent and long
personal visits of IDE(I)
staff
High
IIMA
None other than alumni
connection of one of the
IDE(I) team
Rapport existed between a
senior manager of CORE,
the CCC manufacturer,
who was student of the
concerned faculty member
Good assessment of
mutual strength
None
IIMA came as an
interested, keen and
responsive consultant and
owned jointly the
development process
Several visits/contacts
from both the sides
Fairly high
Table 3. Process outcomes
Process outcome
Mutual trust
Enhanced mutual
respect
Enhanced sensitivity
to the other’s
concerns
Willingness/ability to
continue relationship
beyond project period,
etc.
IntNGO
Fairly high
Arguable. Respect exists
for the consultant who
dealt with IDE
No information
Not demonstrated
RUCHI
High
Significant
High. IDE(I) knows that
it will have to prolong its
staff presence beyond
project period to satisfy
expectations from
RUCHI/SHG
Stated emphatically as
high desire, need and
ability
IIMA
High
Substantial
Moderately high
Indicated willingness to
support second
transportation trial
IDE(I) partnership with organization
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• At least in the cultural context of India, prior personal rapport between key
individuals is almost a precondition for even starting a meaningful partnership.
For example, the Executive Director of RUCHI explained that rapport and
relationship between him and a key functionary in IDE(I) were quite important
to making the relationship so productive. The concerned functionary of IDE(I)
echoed this sentiment saying that he chose RUCHI over some other potential
grass-roots partners because he had rapport with RUCHI. Thus, a start needs
to be made using personal relationship between individuals from the two
organizations. This is, of course, never sufficient since the nature of the
partnership emerges through frequent and continuing interactions between
people at all level. In this instance, IDE(I) staff at all levels were appreciative
and respectful about their counterparts in RUCHI and reciprocated the help
they received.
• It would appear that unless a financial relationship is central to the partnership,
a formal agreement or MoU that specifies mutual roles and responsibilities is
superfluous at best, and counterproductive at worst. Roles and responsibilities
need to evolve over time and through mutual respect and concern for each
other’s point of view.
• It is critical to back the partner in matters that involve risk and potential loss
of face. RUCHI staff explained that, had the farmers incurred big losses in the
first transportation trial, there would have been a loss of face for them. Farmers
thought until then that IDE(I) people were really ‘new RUCHI staff’ taken on for
the project. IDE(I) responded on the issue by stating that they had provided
incentives in the form of packaging and transportation costs. They had
deliberately left the responsibility of the risk to the goods unstated so that the
farmers would have a stake in the trials. But they would have bailed RUCHI
out by settling with the farmers in the event of any loss. This willingness to
back each other may not be formally stated but emerges only out of mutual
trust.
• Clearly, if there is large social distance, then the nature of interactions has to
be deliberately designed in order to establish rapport and mutuality. Formal
interactions seldom help in this matter.
• Finally, and obviously, the basis of choosing partners must lie in the partners’
operative mandate, competence or demonstrated interest, not in an ephemeral
infatuation with new ideas or perfunctory statements of interests.
Conclusions
This case study has reviewed an approach to technology development that is
relatively new. Rather than conform to conventional development aid projects of
either a ‘research’ or an ‘interventionist’ nature, it combines both approaches in
a research-action program. In this sense it has more in common with a business
development approach than a formal social science one. It is also one in which a
series of partnerships have played an important role. What then can we conclude
in terms of the questions raised by this workshop?
1. In terms of the context what is clearly important is the terms of reference of
the organizations involved. Hence, the lead organization IDE(I) has a mission
to catalyze sustainable development and is constantly searching for useful
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projects that fit within its mandate. Tomato packaging clearly fitted the bill.
Similarly the IntNGO was looking for needs-driven cases that explored the issue
of sustainable technology development and IDE(I) appeared a relevant example.
There were thus important organizational synergies in all cases. It did, however,
require the management skills of IDE(I) staff to realize these synergies effectively.
2. The key partnerships are outlined in the text. What appear to have been crucial
to success are two factors. The first is the good personal relationships between
lead individuals in the co-operant organizations. The second is the ability of
the lead organization to ensure trust on the part of the most vulnerable groups
(in this case through the use of an NGO as the intermediary vehicle). If formal
agreements had been used it appears that this in itself would have been an
indication of relative failure. It follows, at least in this case, that personal
enthusiasm and mutual interest facilitated by the team-building skills of the
lead agency were the catalysts needed.
3. In fact institutional rigidities were encountered on a number of occasions,
especially with the public-sector research and production bodies. The response
of IDE(I) was then simply to bypass the public sector and make use of other
bodies from the private and NGO sectors. In particular, negative experiences
with the IIP and a government CCC factory taught IDE(I) that an efficient outcome
required such a response, if only because available resources were time-limited.
Going through the public system would have killed the project stone dead!
4. In terms of learning the important overall conclusion is that the work (and
apparent success) of this IDE(I) project is consistent with an understanding of
development that emphasizes the importance of innovation systems. It is also
an example of the importance of continuous learning and of institutional
change. In fact, IDE(I) has not stood still in its work in the sense that earlier
experience with irrigation projects clearly provided a heuristic framework that
guided the organization in adapting its research to changing contexts and
needs. At the same time, however, it is not apparent that IDE(I) has consciously
reflected on its experiences. Or at least the actual mechanics of that reflection
have not been documented. Doing so therefore remains an important task for
the future. IDE(I) have subsequently addressed this lacuna through a self-
assessment exercise, although this in itself is only the start of a learning-
based process.
5. Finally, it is clear that a poverty focus was explicitly on the IDE(I) agenda in
the sense that the IntNGO were persuaded of the project’s poverty relevance
and that the poor hillside farmer was a target. It might be argued that such a
group of farmers are not representative of the absolute poor since they are
involved in selling a cash crop to a wider market. However, such a view would
be short-sighted. Improved incomes for a significant cohort of the region will
clearly impinge on all groups in terms of both straight incomes and through
environmental benefits. Subsistence groups might well be encouraged to enter
the cash market. Also, it should not be forgotten, that prevailing topographic
conditions in Himachal Pradesh generate great vulnerability. Better economic
conditions for key groups of farmers will positively affect security for all groups.
As for the future policy agenda, it appears that there is a clear need to involve
the public sector in ventures of this kind. But the hiatus appears to be an
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institutional one. It is the personal relationships involved that mark the success
of this case, mainly through the trust engendered on all sides. Certainly bridges
need to be built with public-sector bodies but this will only be possible if space is
given to individual initiative. In the absence of such freedom it is likely that many
of the best talents in India will continue to remain marginal to national development
and therefore remain an under-utilized resource.
Endnote
This paper is the output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom Department
for International Development (DFID). The views expressed are not necessarily those of
DFID [R7551: Crop Post-Harvest Programme].
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People’s Technology Initiatives: embedding
technology in community-based production
systems
D Abrol
1
Abstract
The People’s Technology Initiatives (PTI) espouse an alternative paradigm of science
and technology (S&T) and rural development. The approach emerges out of the broader
People’s Science Movement in India, itself a backlash against what was viewed as the
weak governance of science and its failure to meet the needs of the poor and to enhance
their productive capacities. The elements of the PTI philosophy reflect these contextual
origins with an approach that seeks to build technology systems around local knowledge,
resources, and economies – rather than vice versa as is the case with conventional
models of technology development. Networking and building partnership has been a
very important component in the PTI – both in terms of individual initiatives as well as
in terms of promoting and supporting the approach. Notable also is the capacity
development focus of the PTI. This is capacity- development both in terms of enhancing
the skills and technologies of poor people and in the sense of linking the poor to sources
of S&T and thus enhancing the capacity of the local technology system. The evolutionary
characteristics of this capacity development reflect the learning-based nature of this
approach. This case perhaps presents a rather radical alternative to mainstream S&T
and rural development initiatives; however it contains principles of partnership and
learning that others could adopt.
Introduction
This paper discusses the generic principles of a rural innovation movement
collectively known as the People’s Technology Initiatives (PTIs). The PTI are
structured to specifically support the livelihoods of the rural poor through the
development of locally based economic systems by connecting science and
technology (S&T) to production and marketing undertaken by enterprises
characterized by worker participation in management. The approach represents
an alternative to mainstream thinking and practice on technology development
and application in poverty-reduction interventions. The PTI are part of the People’s
Science Movement, the activities of which go much beyond rural innovation, but
which share a common set of values and principles. The approach owes its origin
to the wider People’s Science Movement that emerged in the early 1980s around
a range of science and society contentions. The PTI approach challenges many
given assumptions that form the (tacit) framework for the discussion of
conventional S&T and development interventions. The paper begins with a
discussion of some of the key theoretical underpinnings that the approach of PTI
implies for the development of a framework for rural innovation. The main elements
of the approach are then discussed with the help of examples. The remainder of
1 . National Institute of Science, Technology and Development Studies (NISTADS), K S Krishnan
Marg, New Delhi 110 012, India
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the paper is structured around the five questions of the workshop: context
(historical and institutional), partnership, institutional rigidity and change,
learning, and poverty focus.
The PTI as an approach to rural innovation in the
framework of innovation systems
Despite the apparently radical philosophy behind the PTI approach (and indeed
the People’s Science Movement as well), many of the concepts and principles that
it uses are clearly recognizable elements of contemporary policy thinking on
innovation systems. Its distinctive use of these conceptual elements is reflected
in the way the PTI approach the process of restructuring arrangement for rural
innovation.
The PTI believes that mainstream, thinking is only focused on how to remove
the barriers to interaction and integration of research and non-research
organizations’ in the context of public–private sector relationships. PTI also believes
that the question of ‘participation’ of end-users from the weaker sections in
innovation systems is effectively neglected by mainstream thinking. The PTI
approach posits that the formulation of a strategy for system transition must
begin by determining how to improve the ‘participation’ of poor end-users also. It
suggests that mainstream thinking is viewing the patterns of interaction with
end-users in the innovation system approach with the lens of an ‘informational
conception’ of barriers to interaction and integration. Such end-users as poor
peasants, artisans, and agricultural laborers are never targeted for the purpose
of user development. User support is not oriented to improving the participation
of the rural poor in the process of technology development. Mainstream thinking
does not help to make the rural poor competitive and stand on their own feet in
competition with large and medium private- sector organizations. When it does
come to the formulation of strategies to develop knowledge markets, the target for
user development and the development of user-support organizations is private-
sector organizations. The perspective of the large-scale private organizations
essentially guides the pursuit of competitive advantage.
The PTI believes that mainstream thinking is wrong in treating technology
transfer failures as merely a consequence of the poorly developed out-reach of
the public- sector research system. It holds that, even if private-sector organizations
are encouraged to develop partnerships with the public-sector research system
they will not be able to fill the gap to the benefit of end-users among the rural
poor. PTI suggests that calculations of economic viability of technologies to be
implemented by potential adopters among the weaker sections should not be ipso
facto undertaken as if the weaker section cannot organize themselves and their
access to the knowledge markets. It is wrong to promote these weaker sections in
the market as atomized competing individual producers of small means. It is
incorrect to reduce them to merely making their land and labor available for
agricultural production, or at best, participating in the process of value addition
as lower-end producers in long value chain controlled by large-scale private and
public-sector organizations.
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The PTI suggests that policy-makers should not characterize and target the
potential domains of multiple stakeholders based on existing comparative
advantages. Strategies of transformation of technological and innovation systems
that go beyond the primitive conception of competitiveness of poor peasants,
agricultural laborers and artisans who populate the production systems of Indian
agriculture and its allied sectors should be sought. The selection of technology
development objectives and the choice of partners for user development need to
be designed bearing in mind what weaker sections can offer through their
appropriate organizations. The designs should interface economies of scale and
scope, and ensure that network and cluster effects, often ignored when evaluating
competitiveness, are considered.
PTI considers that a major premise preventing the achievement of anti-poverty
objectives for the rural poor has been that in anti-poverty strategies each poor
individual household is targeted separately for assistance to raise it above the
poverty line by providing access to credit, and training in traditional occupations.
This premise has resulted in the approach of promoting small-scale producers
who alone are unable to compete with large-scale producers in the market place.
PTI believe that no small-scale producer can be made individually competitive.
The PTI propose that policy-makers must shift away from the assumption that a
small-scale producer or a single village can, through new technology, be made
individually competitive in a market where large-scale producers are present as
competitors. Its critique of the co-operative movement is that even though in some
areas co-operatives or groups were formed to procure input and/or credit, mutual
competition amongst small-scale producers resulted in these co-operatives/groups
breaking up. It believes that this step, while in the right direction, was inadequate
and has to be complemented by establishing co-operation in production. It is
suggested that policy-makers will have to abandon the approach of promoting
stand-alone small-scale producers.
The PTI suggests that self-employed small-scale producers must not only come
together to access resources under competitive conditions, but should also emerge
as multi-sectoral/multi-occupation collectives, co-operating in production.
Economies of scale in production are required to overcome adverse competition. It
is necessary to organize production units that are based on mutually comple-
menting technological elements packaged into consciously networked production
systems that will be accessible to the rural poor.
The implication is that the rural poor will have to pool their resources and
capabilities to raise the scale and scope of their existing production organization.
This change in the scale and scope of their collective production organization is
absolutely necessary to allow participating members to lower the barriers facing
them in the adoption of improved technologies. To gain a superior access to
resources, markets, and technology improvements the rural poor will therefore
need to avoid mutual competition. Landless labor, artisans, and poor peasants
will need to consider the possibilities of upgrading their local economies as a
system.
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PTI: the key elements
Establishment of taluk-wide peasant–artisan–agricultural labor
cooperation
The PTI has undertaken a large number of feasibility studies to demonstrate the
validity of its approach in a wide variety of field areas. Studies show that in order
to be competitive the rural poor will have to come together to implement taluk -
wide, area- based, multi-sectoral, large-scale networks of production.2 The approach
suggests that no village can or should exist as a closed self-sufficient entity. PTI
believes that taluks are viable units for planned development at the local economy
level. Every Indian village, for all its major needs, is today closely dependent on
the local taluk-wide economy. This local economy should be approached as a multi-
sectoral network. In such networks the rural poor are themselves both producers
and consumers of most items. In the interest of weaker sections, sectors should
be upgraded competitively and this can only be done successfully if the approach
is not based on small-scale producers but on the principle of co-operation in
production across sectors.
To get started, the PTI base their efforts on the existing local peasant–artisan
economy. The assumption is that this economy is still under the control of the
rural poor to a large extent. It is organized as a rudimentary taluk-wide network in
which even today secondary and primary production are carried out in an inter-
linked manner by poor people. The strategy should be to upgrade their production
activity for local markets as a system in itself. The rural poor can hope to establish
a large-scale networked system of collective production in addition to this
production system, because the local economy is accessible and several of its
elements are already under their control. In the initial period of development
non-local markets are assigned a supplementary role in this strategy. It is
suggested that it would be possible for them to develop a participatory taluk-wide
network in the hope that a large number of small-scale producers would eliminate
mutual competition among themselves and thus have fewer problems in achieving
economies of scale and scope in production.
These systems of inter-related occupations also cover a spectrum of settlement
patterns in a way that encourages the introduction and development of technology
systems for the creation of area-based, well organized, taluk-wide, multi-sectoral
production networks comprising a mix of both large- and small-scale enterprises.
For rural economy systems in the plains, the kasbas, or weekly bazaars with
their characteristic concentrations of artisans, service nearby villages. Therefore,
at the kasbas those unit operations/sub-systems that involve fabrication/
manufacturing can be located (Figure 1 B point). Within each of the kasbas-level
units of local economy, there are villages inhabited by tolas/dhanis (i.e., places
where casual laborers live). These (Figure 1 M points) comprise concentrations of
agricultural labor. Such people earn their living by going out to nearby cultivator
settlements for daily labor (Figure 1 S points), and these sub-areas (which are also
normally equivalent to panchayats in area) form sub-units (M/S complexes,
2. A taluk is an administrative unit equivalent to a district and will usually include an area
containing approximately 250 villages
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Figure 1) of inter-linked villages. At these settlements intermediate processing
functions can be located. Kasbas in their turn are inter-linked to the local taluk
town that provides access to non-local products. Taluk towns also serve as outlets
for local products to non-local economies. At taluk towns (Figure 1 N level) the
functions of technological services, fabrication, sales, and distribution can be
located.
New mechanisms of technology implementation
Experience indicates that interventions are required to consistently develop this
cooperation. To improve the transfer of available technologies and to establish
multi-sectoral production networks of rural poor, S&T-oriented development
agencies need an active intervention approach in five key domains:
• Identification of the needs of peasants, artisans, and agricultural laborers as
producers
• Adaptation of technologies to make them fully competitive in local markets
• Development of users’ capabilities that aim to make the local producers
competitive against non-local goods
• Formation of production networks to establish forward and backward linkages
within the local economy area thus strengthening the competitiveness of the
local system
• Establishment linkages with laboratories, financial institutions, and
governmental bodies as a way of continuously improving of the competitiveness
of the local system.
To take charge of these interventions the proposed approach of establishing a
multi-sectoral network system of group enterprises requires a new system of
technology implementation – PTI refers to this as the network system of technology
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implementation. This system incorporates four new mechanisms of need
identification, technology adaptation, user development, and network formation.
These new mechanisms are needed to incorporate integrated solutions to such
problems as rural enterprises face while adopting the technologies:
• Choice of markets, product mix, and production system design to tackle
competition from large urban producers who have cheaper access to finance,
raw materials, technological inputs, and markets
• Adaptation of technology to connect the available technologies to local
resources, capabilities, and markets to improve the competitiveness of rural
enterprises in the market
• Acquisition of matching economic and technological competence by local
enterprises so they can master technology and market development
• Selection and implementation of strategies for network development to establish
the required forward and backward linkages.
Need identification. Need identification in the proposed approach to technology
implementation is undertaken for system design to provide integrated solutions
to the above problems faced by the users. Needs are identified in the form of a
feasibility study through field investigations by the S&T field persons in
collaboration with technology generating scientists and those identified for
technology system development. In such field investigations the users participate
actively, assisted by the facilitation of the S&T field persons.
User development. Efforts are needed to help users organize themselves to become
competitive. In the case of rural enterprises the industries under consideration
are highly competitive and people- based initiatives need special efforts if they
are to succeed. By creating group enterprises, networked systems of production,
and participative management in production, people-oriented development is
created. Successes in user development are achieved via the guidance and support
for economic competence development provided by S&T field persons who also
stimulate users to organize themselves to make use of the help.
Technology adaptation. Technology adaptation efforts are undertaken by
technology-generating laboratories through a field-level program of adaptive
research, development and design (RDD) in which identified scientists collaborate
with S&T field activists identified for the development of system functions. Through
a program of adaptive RDD selected technological designs are made compatible
with locally available resources, locally controllable markets, and local capabilities.
The process of shaping the technology package is guided by the design heuristics
of the networked system of production.
Network formation. Network formation is provided for in the efforts for production
network development, technology proving, and technology replication to tackle
the problems of establishment of appropriate forward and backward linkages.
The development of the local economy as a system in itself is incorporated in the
approach to system design of production technology implementation. It is again
taken up as a collaborative program between the S&T field persons, scientists
identified for bridging roles and the technology-generating team.
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Spread and scope technology models developed for rural non-farm
sectors
Currently, PTI focuses on the development of technology application models for
the rural non-farm sector. This choice of a priority target is because of the
understanding that interventions that encourage local value addition by linking
primary and secondary production, and through the technological upgrading of
existing occupations will realize the economies of scale and scope, assure network
and cluster effects, and develop the local economy as a system. In 6–7 Indian
states users whose access to land is limited and who engage in mainly non-farm
occupations are already using this principle for technological upgrading of some
of the rural non-farm sectors. People’s Science Movement activists are helping
these users to implement the innovative technology models developed to get started
for the development of local economies as a system. Innovative technology models
have been developed with the support of such agencies as the Department of
Science and Technology (DST), the Council for Promotion of Application of Rural
Technologies (CAPART), and the Technology Mission on Oilseeds and Pulses
(TMOP). Today a wide range of technology models are available for rural application
by S&T voluntary agencies, including those for processing fruit and vegetables:
economic and medicinal plants, biomass based energy systems, and leather, meat,
and carcass products. For further details contact the author directly.
Readers unfamiliar with the approach may be surprised that already more
than a dozen groups have been established with these principles in India. Each
group has been able to involve about 200–300 households spread over about 30
rural and semi-rural settlements. Each initiative directly or indirectly benefits a
target population of approximately 0.1–0.12 million rural people. Most of the
initiatives have been implemented through the financial support of government
programs for rural technologies. The approach has, however, received limited
exposure in innovation literature, and is practically absent from general debates
on agricultural technology and development and in particular from those dealing
with institutional reform in research and extension systems.
Examples processing in rural non-farm sectors using the PTI
approach
Fruit and vegetables. Several organizations3  are already implementing suitably
designed systems of fruit and vegetable processing managed by the group
enterprises. Products are marketed using a common brand name ‘Farmers’. The
niche selected for intervention emphasizes the development of natural products.
Technology models have been standardized under field conditions of networked
systems of production for pulping/juicing/jamming, pickling/fermentation, and
drying/osmo-dehydration. The system design involves a network of women
beneficiaries organized in small, village-level units, and a nodal processing unit
3 . Including: Society for Technology and Development (STD), Mandi; Centre for Technology and
Development (CTD), Dehradun; Forum of Scientists, Engineers, and Technologists (FOSET),
Kolkatta; Centre for Social work and Research (CSR), Agartala; Centre for Ecology and Rural
Development (CERD), Pondicherry; Himalayan Environmental Studies and Conservation
Organization (HESCO), Garhwal; Haryana Vigyan Manch (HVM), Rohtak, etc.
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at the town/kasba level which receives semi-processed materials for final pro-
cessing and packaging.
Small-scale systems for processing oilseeds. Developed at Mechanical and
Engineering Research and Development Organization (MERADO), Ludhiana, a
constituent establishment of Central Mechanical Engineering Research Institute
(CMERI), Durgapur, 1 t day-1 (1 TPD) Oil Expeller is a small-scale oilseed processing
unit with several advantages: extraction of pungent oil from mustard oil, high oil-
extraction efficiency, low residual oil in cake, better hygiene than a ghani (a type
of traditional expeller), and longer life of critical components. To process mustard,
the machine was developed by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR) laboratory as a substitute for the kolhu (a traditional oil press used in
rural areas to produce pungent mustard oil). When the PTI considered it for
incorporation into its technology system design as a commercial system, the
1 TPD oil expelling unit was yet to be tried out in the field. The edible oil industry
is highly competitive with a price-sensitive market, and large mill owners can
even make money through speculative trading of oilseeds and oil. It was a foregone
conclusion that it would not be easy for the rural enterprise to run a viable business
based on this machine. Further, as the capacity of this expeller is four times the
capacity of a kolhu, it posed such problems as ‘How would rural enterprises access
markets outside the village? How would they dispose oilcake?, and How could
working capital be raised to run a relatively higher-scale unit?
MERADO scientists had not applied their minds to such problems. They did
not have a technology package to deal with them from the standpoint of rural
enterprise. It was necessary to develop a complete technology package based on a
system design that would make this machine accessible to rural enterprises.
Based on the need to develop system designs that would allow the rural poor
to access local markets and to successfully establish forward and backward
linkages within the local economy, PTI successfully implemented its system design
in Hisar, Haryana. It commercialized the oil expeller by diversifying into the sale
of packaged oil and compound cattle feed made from oilcake, a by-product of the
process. Cattle feed made from mustard oilseed cake has started to be adopted in
an area where previously animals were mainly fed cotton oilseed cake. Single
filter based oil filtration is working successfully and processing 1 t d-1 oilseed in a
worker-owned rural enterprise. Such innovations involve a significant contribution
from the workers who implement them. The single filter based oil filtration was
developed on the basis of inputs received from workers in large-scale industry.
Cattle-feed recipes had inputs from scientists of Haryana Agricultural University
(HAU), Hisar. The worker-owned model has been shown to be a successful
organizational innovation in respect of both production and marketing.
The success of the 1 TPD oil expeller is only a beginning of the plans developed
for the development of a local economy as a system. This group enterprise is now
getting ready to implement a mini dhal mill developed by the Central Food Technology
Research Institute (CFTRI), a constituent laboratory of the CSIR system. Technology
demonstrations of the mill are already taking place on behalf of this laboratory in
the major markets. Licensed fabricators are marketing mini dhal mill units as
commercial entities in the states of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. Already, in Bihar,
some parties are successfully working mini dhal mills and hand-operated pulse
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de-husking machines as viable commercial units in city markets. It appears that
many of them are successful only due to the forward integration they have been
able to undertake because of their competitive access to markets for such local
food products as sattu, besan, vadi, papad, and chanachur. They are mainly using
the machines as in-house units to make the food products. However, in rural
environments close to the centers of raw material production, the commercial
viability of such mills is yet to be established. HVM, Haryana is establishing mini
dhal mills as a part of a networked system of group enterprises in Hisar, where it
is attempting to integrate the operation of mini-dhal mills with the system design
developed for the implementation of the oil expeller.
PTI and the context that shaped its emergence and
evolution
The People’s Science Movement owes its emergence to a complex of conceptual,
ideological, historical, and personal contexts. One part of this context relates to a
disillusionment with the mainstream development process and specifically to a
Marxist critique of its progress that included:
• The failure of many national programs to really address then needs of the
poor. This includes both the Green Revolution paradigm of agricultural develop-
ment and the integrated rural development program of that period
• The failure of poverty-targeted programs to address poverty
• The global context of the emergence of the appropriate and intermediate
technology movement and its ultimate failure to restructure technology
development relations.
The other part of this context is related to factors during the 1980s that
nurtured an alternative to mainstream approaches among an activist movement
which has its origins in the discourse on the future practice of Marxist philosophy
in an underdeveloped country like India.
A notable feature of the PTI is that the movement activists have intervened in
the debate on development in the tradition of constructive work. In India, as
experiments, these initiatives represent a constructive response to the ongoing
protests against:
• Large-scale public technology interventions such as large dam schemes
• Agricultural technology development trajectories that are not environmentally
sustainable, that do not conserve biodiversity and that were viewed as socially
divisive
• A centralized model of industrial development where agricultural and other
natural resources production and supply relationship were structured around
a Western capitalist techno-economic paradigm of development.
Unlike some civil society movements, the People’s Science Movement
recognizes the importance of science and technology for the realization of alternate
development to achieve the aims of poverty reduction and empowerment. It,
however, took issue with the prevailing patterns of governance and power associated
with science and technology and with the way this skewed the outcome of the
emerging development paradigm. These concerns led to the development of an
alternative perspective with regard to technology/production/society relationships
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that was both rooted in science and society contentions, in combination with a
leftist critique of the development process.
The following points in respect of the conceptual and philosophical perspectives
seem to matter to the PTI activists:
• A commitment to constructive protest for change – an activist philosophy
• A commitment to enabling access to scientific knowledge for all
• A commitment to reshaping technology systems so that they embed in, and
are shaped by the visions of the social systems to be established
• Conceptual principles that recognize the need to break down the organizational
and institutional (in the sense of rule sets and norms) boundaries of formal
scientific research, seeking more socially relevant organizing principles
• Conceptual principles that view needs assessment not in terms of technical
constraints analysis, but rather in terms of the systems, resource, and skill
embedded in and linked to rural communities; the potentials these present,
and the way linkages with other S&T nodes can be strengthened. This also
helps focus on an entry point that can be used to strength local systems and
the capacities they contain
• A view of the development process that recognizes that primary production
through land-based activities is unlikely to be poverty-focused. This has led to
greater emphasis on non-farm, secondary processing and value addition
through the development of (mainly) agro-based enterprises
• An ideological perspective that views the local or community economy as the
unit of production. Operationally this means that a network or collective system
of production has to be adopted. This is achieved through the establishment of
workers co-operatives
• A commitment to developing systems and nodal capacities that can allow the
poor to interface with formal S&T and other individuals and agencies, and to
do so independently of external intervention.
Several critical developments allowed the disparate parts of this movement to
coalesce and take organizational form. These included:
1. DST programs of S&T for weaker sections and similar state-sponsored schemes.
2. The visionary role of individuals both in the DST and within the activist movement
itself.
3. The emergence of S&T voluntary organizations (STVOs), starting with the Delhi
Science Forum and others.
4. The emergence of a collective identity of these organizations as a national
People’s Science Movement
A further context that allowed this alternative approach to take shape
concerned a loosening of institutional rigidities in public-sector research
organizations, particularly in the CSIR. The PTI viewed sources of knowledge in
systems terms, seeking to reorganize S&T expertise around technology systems
embedded in community-based contexts (rather than disciplinary and corporate
enterprise contexts). Program support from the DST helps to draw together cross-
organizational expertise, breaking down the barriers of disciplinary funding and
rigid mandates inherent in research council institutional arrangements.
A final contextual feature relates to the evolution of different SVTO’s and the
way they have adapted the PTI ideals to different local institutional and development
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contexts, introducing considerable variation. Processes within the People’s Science
Movement are being consciously utilized to articulate and communicate these
conceptual and philosophical perspectives within and between the PTI. Needless
to say, the processes are less than smooth. Debates exist inside on who is
implementing, to what extent the rules are enunciated, and how much of the
informal shared values are shared within the broader People’s Science Movement.
The nature and role of partnerships in the PTI
As discussed earlier in the description of technology implementation mechanisms,
the approach needs the formation of bridging organizations for the creation of
relevant partnerships. The partnerships involved in the PTI approach are of two
types. The first is partnerships within the movement and its different organizational
elements and the critical partnership with the poor themselves. The second is
the partnerships between PTI and the formal (usually) public research institutions
and the agencies funding the programs with which the PTI is involved.
The role of bridging organizations
In the proposed approach the bridging institutions to be set up have a very
important role in partnership building. The approach suggests the formation of
technology generating groups, system design and development groups, and S&T
field groups as bridging institutions. The organization that plays the role of a
system development group is critical. The approach to technology implementation
suggests that laboratories, as technology generating groups, will be required to
collaborate with the two new groups: the S&T field groups and the system design
and development groups. The S&T activists being identified for the bridging role
are asked to act as part of the system design and development group and to take
care of the functions of: executive co-ordination of opportunity analysis; system
design; technology specification; technology adaptation and proving; management
information systems; monitoring; and. organizational guidance for enterprise
development, network formation and technology replication.
In this approach the S&T field groups are important as they provide the
connection with the rural poor to every other actor. The S&T field groups are
formed by such persons who are capable of performing the functions of
entrepreneurial leadership. The S&T field persons are selected from among the
users, and are themselves users. They are selected from among the users for
their ability to provide entrepreneurial leadership to the local producers. They
are an active interface of the technology-generating organization in the field. Their
income comes from participation in production. They participate in the tasks of
need identification, user development, technology adaptation, and network
formation. They are selected and trained by the S&T persons identified for system
group development and technology development functions. They may be selected
either from among the S&T voluntary agencies that are willing to perform this
role, or from among the potential users who are willing to establish the role of
mother units for the satellite users.
Needless to say, the above-mentioned collaborators need to be nurtured by
the agencies as close network partners in an interactive, bottom-up, and user-
oriented process of technology implementation.
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Partnerships as a process
To understand this concept some details of the process are necessary. Such
interventions have led to the successful establishment of a range of rural
enterprises serving local markets in selected field sites. These have usually been
related to agro-based products or natural resources; for example, pottery, leather
tanning, and agro-processing of fruit and vegetables. Experience shows that there
are a number of elements involved.
Partnerships in planning: need identification
A PTI initiative usually starts with a system design group involving the members
of an S&T field group who together with poor people from rural areas undertake a
field investigation and develop an implementation plan. The term ‘system design’
signifies an approach that is different from needs assessment in the conventional
sense. The approach is to identify resources in rural areas and opportunities in
local economies and then formulate the nature of the technology system that
would be required to strengthen the local economy and the participation of the
poor in it. An important aspect of the approach is its preference for primarily
selecting those opportunities that will help the S&T field group to act as a hook to
network small producers over a large area. The focus on non-farm interventions
allows this and is used to anchor a related set of activities alongside, e.g., processing
different crops or other value addition or marketing activities. This approach
suggests the implementation of an important and different type of partnership to
that conventionally found in development interventions. It is a partnership between
rural people and bridging organizations wanting to work in the local economy,
with a view to identifying ways in which the whole can be strengthened.
Partnership in participatory technology proving and shaping
Technology proving and replication are seen as participatory jobs to be implemented
in collaboration with users through the system of S&T field groups and system
design and development groups. Technologies developed in laboratories have to
often go through a phase of participatory proving for successful technology
replication. This is particularly applicable when the enterprises are of the rural
poor and are to operate in competitive markets. Such a phase helps the S&T field
groups to also build into the process a skeletal production network in which the
local people are fully involved. In this way it is possible to avoid the commonly
observed phenomena whereby local people are alienated from the process of
enterprise development. An understanding of the existing knowledge, resources,
relations, and culture is considered a pre-condition for the success of technology
implementation. It helps technologies to be rapidly replicated and eases network
development.
The S&T personnel cannot be expected to provide ‘ready to implement’
technology variants to field groups working in diverse environments. They will
need persons who can interact with them to identify requirements of design
modification and improvements in quality control protocols. Persons will be needed
who can document varied field experiences and create knowledge bases, decision-
support systems, and training manuals for use in the multiplication phase of
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technology implementing units. Successful enterprise establishment needs not
only technology that is adapted to local conditions, but also support in terms of
management information systems, arrangements for access to finance, land and
other resources, and training. Such functions can be performed successfully when
these services are provided in an integrated manner. This means that the
capabilities required for interface are in the nature of system analysis/synthesis
and can be provided only if there is a dedicated system design and development
group specifically constituted to perform these functions. The persons comprising
this group normally therefore include those who are/were field activists/or persons
who have been intimately associated with field activists for a period of time.
Partnerships in capacity development and implementation: user
involvement and participation
The S&T field group is a key link of PTI with the poor people in rural areas. It
arranges to mobilize poor people to participate in the initiative as technology users.
Therefore, one of the key tasks of the system design and development group is to
identify members of the S&T field group. The members of the system design and
development group help in the capacity development of the S&T field group. They
are groomed to develop their entrepreneurial leadership qualities, and in turn to
take the responsibility of developing more entrepreneurial leaders among the rural
poor. For this to happen successfully the organizational model that they adopt is
that of the worker-managed cooperative. The S&T field group also performs the
crucial role of mother unit in the network. It helps to organize users to establish
networked units, be these satellite or independent. For the supply and
implementation of technological inputs, the role of field- level interaction with the
users, particularly from among artisans, landless labor, and small-scale farmers,
is performed by the S&T field group. But what is important, is that this group is
not a parasite. It actively participates in production to ensure continuity and
development. It also undertakes interaction with technology generating institutions
to upgrade the skills of producers in new/improved technology and their
organization and management. Since the new/improved technologies are often
not readily available, the approach also envisages the involvement of technology
generators from various institutions in such functions as guiding field
investigations and opportunities analysis and technology development and
implementation. The system design and development group and technology-
generating groups (TGs) help the S&T field groups perform the functions of guiding
field investigations and opportunity analysis, training, design of manuals,
assistance in start-up and trouble shooting, prototype design, pilot-scale
demonstration, adaptive research, etc. S&T field group members learn a lot while
working on the job. The system design and development group systematically co-
ordinates capacity development; it undertakes the task of continuously training
S&T field group members and orients them to group entrepreneurship and
participative management. Once again, the relationship between the PTI and S&T
field group members is a critical partnership that is nurtured as the intervention
develops and evolves along the way.
58
Partnership with the science community: scientific organizations
without walls
As already suggested, the task of the system design and development group is
also to develop linkages with scientists within the formal science system. The
approach is that this group will first look at the indigenous knowledge of rural
people and use this as a starting point to build the technological system and its
capabilities. Formal science is therefore used as a way of strengthening existing
technological starting points and building techno-economic trajectories from the
bottom up. The PTI takes the perspective of starting with the occupations of the
rural poor in non-farm sectors, and looking at how formal S&T can improve the
technologies involved and can help develop the quality of primary production and
supply systems to link decentralized processing to the local and wider economy.
However, when it comes to developing partnerships with the formal science
system, the PTI does not partner with organizations, instead preferring to link
with individuals. In fact this has been one of the key networking achievement of
the PTI as it has built up a network of individuals working in the formal science
system who recognize that S&T can be exploited in different ways. The PTI recognize
this approach as one that helps to construct scientific organizations without walls.
Building up these ties with the formal scientific (and as can be seen below)
government establishment has been an important mechanism for garnering
sufficient support to make PTI initiatives a reality. Without this network support
one could quite easily see how such an idea could remain little more than a
pipedream.
Partnerships with funders
As was alluded to in the introductory sections of this paper, an initial impetus for
launching the PTI was the start of the S&T for Weaker Sections scheme within the
Indian Government’s Department for Science and Technology (DST). More
specifically, it was the funding that the DST made available, and indeed other
sources of funding have been made available. An important point here is that
DST was a key partner in the evolution of the PTI. The S&T for Weaker Sections
scheme recognized the value of an approach that one could argue flies in the face
of all that is held to be good scientific practice in the formal scientific organizations
of India. This type of partnership needs to be recognized.
Institutional rigidities faced by the PTI
 Naturally an approach such as that of the PTI has repeatedly encountered
institutional rigidities, rule sets and norms of formal S&T organizations, and other
administrative systems. As has already been discussed, networking at an individual
level has been an important way of dealing with rigidities. This has been important
as a way of bring together formal S&T expertise from different institutional settings,
an outcome that would have been much more difficult to achieve through
partnerships at the organization level.
One persistent area of rigidity concerns the rules that accompany many
sponsors. The main problem is that sponsors like to have a clear statement at the
beginning of the project about the nature of the problem and how it will be resolved
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and the project executed. This tends to sit uncomfortably with an approach that
is evolutionary in nature, i.e., in the sense it is process-driven, concentrating on
developing local capacities and pursuing opportunities in the local economy as
and where they arise. In fact the PTI felt that its reliance on grants was becoming
rigid within the organization itself. In other words, it has to make serious efforts
to overcome a norm that is both creating dependency and bringing with it the
rigidities and norms of the outside funding agency.
Lessons and the learning process in the PTI
The critical issue for the PTI is that as an approach it has developed and evolved
over time. And it has not developed and evolved uniformly across the country.
Instead, a number of variants in the approached have emerged. This diversity is
seen as a healthy sign that the approach is adapting itself to different contexts
and circumstances. There are a number of lessons that PTI has learned along the
way these include the:
• Importance of using indigenous knowledge as a starting point
• Importance of developing networks with individuals in formal scientific and
administrative organizations
• Cost of failure and the need to insulate the poor from this in program
implementation
• Importance of concentrating on the local economy as the unit of intervention
• Value of networking together small rural enterprise units
• Critical importance of selecting the best entry point and the importance of by
whom this is selected, and how. The make-up of the system design and
development group and the involvement poor people have been very important
• Recognition that the system design and development group has to complete its
task relatively quickly to maintain momentum.
Take for example, the lessons learned from the case of development of a system
design based on the oil expeller developed by CSIR by the People’s Science
Movement. In face of the competition from cheap imports of palm oil the main
weakness faced by the implementing team in Hisar was the slow pace of local
market development for the packaged mustard oil. Experience indicated that
though it was quite possible for the rural poor based group enterprise to grow on
the basis of the opportunities available in local markets through the introduction
of compound cattlefeed, but the development of local markets for packaged mustard
oil was taking time. It has always been clearly realized that a wide range of factors
could easily adversely affect the pace of local market development. It came out
that often these factors are such that the rural poor would find them difficult to
control. For example, as in the case of oil expeller, right from the beginning the
unit had to face the additional difficulty of unfair competition inflicted on the sale
of unadulterated, unblended, pure mustard oil due to the import of cheaper palm
oil. During this period all over India the markets for mustard oil were heavy
sufferers due to the lack of safeguards at both at the level of the legislation required
on blending and labeling, and the customs duty leveled on imported oils. The
expected premium for pungency of mustard oil was also not easy to obtain in the
local rural market segments of Hisar. As a result, throughout the project period
the unit established in Kanwari was definitely faced with heavy competition in
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the local market. Local markets of Hisar were not sufficient as such to absorb
fully the main value-added product yielded by the technology system. To sustain
itself the enterprise was induced to tap the non-local mustard oil markets of
Rohtak, Jind, and Delhi where the FG had its contacts. Clear lessons were learnt
about the role that non-local markets can play even in the initial stage.
Experience with the implementation of interfaces in the innovation system,
the support to Jan Taknik Network (JATAN), Hisar, HVM, the S&T field group
established at Kanwari from the youth of the village has been quite critical to the
successful implementation of PTI including competence development for
technological innovations. Village youth supported the efforts for mobilization of
local funds. As some of the young people are working in the mills in Hisar the S&T
field group was able to use those contacts to build links with skilled innovative
people working in large oil mills. Thanks to these contacts this S&T field group
has contributed extremely useful inputs to the successful development of the
technology system, particularly in respect of oil filtration.
The nodal team (N-level group) formed at Hisar with the help of the activists of
HVM, a People’s Science Movement group was found to be an essential condition
for success in the implementation of system design It had access to external
competencies of HAU, and National Institute of Science, Technology, and
Development Studies (NISTADS), Delhi, CSIR, etc. With the help of this nodal
group the S&T field group could easily make all the efforts needed to learn the
capabilities required for network development. Innovative protocols needed to be
designed for in-house filtration, quality control and packaging of mustard oil to
be competitive in the local market. The nodal group located was able to help the
S&T field group to gain access to the competencies needed to complete the
technology package.
Active encouragement to the participation of workers in the management of
group enterprises has been a point of debate within the movement. It has been
generally found that while selected workers are always quite comfortable in these
initiatives with the learning of technological competences they have taken more
time to develop such economic competences as market-building, sales recovery,
and management. Particularly, experience with the reformist leadership practices
of activists and preference for comfortable funding approaches have been debated.
Conclusions are that the movement must shun these weaknesses at the earliest
if it is to succeed better with the replication process.
And there are undoubtedly many more specific and general principles that
have been learned along the way. But perhaps a more important question in
relation to an approach that has successfully learned and developed in new and
useful ways is how this learning takes place. Formal evaluations, usually associated
initiatives supported by external funds, have been an important way of monitoring
outcomes of the approach against stated aims (see below on poverty relevance).
However, probably much more important has been the constant debates and
interactions among those involved in the Peoples Movement. This relates closely
to the organizational culture of the PTI. Members all have a very strong personal
commitment to the underlying ideology of the movement and as such have a
personal stake in the way it is interpreted and implemented. This appears to
have lead to a tradition of robust debate and reflection on the relative merits of
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approaches practices and principles. This sort of organizational culture seems to
be the most recognizable mechanism by which the PTI learns and evolves, and
with a fair degree of such success by all accounts.
PTI’s poverty focus
The PTI has an explicit poverty focus to its work, seeking only to work with the
poor. It achieves this focus in a number of ways. Perhaps the most important way
is that it believes that if the poor are to be reached by interventions these
interventions should not be based on the ownership of land. In other words, by
placing greater emphasis on non-farm, secondary processing and value addition
through the development of (mainly) agro-based enterprises, the approach seeks
to focus on households without land. In many rural areas this landless category
should contain the poorest households.
As mentioned earlier PTI programs have been evaluated formally by their
sponsors. These evaluations have tended to confirm that the approach is
specifically addressing poverty reduction and targeting the poor. The PTI itself is
not satisfied and feels its needs to strive harder to work for the poor and focus
specifically on their needs.
Conclusion
The PTI espouses an alternative paradigm of S&T and rural development. The
approach emerges out of the broader People’s Science Movement in India, itself a
backlash against what was viewed as the weak governance of science and its
failure to meet the needs of the poor and to enhance their productive capacities.
The elements of the PTI reflect these contextual origins with an approach that
seeks to build technology systems around local knowledge and resources – rather
than vice versa as is the case with conventional models of technology development.
As can be seen, networking and building partnerships has been a very important
element in the PTI – both in terms of individual initiatives and in terms of promoting
and supporting the approach more widely. A final point that is notable is the
capacity-development focus of the PTI. This is capacity development both in terms
of enhancing the skills and technologies of poor people, and but also in the sense
of linking the poor to sources of S&T and thus enhancing the capacity of the local
technology system. The evolutionary characteristics of this capacity development
are typical of a learning-based approach where the goals are the competitive
advantage of the poor, and not of the nation in whose name the rich only benefit
more. This case perhaps presents a rather radical alternative to mainstream
S&T and rural development initiatives, however the principles of partnership and
learning are clearly more widely relevant and could be adopted by others.
Endnote
This paper is the output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom Department
for International Development (DFID). The views expressed are not necessarily those of
DFID [R7502: Crop Post-Harvest Programme]. The author is grateful to A J Hall for
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6 May 2002.
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Abstract
A capacity-building program was undertaken over a 4-year period during the mid
1990s. The African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) Capacity Development
Programme [CDP] was established in 1994 to enhance policy analysis capacities in
sub-Saharan Africa with special reference to issues of technology and environmental
policy arising out of Agenda 21 at the Rio Earth Summit, 1992. A number of important
features and lessons emerged from this experience: 1. the introduction of policy analysis
directly to the recipients (government officials) and the providers of knowledge (research
sector), 2. focus on the problem as the unit of analysis rather than the academic discipline,
3. combination of broad orientation lectures and seminars (to bring participants up to
speed with basic issues and agendas) with field research project work (to show
participants that there is much to be gained by interacting directly with those at the
receiving end of public policy, 4. training in basic communications skills (verbal and
written), and 5. focus on a specific set of policy issues (those arising from the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climatic
Change). Despite some success with this approach it became clear that this a new
form of capacity building that needs further exploration. The main lesson perhaps is
that such initiatives should be tried out in other contexts. What is certainly true is that
the need for this type of capacity building program is a sad reflection on the higher
education sector in many countries.
Introduction
The African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) Capacity Development
Programme [CDP] was established in 1994 to enhance policy analysis capacities
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with special reference to issues of technology and
environmental policy arising out of Agenda 21 of the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED). Agenda 21 was negotiated and agreed
at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. It set out the goals and mechanisms designed
to achieve sustainable development. Its main focus was to build capacity amongst
public officials to implement sustainable development programs related to the
major international environmental conventions with special emphasis on the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC). The CDP training courses were also
1. Graduate School of Environmental Studies (GSES), Wolfson Centre, University of Strathclyde,
Glasgow, G4 0NW, UK
2. Commission of Science and Technology, New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)
Secretariat, based at the Development Bank of Southern Africa, Midrand, South Africa
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made available to selected personnel from research institutions, the NGO sector,
and private enterprise. The concentration was on public policy analysis and the
skills imparted covered: policy research, formulation, implementation, monitoring,
control, and evaluation. Over the 4 years between 1995 and 1998 nine courses
took place, including an initial trial course early in 1994. Some 60 people in all
benefited from the training. Typical issues covered included intellectual property
rights (IPR) protection and technology transfer promotion, protection of indigenous
knowledge, regulation of access to genetic resources, biosafety regulation,
environmental planning, the valuation and sustainable use of biodiversity, local
incentives for environmental protection and the transfer and adoption of ‘clean’
technologies.
This paper has been included in this publication for two reasons. Firstly, it
represents an innovation in technology development; as far as we know nothing
similar has been attempted previously. Secondly, it is an example of a consortium
of organizations getting together for a common purpose and then learning how to
do things better as the project proceeded. In fact the CDP as a whole was a learning
experience and for this reason evolved significantly over the period from 1994–98.
A number of early assumptions and procedures were found to be misplaced and
corresponding changes were put in place. The second Section attempts a definition
of capacity building and explores how it was becoming increasingly important in
the period before the CDP was launched. The third Section describes in detail
why the CDP was started, while the fourth Section outlines how the CDP was
structured and implemented. The fifth Section deals with finance and
administration, and the sixth explains how the training course received academic
validation from a northern university with relevant expertise. This is followed by
an overall evaluation, and finally some overall conclusions about partnerships
and the need for institutional reform are drawn.
Capacity building
The notion of capacity building has come on to the developmental agenda
comparatively recently and is now enshrined as a primary objective in the mission
statements of a number of relevant international bodies. Discussion of ‘capacity’
probably goes back to the Berg Report of the early 1980s (World Bank 1981) when
it seems to have been used as a ‘catch-all’ concept to denote the need for many
Third World countries to take charge of their own developmental destiny. Later on
perhaps the agency that has made it most central to its mission statement is the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), particularly in relation to
environmental conservation. The mission was launched at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development conference in Rio de Janeiro in
1992 as Capacity 21 and was hailed as the ‘main post-UNCED international effort
to take forward the principles that were agreed at Rio [to] assist countries to
attain sustainable development’ (UNDP 1994). UNDP define capacity building as
the ‘sum of efforts needed to nurture, enhance and use the skills of people and
institutions to progress towards sustainable development’ (UNDP 1994). In 1993
UNDP instituted a funding program to enhance this capacity, this was a program
designed specifically to involve as wide a spectrum of ‘stakeholders’ as possible. A
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typical project under this program was one for Swaziland, designed to integrate
environmental management strategies into the National Development Strategy
and to do so using ‘new participatory processes’. Another was a project co-
sponsored with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) designed to
build capacities in the field of environmental law; such capacities are needed for
the implementation of national obligations incurred under various international
protocols.
Environmental management has increasingly come on to the international
policy agenda as a result of UNCED and the subsequent meeting at Kyoto in
1997. The problem is that despite good intentions on the part of politicians who
sign up to international agreements, the ‘capacity’ of governments to fulfill
resultant obligations at national level is often weak. Administrative organizations
are used to the applications of fairly standard policy instruments such as those
associated with monetary and fiscal interventions, but these have difficulty in
coping with issues involving the natural environment. Thus, for example, Clark
and Juma (1998) have criticized the ‘incremental cost’ rule used by the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF) in decision-making about projects designed to fulfill
such agreements at national level. Their proposition is that measures to deal
with environmental degradation cannot rest solely on a project basis that is
informed only by (such a) rule, analytically useful though (this) is. Economic
systems are complex things that evolve in unpredictable ways and whose
development is of central importance to those who live and work in them. Donors
are sometimes curiously ambiguous on this point. On the one hand they prefer
lending rules that are bureaucratically easy to administer, while on the other
hand they would like recipients to behave in ways that reflect their own political
agendas which in turn reflect pre-dispositions about how development really takes
place. What they tried to show, however, is that since economic systems evolve
unpredictably (at least relatively so) there is a prima facie case for capacity-building
at the policy level to accompany project decisions that are environmentally related.
A similar point has been made by Hayes and Smith (1993) who point out in a
detailed survey of relevant contributions that ‘a greenhouse regime must be flexible
enough to demonstrate what is possible rather than to strive for final policy
commitments that are simply ignored’ (Hayes and Smith 1993). There is little
point, for example, in relying on the importation of (environmentally) clean
technologies (through project aid) in the absence of the capacity to understand
what these technologies are, and how they may be diffused throughout the
economic system. Instead they call for donors to ‘accept longer time horizons and
invest in long-running training programs rather than (rely only upon) traditional
aid projects’ (Hayes and Smith 1993).
But what exactly is ‘capacity’ and how can it be defined? In its earlier guises
it was mainly about management of structural adjustment through local ownership
of resources, local human resource development, and the relative avoidance of
expatriate influences (e.g., through consultants). In its more recent guises it has
become more to do with governance and how institutional innovations can help
ensure greater efficiency and accountability in the mobilization and control of
national resources (King 1992). The CDP, however, was influenced by a yet more
recent orientation, the technological capabilities that countries have (or do not
68
have) to transform their economic systems. Although interest in this area is
comparatively recent in the development literature it is arguable that capacity
defined in this way probably underlies all other definitions, simply because it
relates to the capacity of an economic system to transform itself. It therefore has
the following broad properties:
• It is concerned with people-embodied skills and competences
• It carries with it the notion that such ‘capacities’ go well beyond expertise in
the normal (reductionist) sense of that word. In particular they are not
isomorphic with academic disciplines
• The idea of ‘capacity’ is often concerned with technology and technological
transformation of resources for socio-economic ends
• There is a frequent, if tacit, assumption that ‘capacities’ are underrepresented
in disadvantaged groups (i.e., women, the rural labor force, the poor, etc.)
• It is frequently stated (or implied) that more resources ought now to be
channeled into ‘capacity building’, if necessary at the expense of such traditional
instruments of economic development as higher education, major investment
projects or the employment of expatriate consultants.
Perhaps the best way of approaching the concept is through the recent writings
of a school of economists who take inspiration from the writings of Joseph
Schumpeter. Schumpeterians, although very few of them have actually paid much
attention to Third World problems, start off from the position that innovation is
the key ingredient in economic transformation, stressing the importance of a total
systems approach to the development problem and, within this, the great
significance of what have come to be known as ‘technological capabilities’. While
there is no single accepted definition of this term, nevertheless a growing minority
of analysts and practitioners have begun to realize that it somehow captures the
essentially creative and non-linear realities of the change process, a process that
it is essential to understand if the world is to proceed rapidly towards sustainable
development (see Adeboye and Clark (1996) for a fuller discussion of this point).
Technological capabilities have recently been defined in various ways by a
range of analysts. Lall (1992), for example, sees them as a range of capacities that
allow an economic system to understand best-practice technology on a world scale
and to use this understanding to promote more rapid economic growth than would
otherwise have been possible. Such capacities are closely determined by
indigenous technological efforts to master new technologies, adapt them to local
conditions, improve and diffuse them within the economy, and then exploit them
overseas by manufactured export growth and diversification, and eventually by
the export of the technologies themselves. Bell and Pavitt (1993) for whom the
notion of ‘capability’ is equally concerned with the capacity for change but is
expressed rather differently have suggested another definition.
‘We draw a distinction between two stocks of resources: production capacity
and technological capabilities. The former incorporates the resources used to
produce industrial goods at given levels of efficiency and given input combinations:
equipment (capital embodied technology), labor skills (operating and managerial
know-how and experience), product and input specifications, and the
organizational methods and systems used. Technological capabilities (on the other
hand) incorporate the resources needed to generate and manage technical change,
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including skills, knowledge and experience, and institutional structures and
linkages. We emphasize the distinction between the two because we are primarily
interested in the dynamics of industrialization, and hence in the resources
necessary to generate and manage that dynamism.’ (Authors’ emphasis)
Traditionally there was emphasis on the former because it was simply assumed
that the latter would occur automatically as a kind of marginal ‘add on’ to direct
foreign investment. However, nowadays it is slowly being realized that with the
growing knowledge intensity of production that is not so. Indeed, if we can accept
the historical research of authorities like Fukusaku (1995) and Fransman (1995),
it was probably never really the case. Fukusaku shows how the technological
development of the Japanese shipbuilding sector over the period 1880–1939 was
heavily dependent on systematic investments in technological capabilities carefully
orchestrated by both corporate and national policy. And for Bell and Pavitt (1993)
it is therefore essential for policy to focus on this area. In particular they stress:
1. The importance of direct foreign investment
2. The growing importance of the science base, and therefore the need for heavy
investments in education, training, and skills
3. Appropriate incentives for innovation and imitation
4. Favorable product-market conditions
5. Institutions and policies that will encourage learning.
However, they readily admit that we still do not have much idea about the
conditions for successful learning, arguing that ‘we have too few careful empirical
studies in developing countries of the nature and determinants of successful
learning at the level of the firm or industry, including the role of government
policy and supporting institutions’ Bell and Pavitt (1993). What is common to
both sources, and indeed to many others such as Hobday (1994a; 1994b); Weiss
(1993); and Ernst et al. (1998), is that capacity-building in this (technological)
sense has a number of specific characteristics which tend to set it apart from
traditional definitions. These characteristics are that:
1. The acquisition, validation, and use of knowledge is fundamental to capacity-
building
2. This knowledge is not freely available, but on the contrary, has to be sought
through the committal of scarce resources
3. It is not universally applicable across time and space but has to be adapted to
the context in which it is to be used
4. It can be held both by individuals and by organizations
5. Its effective promotion and use in an economic sense needs to take place as
close as possible to the process of economic production
6. Its effective promotion will need new types of institutional structures.4
Programme rationale
As outlined above the CDP began in 1994 although its planning began in 1993
under the auspices of the Second ACTS Medium Term Plan. Prior to 1993 ACTS
had developed primarily as a contract research institution funded mainly through
4. A discussion of how these factors relate to governance issues in Africa more generally is
contained in Juma and Clark (1995)
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project grants and consulting income. The rationale for moving into human
resource development as well was as follows: 1. Interdisciplinary research bodies
breaking new ground have always had great problems recruiting suitable staff. 2.
The existing pool has often been brought up in conventional ways, i.e., learning
analytical techniques in university systems structured on the basis of single
disciplines. 3. By the time a student has proceeded to the graduate level (and
gone on to obtain a masters or a doctoral degree) he/she usually has great difficulty
in engaging in the kinds of activities needed by such research bodies as ACTS.
This problem was compounded in two further ways. Firstly, the idea of ‘policy
research’ is extremely novel even in such industrialized countries such as the
UK, so that temporary assistance from an international pool is hard to obtain
notwithstanding the normal difficulties associated with the acquisition of work
permits. Secondly, many African universities have regrettably declined greatly
over the past 15–20 years in terms of the quality of their educational provision.
And this is particularly so at postgraduate level where it is actually very hard to
identify a school providing the types of empirical training necessary for the
production of good quality research staff relevant to ACTS. All too often, for example,
students appear able to obtain masters degrees without ever having engaged in
sustained field research; the absence of this type of ‘research culture’ in graduate
schools appears to strongly influence subsequent research performance. In short,
ACTS was forced into ‘growing its own staff’ and the CDP was established partly
for this reason.
It was also becoming clear at ACTS that despite considerable success in
producing the normal output of a research institution (i.e., through reports,
articles, books, etc.) these were not apparently having the direct impact on policy
that was expected. In fact, it had become clear that policy advice is only acceptable
if recipients actually understand it and since few apparently did, this meant that
ACTS would need to begin to create its own ‘constituency’ of policy-makers. It was
partly for this reason that the CDP concentrated primarily on building capacity
amongst public officials to implement sustainable development programs
associated with obligations incurred by national governments under recent
environmental conventions. The focus was therefore to be on public policy (i.e.,
on analysis, research, formulation, implementation, monitoring, control, and
evaluation) pertaining to sustainable development in general, although
subsequently the program narrowed down mainly to issues associated with
biodiversity conservation. In addition it was expected that operating at a regional
level would help to create a regional ‘constituency across SSA’.
However, probably the most important factor was objective need. For it was
already becoming clear that although much of Africa had signed up to Agenda 21
and the associated conventions, the actual implementation of associated action
plans, policies, etc would certainly be hindered because of lack of public policy-
making capacity. If progress towards fulfilling the goals of the CBD is to be made,
for example, national governments would need at the very least a cadre of trained
people that not only understood the CBD but could also advise on its substantive
implementation. Hence the need for suitable training courses was also self-evident.
Indeed subsequently ACTS found (through discussions at COP 4) that it is still
the only international organization mounting policy-oriented courses to meet such
a need.
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Course format
Typically the CDP training courses lasted for 3 months. They normally specified a
particular theme and were implemented on a dual-track approach. In the first
place participants were introduced, through a series of lectures, workshops,
discussion groups, and plenary sessions, to a range of topics of relevant to the
overall theme of the course. In most cases these were provided by ACTS own
training staff although international experts were often brought in from such
bodies as the World Resources Institute (WRI), Washington at various points in
CDP to provide up-to-date insights on specific issues and organizations. In addition,
field trips were arranged to enable participants to visit institutions whose work
relates closely to the implementation of international environmental agreements.
Besides this general orientation, emphasis was also given to a second activity,
that of the preparation of a policy paper. Participants were expected to bring with
them a problem of particular relevance to their own country that they then
researched during the training course. All participants were assigned a personal
tutor whose function it was to act as an academic adviser throughout the course.
In particular, the personal tutor advised participants on developing their project
proposals. During the course they were provided with relevant writing,
presentation, policy research techniques, problem formulation, and other skills
necessary to carry out this task. Participants also had available a series of specially
selected texts in the ACTS library and were taken to the UNEP and the International
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) libraries from time to time. By the
end of the course they were expected to prepare and submit a policy paper and to
present their findings at a final regional workshop.
International quality standards
Course certificates were validated through a special arrangement with the
Graduate School of Environmental Studies (GSES), University of Strathclyde, UK
(see further discussion below). This link was supported by a grant from the UK
Darwin Initiative for the Survival of the Species. Besides supporting the travel
costs of Strathclyde staff to Africa the Darwin Initiative also provided a number of
fellowships to fund travel, maintenance, and tutorial costs for trainees who perform
well enough on the courses to be considered for acceptance into the Research
Degree Programme at Strathclyde. What was particularly innovative about the
ACTS/Strathclyde relationship is that these research students spend most of
their time (65%) in Africa on both fieldwork and supervised desk research.
Links to other ACTS activities
It is important to stress links to other ACTS programs. For example, through its
regional workshops the CDP provided a forum for raising public awareness on
international and national environmental policy issues. The research output of
ACTS provided updated materials for the courses while very often the policy papers
of the participants contributed to ACTS published output. Finally, on returning
home trainees began to provide a ‘constituency’ for ACTS policy research in many
parts of the continent, since they provided a focus for the comprehension,
interpretation, and implementation of associated policy recommendations.
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Finance and administration
CDP had two types of funding ‘core’ and ‘fellowship’. The former was designed to
cover the overhead costs of administration, while the fellowships covered the
marginal costs of the individual courses. Core funding for CDP was originally
supplied by Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD). Subsequent
core finance was provided by Norway (NORAD) and Sweden (SAREC), the UK Darwin
Initiative, and the John D and Catherine McArthur Foundation. Fellowships were
supplied by Finland (FINNIDA), NORAD, McArthur and the Sasakawa and Ford
Foundations. These fellowships, worth some US$10,000 per participant, were
normally split into two equal parts. One part was to meet the maintenance,
incidental and travel costs of participants, while the other covered the tutorial
costs of the course.
Administration was handled by a Programme Administrator under the guidance
of a part-time Academic Director. This latter position has been filled since the
inception of the CDP by the author of this paper under an arrangement with the
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. Besides providing an academic ‘backstop’ for
the CDP he and his colleagues also collaborate on ACTS research activities.
Academic validation
Right from its inception the CDP decided that its training courses should have
adequate academic validation and that the certificates on offer should be treated
as internationally accredited postgraduate qualifications. The main reason for
this was to give the program as a whole a high degree of credibility. It also acts as
an incentive for participants to treat the courses more seriously than perhaps
they otherwise might. The means used was to enter into an arrangement with a
northern university that would validate the ACTS certificate as part of its normal
postgraduate operations. This is quite a usual activity these days and is used
internationally in many contexts. Validation by a university had the added
attraction that it created possibilities for the best participants to go on to register
for a research degree, thus giving them another incentive.
The question then was – what kind of validating institution would be most
suitable? Here the most important criterion was capacity to handle the
interdisciplinary nature of environmental management. This is not so
straightforward as it might appear simply because the knowledge needed for the
policy-maker is often locked away in ‘cognitive boxes’ that are not only inaccessible
to the intelligent lay person but actually also to different professional interests.
For example, the issue of ‘desertification’ is about prices and resource allocation
to the economist, stress responsiveness of different soil types/aggregates to the
soil scientist, the weather and its vagaries to the climatologist, the structure of
power to the political scientist, etc. Sometimes they talk to each other. On occasion
they even understand each other. But, regrettably, often they do not.
The reasons for this are well known. Academic life is still very much about
reducing issues to narrow problems that are amenable to rigorous experiment,
and this is reflected in how universities are traditionally organized. Small wonder
then, that those actually responsible for environmental sustainability have
difficulty knowing whose advice to seek on questions of public policy. To fill this
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gap we are beginning to see organizational innovations in the ‘knowledge market’
(the interaction between those who need the knowledge and those who supply
and validate it). A key feature of these is the fostering of interdisciplinary training
on the part of a small number of universities; training that often takes the form of
postgraduate management and policy studies. In the end, after reviewing a number
of possibilities, GSES was chosen because it most closely fitted what was needed.
GSES was established in 1992 to provide training facilities for those with a
first degree or equivalent in any discipline (science, humanities, social science,
engineering, etc.) who are interested in developing skills/perspectives relevant to
environmental management. GSES- taught programs over two semesters require
students to take a constrained choice of 10 modules (out of the approximately 25
available). Those students, whose grades are good enough are allowed to proceed
to the dissertation phase, culminating hopefully in the award of a master’s degree,
those who do not proceed will normally qualify for a diploma. The modules are
drawn from all aspects of environmental studies and range from straight
environmental sciences and engineering (such as ecology and solid waste
management) to more ‘decision-making’ subjects like environmental law and
environmental economics. The dissertation is usually based on an empirical
research project (often involving work placement) on a topic relevant to industry,
local government, NGO, or regulatory authority interests. In this way the GSES is
primarily focused to build policy capacity for the years to come. Its research
interests include the international conventions, biotechnology policy,
environmental economics, and decision tools for public policy. It also has a
successful short course program.
Evaluation
As outlined above, the CDP as a whole was a learning experience and as such
evolved significantly over the period 1994–98. The most important changes during
its evolution were:
Choice of applicants
At the beginning ACTS underestimated the problem of securing suitable applicants.
Reliance upon formal advertisements and circulars to ministries across the region
tended to produce participants who were technically unsuitable, who saw the
courses mainly as a means of making money, or in some cases, both. In extreme
cases some participants were sent home. Of course, those who remained benefited
to some extent but nevertheless the CDP put significant efforts into improving the
quality and motivation of applicants. It learned to do this through: personal
contacts, announcements at relevant fora (such as regional workshops), its own
publications, and more conventional channels. As a result of these changes the
quality of applicants certainly improved.
Period of stay at ACTS
The first training courses were only held in Nairobi. However, 3 months of intensive
training proved hard, even for the most committed of participants. It was difficult
to keep concentration levels up on the part of people who were not used to this
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type of activity, as was the case with the primary target group (government officials).
In addition, there were often problems associated with absence from home for a
long period (especially, but not exclusively, for women who had children). On the
content side, although great efforts were made to ensure that policy problems
were those encountered at home base, participants frequently lost touch with
that reality since their research work was based on materials and people available
in Nairobi. Even if they had been asked to bring relevant materials with them,
they either did not do so, or they did not typically bring enough to deal adequately
with their project requirements. Finally this original course format was very
expensive in terms of resources, including staff time.
Need for research-based training
Right from its inception the CDP tried to ensure that the training activities would
relate to relevant problems and issues in participants’ home countries. What
gradually became clear, however, was that the best results were achieved when
participants were able to have direct ‘hands on’ empirical experience. All too often
participants were found to have little field experience, being used to spending
most of their time behind office desks in traditional bureaucratic pursuits. The
chance to pursue fieldwork clearly enhanced both the knowledge and the
motivation of participants, judging from their performances at final regional
workshops. Conversely the earlier Nairobi-based courses tended to produce
‘bookish’ policy papers without much analytical or real policy content. There were
still some residual problems about field supervision but with time, experience,
and more staff these had lessened.
Policy/‘politics’ tension
One of the most pervasive problems encountered in the initial phases of the CDP
was the assumption that ‘policy’ emanates from ‘on high’ and has to be
implemented unquestioningly by subordinate civil servants. The notion that
competent professional civil servants should be in a position to inform and advise
their superiors on a range of policy options was not widely understood. Considerable
time was therefore spent in dealing with this issue in interactive workshops and
simulated discussion sessions, often based on an evaluation of selected case
studies. In addition the participants were strongly encouraged to write up and
present their final policy papers in such a way as to present findings as a series
of policy options with accompanying prognoses of likely impact. The balance
between ‘chalk and talk’ lecture sessions and workshop sessions also moved in
favor of the latter ‘training’ mode over the period.
Background environmental knowledge
ACTS found that even comparatively senior civil servants have a very weak grasp
of relevant background knowledge. For this reason rather more time was spent in
actually introducing the international conventions, their history, institutional
context, etc than had originally been anticipated. In addition, efforts were made
to leave participants with copies of overhead transparencies and lecture notes.
ACTS began to produce specially designed ‘readers’ for some courses and these,
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combined with copies of suitable ACTS literature, were usually sufficient to bring
participants up to speed with the necessary background to cope with course issues.
A related point concerned participants with varying technical backgrounds when
too much was initially assumed by the course organizers. Here experience showed
that it is safest to assume very little prior technical knowledge on the part of
participants, regardless of paper qualifications, at least at the beginning of courses.
This was so even in the case of participants from the research sector since their
specialized knowledge tended on the whole to be too narrow from a public policy
standpoint. Starting from first principles in had the added advantage of providing
a common baseline for all participants.
Follow-up arrangements
These were not handled systematically and were therefore a weakness of the
CDP. Originally it had been hoped that a database would be established that
would include co-ordinates and other details of alumni, resource persons, relevant
institutions, etc. Two problems stopped this idea from progressing. One was the
ongoing lack of adequate IT facilities within ACTS. The second was the loss of the
first Programme Administrator and the subsequent illness of her replacement.
Library facilities
The ACTS Library, while still in the process of establishment, was available to all
participants during the period of their stay in Nairobi. Although there were
problems in material access in the early years ACTS became satisfied that sufficient
literature was available for training purposes. This was helped especially through
the ACTS Press.
Class size
Experience of the CDP showed that relatively small class sizes tend to be
appropriate for training courses of this type. At first sight this may appear to be
expensive in terms of resources. However, it was found that class sizes of greater
than 8–10 students tend to lose cohesion and the quality of training tends to
suffer. Quality was also affected by the interactive and person-based training
mode that the CDP found to be the most effective.
Conclusions
On the basis of its experience, ACTS came to believe that the CDP was a successful
initiative that broke new ground in socio-economic development activity. Although
mistakes were made, the positive features outweighed the negative ones, and
even in the latter cases lessons were learned. On the positive side the features
were:
• The introduction of policy analysis directly to both the recipients (government
officials) and the providers of knowledge (research sector)
• The focus on the problem as the unit of analysis rather than the academic
discipline
• The combination of broad orientation lectures and seminars (to bring
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participants up to speed with basic issues and agendas) with field research
project work (to show participants that there is a lot to be gained by interacting
directly with those at the receiving end of public policy
• Training in basic communications skills (verbal and written)
• The focus on a specific set of policy issues (those arising from the CBD and the
UNFCCC)
Nevertheless, it became clear that this a new form of capacity building that
needs further exploration. There is still some way to go. Undoubtedly the course
organizers learned a great deal from their activities and indeed, continuously
attempted to improve form and content over the duration of CDP. But undoubtedly
mistakes were made and the main lesson perhaps is that initiatives like this one
should be tried out in other contexts. What is certainly true is that the need for
this type of capacity-building program is a sad reflection on the higher education
sector in many countries. At an individual level, while many African academics
make a useful contribution to ACTS activities (and some have formal positions in
the organization) one of the biggest problems faced by ACTS was how to involve
African universities institutionally. Early on an attempt was made to establish a
MoU with a Kenyan university but this failed. More generally, problems appear to
include: weaknesses at postgraduate level, an apparent inability to deal with
policy analysis, low empirical research capacities, and little experience of
interdisciplinary work. One of the challenges for future programs is therefore how
to build capacity within the African university sector. Ideally it should be the
universities themselves who produce graduates able and willing to fulfill these
sorts of roles in developing-country governance. The fact that they do not indicates
the more general need for substantial reform in postgraduate education.5
The other main (and related) lesson learned is the need for new types of
partnership to promote such activities. For example, as outlined above, academic
validation for the CDP was provided by the link with the GSES. But the CDP
benefited from a much wider range of links. Thus, considerable assistance was
received from local such NGO bodies as IUCN, UNEP, and the Kenya Wildlife Service
(KWS). These institutions regularly provided resource persons, library facilities
and help on field trips that proved essential to CDP’s success. Links were also
established with a range of sympathetic donors and with many helpful government
officials in ministries throughout SSA who assisted in numerous ways. And, despite
the institutional problems mentioned above, many individual academic personnel
from the university sector were able to contribute significantly to specific courses.
In short, the success of programs like this one will always be crucially dependent
on the orchestration of a wide range of expertise. Accessing and mobilizing such
expertise will generally mean developing new types of partnership arrangements.
In this sense institutional innovation must be a key component in capacity building
for development in the Third World.
5. For a more detailed discussion of this and related issues see Clark (2000)
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This paper is the output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom Department
for International Development (DFID). The views expressed are not necessarily those of
DFID [R7502: Crop Post-Harvest Programme].
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Abstract
Post-harvest research and development (R&D) could make a valuable contribution to
pro-poor rural development. Evidence suggests, however, that technological innovations
need to be supplemented by institutional innovations that encourage broader participation
from researchers, entrepreneurs, and users of the technology. Furthermore, greater
attention will need to be given to the wider institutional context in which innovation
takes place. This paper presents the concept of a post-harvest innovation system as a
way of exploring these issues and explains the capacity-development implications of
this perspective. Examples of post-harvest innovation systems are presented to illustrate
the critical importance of partnerships and the influence of the institutional context on
research outcomes. Ways of implementing this in research programs are then discussed.
Introduction
Post-harvest research and development (R&D) offers the potential to support the
livelihoods of poor people in developing countries as: farmers, small-scale agro-
processing entrepreneurs, off-farm laborers, and consumers of food and agri-
cultural products. It is increasingly recognized, however, that efforts to strengthen
post-harvest systems in developing countries will need to pay much greater
attention to the institutional environment in which change takes place (Hall et
al. 2002a). This institutional environment does not just concern the organizations
involved, but more importantly the norms, routines, and rules that govern the
way organizations operate and interact with each other. This distinction is
necessary as our discussion is not just about who is involved in R&D and
innovation, but also about what are the rules and norms that govern the way
learning and change emerges from organizations individually as well as through
their interaction with partners. This is important because it influences not only
the effectiveness of innovation processes generally, but also in terms of the
relevance of these innovations to different interest groups including the poor.
It is all too evident that new technology, although necessary, is not sufficient
to bring about changes in food and marketing systems. Equally, the impact of
technical change in post-harvest systems has often had questionable impact on
rural communities, particularly on the poor. There is, however, growing evidence
that relevant innovations can emerge through partnerships between organizations
1. University of Greenwich, UK, seconded to International Crops Research Institute for the
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India
2 . National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy Research (NCAP), PO Box 11305,
Library Avenue, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012, India
3 . ICRISAT
4. Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Wolfson Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow
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from research, enterprise, implementation, farming, and market sectors,
particularly where institutional conditions support consensus building, synergy,
and learning. In this paper we discuss innovation in the broad sense of the activities
and processes associated with the generation, distribution, adaptation, and use
of new technical, institutional and managerial knowledge. We make this distinction
to emphasis that our discussion is not about innovation in the narrow sense of
the invention of new technology in R&D laboratories. Rather it is about how R&D
needs to be viewed as part of a bigger process that brings about changes in post-
harvest systems.
Post-harvest innovation systems
Post-harvest R&D seems to sit uncomfortably in the conventional arrangements
for agricultural research. Crop improvement research, for example, can clearly
identify plant breeders (and increasingly molecular biologists) as the central
scientific personnel. The product – new varieties – is well-defined and the systems
for disseminating this technology and the roles of extension services and seed
supply agencies are relatively straightforward. The main client, the farmer, is
clearly identified, as is the role of the client in applying this new input technology.
In this view of agricultural research the number of players is fairly limited –
scientist, extension workers, farmers – and their roles are clearly defined and
mutually exclusive. While this is a stylized description of the R&D process and
the way it is arranged, it is all too recognizable as the conventional model of
agricultural research that persists in many parts of the world.
Post-harvest R&D, on the other hand, cannot be so neatly categorized.
Professionally the sector spans engineering, food science, pathology, marketing
systems economics, and beyond. The post-harvest sector is also characterized by
its linkages and relationships between producers and consumers, between rural
and urban areas, with markets playing a large role in mediating these linkages.
The sector includes technology clients and intermediary organizations from the
whole range of organizational types – from both public and private sectors and
from an equally diverse set of stakeholder agendas and interests. Furthermore,
post-harvest technology applications often form part of complex techno-economic
systems where many players are involved, each with different skills, responding
to different incentives. As a result post-harvest innovation is frequently embedded
in a wider set of relationships and contexts than is implied by the conventional
research–extension–farmers model of R&D. Managing post-harvest innovation and
doing so in ways that supports a pro-poor policy goal is therefore challenging.
To deal with these realities a policy perspective is required that provides an
understanding of the institutional and organizational arrangements that lead to
innovations relevant to the livelihoods of poor people. We argue that conceiving
post-harvest innovation as a process emerging from a system of supportive actors,
relationships and institutional contexts, is a policy perspective that can be used
to plan R&D more effectively. To explain what a post-harvest innovation system
perspective might entail we begin by introducing some of the contemporary debate
on the innovation process in relation to agriculture.
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Innovation systems perspectives
The debate about ways of improving the effectiveness and impact of agricultural
research (including post-harvest) is not a new one. However the influence of
institutional arrangements and the dynamics of innovation process are issues
that many theories of agricultural research and technical change find most
problematic. For example, in the induced innovation model (Hayami and Ruttan
1981) factor prices and user demand are predicted to induce scientists to develop
appropriate technology – a demand–pull theory. This has not proved to be the
case. The chief reason being that such a model ignored the political and
institutional context in which resource allocation decisions are made in R&D.
Rogers’ (1983) diffusion of innovations model is blind to similar institutional issues
that not only determine the types of technology developed, but also decisions over
how it is promoted and to who – a technology–push theory.
Another branch of this debate concerns the role of farmers in the research
process. This led to the participatory research movement. However, while the
original conceptual basis of this debate explicitly made the link between the nature
of institutional arrangements (i.e., who had control of the research agenda) and
the performance of the R&D process, much of the subsequent debate has focused
on participatory methods rather than underlying institutional issues. Biggs and
Smith (1998) argue that this ‘methods bias’ masks the fact that the most successful
participatory methods have arisen in specific institutional and political
circumstances and have often evolved to deal with a specific problem area in that
context. This, it is suggested, often occurs through coalition building, i.e.,
associations of people brought together out of the necessity to deal with a specific
problem and the shared belief in the choice of approach to solving it. Biggs and
Smith go on to suggest that participatory methods will not give farmers a greater
role in the research process. This will only happen when participatory methods
are accompanied by an acceptance among those conducting and managing
research that farmers have a valuable role to play and that their knowledge and
perspective are valid and useful. In other words it is the institutional context of
research that needs to change and the introduction of new methods will not bring
this about on its own.
Increasingly these sorts of ideas are being discussed in terms of the systems
that are needed to link research with users needs. For example, Lynam and Blackie
(1994) talk of the need for a chain of technologies, institutions and policies that
function as an effective system rather than as disarticulated parts. The concept
an Agricultural Knowledge and Information System (Roling 1986; 1994) makes a
similar point. More recently the notion of an innovation system has started to be
discussed as a way of about thinking about the institutional context of agricultural
R&D (Hall et al. 2001) .5 The attraction of the innovation system as a policy frame-
work seems to stem from the way it engages with the political, economic, and
social dimension of knowledge production and use at a time when these concerns
5. This builds on the idea of a national system of innovation (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992)
developed to examine the differential performance of national economies. Biggs (1990) develops
a similar concept in the context of agricultural innovation. See also Clark 2002 for a knowledge
market perspective.
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are emerging as central to the development debate (Hall 2002). There are a number
of valuable features of this framework.
• Firstly, it defines the scope of analysis as the innovation process rather than
solely research. The concept of innovation is used in its broad sense of the
activities and processes associated with the generation, production,
distribution, adaptation, and use of new technical, institutional, and managerial
knowledge.
• Secondly, by conceptualizing research as part of the wider process of innovation
it helps identify the scope of the organizations and stakeholders (including
public, private, research, enterprise, civil society and technology users) involved
and the wider set of relationships in which research is embedded.
• Thirdly, because it recognizes the importance of both technology producers
and technology users and that their roles are both context-specific and dynamic.
It breaks out of the polarized debates of technology–push versus demand–pull
theories. Instead that it recognizes that both processes are potentially important
at different stages in the innovation process.
• Fourthly, it recognizes that the institutional context of the organizations
involved, and particularly the wider environment, governs the nature of
relationships, promotes dominant interests, and shapes outcome of the system
as a whole. This aspect is enormously important for introducing a poverty
focus. The framework provides a lens to examine and reveal which agendas
are being promoted, highlighting areas where the agendas of the poor can be
promoted.
• Fifthly, it recognizes this as a social system. In other words, it does not just
focus on the degree of connectivity between the different elements, but also on
the learning and adaptive processes that make this a dynamic, evolutionary
system.
• Sixthly, it is only a framework for analysis and planning, and as such it can
draw on a large body of existing tools from economics, anthropology, evaluation,
management, and organizational sciences and so forth.
One of the most notable points about an innovation system framework is the
emphasis it places on learning processes as a way of evolving new arrangements
specific to local contexts. There is much empirical evidence to suggest innovation
performance is strongly correlated with institutional environments that promote
learning.6  This contrasts with the conventional approach of seeking optimal
blueprints for R&D arrangements. The innovation systems perspective instead
recognizes the importance of supporting the development of adaptive, evolving
arrangements. This in turn suggests that there is likely to be growing diversity in
approaches and practices and that this would be an indicator of an effective
innovation system. One implication of this is that capacity development becomes
a much more important objective of interventions that support to R&D. In other
words, research becomes concerned increasingly with establishing relationships
and process that will underpin future technology and innovation outcomes. The
next section contrasts a number of case studies to illustrate these points.
6 . The literature on learning, competency building and innovation performance is very large
indeed. Edquist (1997) provides a useful review of concepts in the context of innovation
systems.
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Case studies of recent developments in the Indian post-
harvest innovation system
1. Patterns of interaction in research on quality management systems
Recent studies of efforts to develop quality management protocols for the export of
mangoes to the European market illustrates the difficulties of accessing integrated
technical backstopping support from clusters of public agencies (for detailed
discussion see Hall et al. 2001; 2002a). In these efforts the main research task
was to develop a controlled atmosphere (CA) container sea-shipment regime suitable
for Indian mangoes. The research, however, also included the development of
improved pre-and post-harvest practices at farm and packhouse level in order to
improve fruit quality throughout the whole of the supply chain. The focus of this
work was Vijaya, a fruit growers’ association in Andhra Pradesh. Vijaya received
assistance from the Agricultural Processed Products Export Development Authority
(APEDA) and an international donor. This support involved APEDA setting up a
series of contract arrangements with relevant organizations from the Indian Council
of Agricultural Research (ICAR), the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR) and the Horticultural Department of the local State agricultural university,
Dr Acharya N G Ranga Agricultural University (ANGRAU). These organizations
then worked with Vijaya to develop and test the CA protocol along with other
supporting pre- and post-harvest quality management measures. The ICAR
institute dealt mainly with pre-harvest pest management issues; the CSIR institute
undertook experimentation on controlled atmosphere storage regimes; and the
university department advised on packhouse management.
Trial shipments took place over a period of 3 years. However, consistent
problems encountered with the quality of fruit exported led to an evaluation of the
export protocol and technical backstopping provided. Individually the quality
management recommendations were technically robust. However limited
interaction with farmers and packhouse operators in the development of
recommendations resulted in practical difficulties in implementing these
recommendations. This was part of a broader concern over the client focus of the
contracted agencies. The scientists involved in the work came from organizations
where it was unusual to work directly with farmers or in a commercial environment.
As a result they had not developed skills in doing this and there were no incentives
for them to do so.
Another problem was that quality management measures were not devised
and implemented in an integrated way across the supply chain. This resulted
from the fact that pieces of useful and mutually supportive technical expertise
were located in different organizations that were governed by two different research
councils. Scientists from each organization were contracted independently to work
on individual components of the quality management problem. Vijaya was then
left (unsuccessfully) to ensure that these component technologies and practices
operated effectively together. This was particularly apparent with attempts to deal
with anthracnose, a quality-related disease that needs to be tackled with an
integrated pre- and post-harvest approach.
The notable feature of the Vijaya case is that even where interactions between
a farmers’ organization and public R&D capability can be created through
83
contracting arrangements, the ability of individual research organizations to assist
is restricted by current institutional arrangements. Not only is there strong
disciplinary segregation within ICAR, but different research council affiliation
also tends make integration difficult. Normal working practices in these
organizations, which tend to be quite rigid, also make the development of more
integrated research arrangements difficult. While growers associations have the
potential to form the hub of networks of organizations working towards improving
post-harvest systems, ways of making scientist accountable in broad-based
partnership arrangements such as this is clearly an area that needs much greater
attention.
If innovation in a general sense was restricted in this example, what were the
prospects for pro-poor innovation? In this case even though mango growers were
(rather euphemistically) referred to as ‘poor farmers’, the reality was that those
involved in the export shipment trails were inevitably large-scale, non-poor
producers. It was this group that dominated the farmers’ association involved,
even though the majority of members were genuinely poor households whose
livelihoods depended to a large extent on mango production. The key stakeholders
in this intervention were willing to continue the rhetoric of pro-poor focus as this
was a stipulation of the donor supporting some of the work. Dominant (and perfectly
legitimate) stakeholder agendas included: mango export promotion; accessing high-
value export markets; accessing technical expertise; developing (and having
ownership) of new post-harvest technology and other research products. The staff
of the donor agency and scientists implementing research on its behalf did not
fully investigate stakeholder agendas until much later in the research process,
by which time it was probably too late to make any difference. By ignoring this
important institutional context, not only was innovation in a general sense
impeded, but more importantly it was almost a forgone conclusion that pro-poor
innovation would not take place.
2. Working through others: supporting innovation through managing
relationships
This case describes a novel intervention that a non-governmental organization
(NGO), IDE India [IDE(I)] has developed to establish technology development,
production and supply systems (for detailed discussion see Clark et al. 2003).
The approach developed over the last decade involves identifying market demand
for technology, identifying and where necessary developing or adapting suitable
technology and establishing retail networks to produce, distribute, and sell it to
the poor [IDE(I) 2003]. Once the system is established IDE(I) then withdraws. This
approach has been applied with great success in the small-scale irrigation sector.
This case discusses the application of the approach to the post-harvest sector.
IDE(I) began its work on post-harvest systems by making an assessment of
issues relevant to small-scale producers in the Indian hill state of Himachal
Pradesh, an area were it was already working. It found that for farm households
with limited land, out-of-season tomato production is a critical livelihood strategy.
Using family labor, cultivating tomatoes on 0.25 ha can earn each family about
US$ 2000 per season. This level of income is far higher than from any other type
of farming in the area and has raised farm families well above the poverty line.
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However IDE(I) also found that recent changes in environmental policy banning
tree felling, while clearly needed, threatened this livelihood option. The reasons
for this were that tomatoes were packed in wooden boxes for transport to the
lucrative Delhi market. Without an alternative packing technology, tomatoes could
only be sold in the local market and IDE(I) estimated that farmers would lose 70%
of their income. The focus of IDE(I)’s intervention was therefore to develop an
alternative packaging technology for tomatoes and to establish retail systems to
supply the technology to farmers.
It was realized at an early stage of the intervention that, other than its expertise
in identifying a technology demand, IDE(I) had no relevant skills in the area of
post-harvest. As a consequence a decision was taken to implement the intervention
by working through others. IDE(I)’s main role then became one of identifying
appropriate partners and managing the relationships with and between them.
This required some partners who could help in developing alternative packaging
technology and others who could help establish packaging production and supply
systems. The process of actually doing this was to some extent intuitive, although
IDE(I) naturally tended to partner with organizations with shared interests and
philosophies. Another important aspect of this partnering process was the way
IDE(I) chose to work with organizations with whom it had already established a
relationship in the past and whom it felt it could trust.
In this way IDE(I) linked into what turned out to be four different sets or
networks of partners that were required to make its intervention succeed.
• Technology network. This consisted of scientists from the Indian Institute of
Management, Ahmedabad (IIMA) who were working with a cardboard carton
manufacturer with a design studio. The scientists and their industry partners
had already been developing cardboard carton packaging of horticultural
produce and were willing to design and test packaging for tomato transport
from Himachal Pradesh to Delhi. This involved a major field and transportation
trial. The adaptive development of the carton went through four generations
before an appropriate design was arrived at.
• Local knowledge network. A local grassroots non-governmental organization
(NGO) was identified that had already established a relationship with farmers
and self-help groups. These groups formed the focus for the adaptive trials of
the cartons. They subsequently took a lead in pre-financing the manufacture
of cartons. The local state agricultural university was contacted for information
on local crop production systems.
• Market network. This included all those linking farmers to the Delhi market,
including transporters, commission agents, wholesale traders, and the farmers
themselves. This market network was important, as these were the people who
would have to accept and use the cartons in their transactions. They had to be
willing to promote their use.
• Production and distribution network. This consisted of local carton
manufacturers in Himachal Pradesh and box traders who originally supplied
farmers with wooden boxes. It was important to partner with such organizations
as these would form the backbone of the supply and distribution chain for the
new carton. A micro-finance institution was also an important part of this
network as to establish the first commercial production of cartons a loan was
needed to pre-finance local carton manufacture.
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By the end of the third year of this intervention 30,000 cartons were produced
on a commercial basis and sold to tomato producers. A recent donor-sponsored
poverty relevance review (Underwood 2002) of this intervention concluded that:
1. its impact would be inclusive of the poor, i.e., both the poor and the non-poor
would benefit from the intervention; 2. it addressed gender concerns in the sense
that it recognized that women rather than men suffered the drudgery of existing
package technology (making wooden boxes); and 3. it addressed the enabling
environment of the poor by reducing their vulnerability to policy changes – in this
case environmental policy related to raw materials for packaging.
This case suggests the following principles that seem to have led to changes
in post-harvest systems and that have been relevant to the livelihoods of small-
scale farmers:
• Recognition that formal R&D was only one of a series of related tasks required
to bring about change
• That their range of tasks involved required a group or network of partners
each with specific skills. One of the main roles of IDE(I) was to identify these
partners and involve them in the intervention
• Choice of partners was important as they needed a perspective and orientation
that allowed them to work with and include farmers in the part of the
intervention for which that partner assumed responsibility
• IDE(I) relied on partnerships with organizations with whom it had already
established a relationship and built up trust. Actively managing and nurturing
these relationships was a key part of IDE(I)’s role in this intervention
• The approach IDE(I) adopted was experimental, with lessons learned from
establishing technology supply systems in the small-scale irrigation sector
being adapted to post-harvest issues.
3. Institutional innovation in response to technology needs
Like the Vijaya case study, the Maharashtra State Grape Growers Association
(Maharashtra Rajya Draksh Bagaidar Sangh [MRDBS]) and the linked Mahagrapes
concerns a private enterprise that is founded on the farmers’ association and co-
operative model. However in contrast to Vijaya, MRDBS has been established for
over 20 years and approaches to solving some of the technology-input problems
experienced by Vijaya have been overcome. The key feature of this case study is
the way institutional arrangements have evolved over time in response to market
factors and opportunities, and the associated need for new technology that farmer
members required to benefit from these opportunities. The sequence of events
was as follows.
Phase 1. The growers’ association, MRDBS, was established by farmers in the
1960s as a mechanism to support members producing and marketing grapes in
the domestic market. During the 1970s MRDBS sought technical advice from
scientists from the Indian national agricultural research system (NARS) and from
scientists overseas. This allowed the introduction of improved grape varieties that
were further developed and selected by the farmers themselves. This combination
of prescriptive technical advice from the NARS, and the adaptations and
innovativeness of farmers, increased production of grapes to the extent that by
1985 the domestic market was over-supplied and prices were slumping.
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Phase 2. In response MRDBS encouraged the formation of co-operatives to assist
with marketing. Simultaneously a number of enterprising farmers began to explore
export opportunities in the UK and Europe and the Middle East. It was apparent
that significant export markets did exist. As a result exports started on an ad hoc
basis. From previous experience with the NARS, MRDBS was aware that suitable
post-harvest technology was not available in India to allow the shipment of grapes
to European markets. Some of the MRDBS farmers imported cool chain technology
from USA.
Phase 3. With the potential of significant export markets becoming apparent,
grape growers saw the need to create an institutional structure to handle grape
exports. The result, Mahagrapes, was created from the grape growers co-operatives
already established by MRDBS. Mahagrapes was given the mandate to: locate
internationally acceptable quality grapes from growers, identify lucrative foreign
markets, and access and develop pre-cooling and storage facilitates using imported
technology. Mahagrapes went through a process of learning in export marketing,
with initial failure in the Middle East, and subsequent success in European and
Far-Eastern markets.
Phase 4. At the same time that the functions of Mahagrapes were being developed
(predominately the export and post-harvest aspects), MRDBS was strengthening
its arrangements to support farmer members. A well-equipped laboratory was
established at Pune, with regional branches, to undertake routine analysis of
soil, water, cuttings, etc. These centers also provided advice and demonstrations
to members. Subsequently an R&D wing was established mainly to work on grape
production problems and matching varieties and grape quality with international
market needs.
Phase 5. Having established such facilities in response to gaps in public-sector
provision, the public sector itself then began to recognize the importance of MRDBS
and its facilities. The R&D wing was formally recognized by the Science and
Technology (S&T) Division of the Government of India. The local agricultural
university at Rahuri granted affiliated status to MRDBS. The State government
allocated land to MRDBS to conduct research. APEDA appointed a full time
coordinator for grapes to work within the structure of MRDBS with the role of
promoting grape production and export, with a specific focus on technical support.
It is interesting to note that APEDA, a public-sector body, chose to implement
grape extension and promotion through a private organization rather through its
own regional office or through existing state level extension services. The final
response of the public sector has been to establish a National Centre for Grape
Research under ICAR in the buildings of MRDBS.
The MRDBS case is a story of the way that partnerships form and change in
tandem with the institutional arrangement needed to sustain them and the way,
in turn, this occurs in response to changing technology needs associated with
new markets. MRDBS’ initial partnerships were with the NARS. As its technology
needs (required for export markets) outpaced those available from the NARS,
MRDBS formed new alliances with foreign sources of technology. At the same
time it created its own new institutional structure to deal with export markets
and the acquisition and application of the required technology. As MRDBS’ own
technical skills developed it became less reliant on these partnerships with foreign
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technology suppliers. The final partnership has once again been with the NARS,
presumably as the latter viewed the structure put in place by MRDBS as an
effective mechanism for delivering public research and extension services to the
grape sector.
Key points here are that the technological developments that led to economic
changes (of farmers) were the result of a dynamic process, of which institutional
evolution played a fairly significant role. Partnerships were important, but it was
the ability of MRDBS to form and dissolve partnerships as circumstances dictated
that was key to the whole process. The institutional flexibility, not to mention the
foresight to do this, suggests that change and the ability to change is a central
component to partnership approaches.
Donor response and a new approach to research
management
The case studies described above provide contrasting examples of the way
innovation processes can work. In the first case that is probably representative of
many interventions, despite the existence of scientific and entrepreneurial
expertise, and a clear definition of the main tasks to be achieved, the program
was unable to succeed. The reason for this was weakness in the innovation system
of which the mango intervention formed part. Partially this weakness resulted
from missing or ineffective linkages between different pieces of scientific expertise.
But it also concerned the poor integration of this expertise into the broad task of
bringing about innovations in the quality management systems of mangoes and
the need to work with technology users and other stakeholders. The underlying
bottlenecks were institutional in nature – i.e., the behavioral and procedural norms
of the organizations involved and the inability to adapt ways of working to match
the circumstances associated with establishing a mango quality management
system. The endeavor finally failed.
The second case is quite different. Not only does it include a mechanism for
forging linkages between the different parts of the innovation systems, it also
recognizes the importance of relationships between different partners. In fact IDE(I)
go so far as to identify the management of relationships as a key task. Another
aspect of this is the explicit choice of partners that have the orientation and
perspective to work with small-scale farmers and poor rural communities. As the
innovation systems framework would also suggest, these findings point to the
importance of engaging with the institutional context of R&D. Such findings also
emphasize the need to view R&D as part of a larger set of related activities.
The third case study presents a mature set of developments that have unfolded
over a 20-year period. The case is useful as it demonstrates that opportunities
emerge and circumstances change and that this often places new technological
demands on organizations. Instead of standing still, the case of MRBDS shows
how institutional changes have been used to cope with and take advantage of
external shocks and opportunities. This has involved new partners, new
organizational structures and new operational strategies. The critical point
however is that it was the evolutionary, learning-orientated capacity of the
organization that allowed it to exploit post-harvest technology in productive ways.
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7. This has produced a large body of literature including: Hall et al. 1998; 2000; 2001; 2002a;
2002b; Clark 2002; Sulaiman and Hall 2002.
But how can these ideas operate in research management? In the remainder
of this section we describe the way these perspectives have been adopted by the
UK Department for International Development (DFID) Crop Post-Harvest Programme
(CPHP), first in its regional program in South Asia and later across its global
program.
Learning and innovation in post-harvest research
management and practice
CPHP is one of DFID’s 10 centrally managed natural resources research programs.
It commissions research on technology development and promotion and policy
related to the post-harvest sector. CPHP focuses its work in four regions, namely,
East Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa, and South Asia. The discussion below
relates principally to developments in the South Asia Regional Program since 1995.
The CPHP (as a global program) began as a fairly conventional post-harvest
research initiative. The program commissioned mainly technology development
projects relying on disciplinary research on storage, processing, physiology and
marketing systems economics. An output to purpose review of the program in
1997 (Altshul 1998) revealed that many of the projects were achieving their
technological objectives, but few were making an appreciable impact on the
livelihoods of poor people. Around this time CPHP’s South Asia program was
involved in the mango export work discussed in the earlier case study. As it became
increasingly clear that it was the institutional context of research and technology
development that was affecting impact and effectiveness, the program began to
commission studies to investigate this context. These studies were both empirical
and conceptual, developing detailed case histories as well as exploring the
innovation systems framework as a way of investigating institutional issues.7
Emerging from work in South Asia, and in the other CPHP regions was the
recognition that partnerships of various types were becoming important,
particularly those involving partners who were not from public-sector research
organizations. It seemed that project leaders had responded to the need to focus
on the ‘uptake’ pathways for their findings by involving a wider range of partners
in their project. As an initial response, CPHP appointed a consultant to advise on
partnership issues. Subsequently CPHP commissioned a formative review to help
it develop program strategy on these issues. The review highlighted the central
importance of understanding the nature of partnerships and the institutional
context that shapes them. As a way of managing this more effectively, it
recommended that the innovation systems framework be used as the guiding
principle across the whole of the CPHP (Biggs and Underwood 2001). The global
CPHP adopted this recommendation and used it as the central theme in the
proposal that it presented to DFID explaining how it planned to implement the
CPHP in its final phase, 2002–5. CPHP refers to this as the ‘coalitions approach’.8
This new approach has a number of implications.
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• The adoption of an explicit capacity development agenda for research.
The program and project purpose9  address changes in the way innovation
systems operate. This is stated by CPHP as ‘post-harvest innovation systems
respond more effectively to the needs to the poor’. This means that the key
measure of the success of projects relates to changes in the research and
innovation process, rather than direct impacts on the livelihoods of poor people
(although these may also take place during the life of the project). There are a
number of aspects to this capacity. Partially it relates to the networks of
partnerships and relationships and how useful these are – this will be a key
indicator to be mapped and monitored in projects to judge progress and make
mid-course corrects, and where needed, strengthening links. This capacity
also relates to the wider institutional context that governs these relationships
(see next point).
• The delivery of both technical and institutional innovations from research.
Inherent in the stated purpose of changing the way innovation systems operate,
is a much greater emphasis in projects on the different sorts of actor involved
in projects and on the types of relationship between them. Underlying this
emphasis is the belief that innovations relevant to poor people are the result of
the learning emerging from the right networks of individuals and organizations
working together in certain ways. These ‘certain ways’ are the rules, norms, or
routines that make interaction both productive and pro-poor and which are
referred to as institutional arrangements or context. The implication for research
projects is that it is important to explore the partners to be involved in projects,
the roles played by different actors, the nature of institutional arrangements
and the way these are changing. The CPHP views this institutional knowledge
of as equal importance to technical knowledge and has asked projects to deliver
outputs10  relating to institutional arrangements.
• The use of an action research approach. As implied by the last point above,
the emphasis on getting the right partners together and getting them to work
in a certain way implies a new research task where the focus of investigation
is the nature of the research and innovation process itself. Therefore the way
of doing things and the outcomes of doing these things is unknown and
unknowable at the beginning of the project (although such broad aims as
supporting the post-harvest systems of poor tomato producers will remain
constant, the question is how to achieve it.) Furthermore, because projects
are trying to find ways of doing things there is iteration between outcome and
way. A project does x and a happens, therefore the project tries y to see if a+1
will happen. In this way monitoring the cause and effect of ways and outcomes
becomes a central project management tool for evolving new ways of
strengthening post-harvest innovation systems. It is for these reasons that an
action research orientation has been suggested for CPHP projects so that they
can learn, adapt, and evolve en route.
8 . The term partnerships for innovation is used to describe the program’s strategy to implement
this approach.
9 . The purpose is the overarching objective statement in the logical framework, the main planning
tool of the CPHP and its projects.
10.Outputs are the deliverable products of a project that managing partners of projects are
responsible for producing.
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Policy implications of post-harvest innovation systems
We began this paper by arguing that the idea of an innovation system provides a
useful conceptual framework for understanding the institutional context of R&D
as part of the larger process of innovation. We went on to suggest that that this is
particular relevant to the post-harvest sector where relationships, roles and
agendas are often complex and contested. Our case studies illustrate how this
analysis can reveal the reasons for failure; how managing the institutional
environment as part of total systems concept can lead to success; how learning
and evolutionary process can be a central elements of the capacity of innovation
systems; and the implications for implementing this in research programs. Flowing
from this experience, are a number of broad principles that seem to be relevant to
post-harvest research in developing countries, particularly where poverty reduction
concerns are paramount.
Firstly, success of research projects seems closely related to the characteristics
of the partnership grouping or coalition that emerges or is developed around a
particular problem area. Almost by definition this coalition needs to be
predominantly made up of local partners. Only in this way can projects understand
and respond to local institutional contexts. Assumptions about the roles of partners
in the coalition have to be made explicit from the start and reassessed as the
project proceeds. Similarly, roles will evolve as projects evolve. Revealing and
managing the historical and institutional context of these partnerships is an
important element of project design and implementation.
The second related point concerns what is the most appropriate partnership
grouping? We would argue that this is an empirical question that cannot
realistically be answered at the outset of a project, at least not in a definitive
sense. The implication of this is that projects would benefit from an action research
orientation allowing partners to join during the project when it becomes necessary.
Currently, projects often have no systematic ways of assessing the types of
partnerships and relationship require either at the project design stage or during
the life of the project. The mango case was an example of this deficiency, whereas
the grape case demonstrated the usefulness of creating new partnerships to deal
with emerging circumstances.
The related implication of an action research orientation is that the process
and institutional lessons associated with technological success in projects are
valid project outputs and are often innovations complementary to the new technical
knowledge that projects produce. The NGO case study on tomato packaging is a
very clear example of this – it had developed and evolved an approach that could
be used elsewhere. Furthermore this approach is developing and evolving along
the way in its new area of application. Disseminating these institutional innovations
must surely be as important as disseminating their technological counterparts.
Thirdly, where a poverty focus is paramount, stakeholder analysis is needed
to ensure that this agenda is promoted within the coalition. The mango case
typifies how easily the competing agendas of different stakeholders can subsume
a poverty focus. The relationship of the coalition with the wider institutional context,
the effects this has on patterns of relationship and the way agendas and priorities
are identified and promoted needs to be made explicit from the start of the project.
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The fourth point relates to the way projects are monitored. Monitoring projects
for direct impact makes little sense from a day-to-day project management
perspective. A useful alternative is monitor behavioral changes during the life of
the project that support such implementation goals as poverty relevance, effective
partnerships, and consensual and inclusive processes.
The implication of this need to focus on behavioral changes in post-harvest
innovation systems is that much greater emphasis needs to be placed on the
capacity-development effect of research projects. By this we do not only refer to
building up stocks of research infrastructure and trained scientists, but also to
the development of the collective capacity of networks or systems of organizations
to learn and innovate in ways that support the current development agendas. It
is perhaps this last point that forms the critical message for development
assistance agencies seeking to exploit post-harvest R&D in the cause of poverty
reduction. Building up institutional knowledge on how to do this will only take
place when R&D becomes more fully integrated into the broader task of innovation,
and when policies and practices are in place that supports learning and
institutional change.
Although these ways of thinking about the progress of ‘scientific’ projects may
be new to those working in the conventional post-harvest research arena, a well
developed set of tools that can help scientists deal with the contextual setting of
their work already exists. Examples include, stakeholder analysis (see Grimble
and Wellard 1997) and the actor linkage matrix (see Biggs and Matseart 1999).
Such tools could help introduce an innovation systems orientation into research
projects.
Conclusions
Post-harvest innovation is a critical area of international development that could
support the poor in many ways through: production, employment, value addition,
and cheaper, safer food. This will only happen, however, if post-harvest innovation
systems are strengthened. In part this concerns encouraging linkages,
connections, and learning processes, but it also concerns ensuring that the
institutional context of these endeavors is managed in ways that ensures that
innovations are pro-poor. These linked tasks are challenging but essential. The
innovation systems framework could be a useful starting point in this task.
Endnote
This paper is the output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom Department
for International Development (DFID). The views expressed are not necessarily those of
DFID [R7502: Crop Post-Harvest Programme]. A shorter version will be published as Hall
A J, Rasheed Sulaiman V, Yoganand B, and Clark N G. 2003 (in press). Post-harvest
innovation systems in South Asia: research as capacity development for pro-poor impact.
Outlook on Agriculture 32(2): 19–26.
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The evolving culture of science in the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research:
concepts for building a new architecture of
innovation in agri-biotechnology
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2
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Abstract
The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) needs to respond
to the wider implications of biotechnology in the way it conducts its research. This
involves an evolving role and important institutional developments. Critically the CGIAR
needs to forge a new relationship with the private sector, to gain access to proprietary
technologies, and as a delivery mechanism for its own research products. This in turn
suggests the need to build intellectual property management skills and business-
orientated perspectives, previously under developed in most CGIAR centers. At the
same time the CGIAR must visibly engage in and promote a debate that helps quell
public unease concerning the use of new technologies in the production of food crops.
And this must all be achieved within the loudly proclaimed mandate of poverty reduction
and development. Using the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid
Tropics (ICRISAT) as an illustration, this paper explores recent innovation systems
thinking and associated planning tools as possible ways of helping the culture of
international agricultural science evolve in useful ways. While institutional change has
certainly begun, there is still much distance to travel.
Introduction
Innovations and impacts from research in the life sciences and from biotechnology
in particular, are increasingly dependent on new groupings, alliances, and
relationships both within science, and between science and business. In Europe
and the USA, for example, the boundaries between public and private sectors are
becoming increasingly blurred as both private companies and national govern-
ments recognize the economic importance of knowledge and the need for greater
collaboration in its production and use. This new architecture of innovation has
emerged in the developed world for a number of interrelated reasons:
• Advances in the biosciences that have both economic and social relevance,
particularly in health and agriculture
• The new possibilities that this presents for ownership of biological materials
and processes, coupled with strengthening intellectual property regimes
• The changing role of the state and the emergence of the market as a major
decision-making institution
• A growing understanding of the importance and role of new knowledge and
innovation in economic development
• An increasing focus on innovation policy and the associated need to encourage
greater connectivity between scientific and entrepreneurial elements in national
innovation systems.
1. University of Greenwich, UK, seconded to International Crops Research Institute for the
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India
2 . ICRISAT
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These same issues and possibilities are starting to increasingly impinge on
developing countries. While there is little doubt that biotechnology has enormous
potential to make a significant contribution to poverty reduction, this will not
happen through market mechanisms alone. As Byerlee and Fischer (2002) point
out, while the private sector is the major global player, investing US$ 2.6 billion in
agricultural research and development (R&D), only modest private investments
are taking place in the developing world. Furthermore, these investments tend to
be in such niche areas as hybrid vegetables and cereals plus spill-overs from
their investments in major global commodities such as soybean and cotton. Social
commentators such as Scoones (2002a) suggest that the political economy of the
biotechnology industry in developing countries – both local start-up companies
and multinational corporations – is such that the poor are unlikely to benefit
from biotechnology unless there is specific public policy intervention in this arena.
Other groups fear that the risks from biotechnology are unacceptable and
that the public should not be exposed to technologies and products that are derived
from it, particularly genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Innovation analysts
such as Clark et al. (2002a) suggest that biotechnology will fail to impinge in
developing countries unless biotechnology capacity is developed locally. This often
has less to do with numbers of trained scientific personnel and instead concerns
greater connectivity within national innovation systems including partnerships
within science, between science and public policy, between the public and the
private sectors, and between science and society in general.
The emerging view is that the public sector must simultaneously continue to
invest in R&D while seeking alliances with the private sector. At the same time it
must engage in policy and regulatory issues that protect and promote the agendas
of the weaker sections of society. The international community and particularly
the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR),3  has a
unique role in this process in its operational countries. However, it must first give
careful consideration to the ways in which it approaches this task bearing in
mind its own research-for-development goals. For example:
• How does the CGIAR initiate and evolve relationships with, the private sector
and advanced research organizations?
• How does it ensure public access to proprietary (privately owned) technologies
and processes?
• How does it maximize the public good nature of innovations jointly owned with
the private sector?
• How does it negotiate new partnerships that ensure that all stakeholders
including the poor stand to gain?
• How does it constructively engage in issues of public acceptance of biotechnology,
simultaneously promoting new technology and protecting society from the
unknown?
• How does it reach consensus with stakeholders on research priorities?
• How does it engage and build capacity in national and international policy
processes relevant to exploiting biotechnology for pro-poor development?
3. The CGIAR (established in 1971), is an informal association of public and private sector
members that supports a network of 16 international agricultural research centers. It is
managed and core funded by the World Bank.
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These questions are part of the wider issue concerning how to integrate the
CGIAR’s work and agenda into that of others working across the science –
development continuum. Byerlee and Fischer (2002, quoting Morris and Hoising-
ton 2000) make the point that while the CGIAR has focused on biotechnology R&D
capacity development (its own and in its public partners in developing countries)
it has paid less attention to the operating environment necessary to nurture the
use of biotechnology. So, for example, the CGIAR has invested little in strengthening
capacity in policy and regulatory issues related to the deployment of biotechnology
products, and has shied away from active participation in public dialog surrounding
transgenics (Byerlee and Fischer 2002), (although more recently a system-wide
Biotech Awareness and Biosafety Support Unit have been established). It is clear
that not only do these challenges need to be faced, but that there is also a strategic
value to knowledge that deals with ways of enabling innovation in these new,
dynamic, and complex relationships and institutional environments.
What conceptual and policy tools does the CGIAR have to assist it in its struggle
with the policy and implementation questions associated with biotechnology? In
the main the answer is very little. What it has are scarcely more than the neo-
classical tools of research priority setting and rather simplistic notions of public
and private goods and services. This lacuna is made all the more remarkable by
the fact that there is a well developed set of concepts and tools available to help
guide thinking on these issues. For inspiration one only needs to look at
contemporary science and technology (S&T) policy as practiced in many of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.
There, as the old world order of public-sector, science-led economic growth has
been eclipsed by more complex circumstances, so too the approaches to S&T policy
have changed. Our main argument is that ICRISAT and the CGIAR could usefully
draw from this other, parallel policy paradigm. Of specific relevance is the on-
going analysis of innovation processes and the systems that support these
processes (Hall et al. 2000). Not only has this allowed the debate to break out of
the old linear paradigm of science-led innovation, it has also allowed a greater
analysis of the institutional context that shapes research and innovation. In turn
this has shed light on ways of planning this as an embedded process – i.e., a
process that is specific to and shaped by context, task, stakeholders, and
institutional arrangements.
This paper reviews some of this parallel policy literature and reflects on the
developments and challenges that face ICRISAT and the CGIAR in general. In the
empirical section the evolving of the culture of science at the Institute is discussed.
The main argument here is that cultures and norms in science do change, and
ICRISAT is adapting to the contingencies of the pervasive importance of
biotechnology and the institutional and policy implications of this. In essence
this is a story about the way CGIAR science is coming to terms with a new more
interactive way of working with partners, particularly the private sector; the way
new business and legal competencies are becoming essential to public science;
and the way the role of organizations like ICRISAT is changing. Challenges lie
ahead. These include the need for new governance structures with wider
stakeholder participation and, closer to home, new incentive structures to
encourage scientists to work in teams where conventional disciplinary and
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institutional boundaries and hierarchies need to be replaced by new disciplinary
groupings and working relationships required to exploit biotechnology effectively.
The discussion section of the paper explores concepts and tools that may assist
in this task. The paper begins by providing an overview of some of current issues
in the biotechnology for development debate.
Biotechnology and international agricultural research
Promises and threats
Biotechnology and its potential to contribute to the developmental agenda of
agricultural research has been widely debated for nearly two decades (see Sasson
1988; Klopenburge 1988). It has a number of technical and institutional features
which distinguish it from conventional agricultural technology which means that
its raises specific policy, ethical, equity, and scientific questions. There are four
broad technical areas of biotechnology intervention for plant breeders:
1. Genomics. Diagnostic techniques that use an understanding of molecular
biology to improve the speed, efficiency and precision of plant breeding while
promising to address new goals not possible through conventional means.
2. Tissue culture. Multiplication techniques that allow rapid multiplication of
disease-free planting material, embryo rescue techniques that facilitate the
recovery of hybrids from crosses between different species, and, gamete culture
techniques that allow rapid development of inbred material.
3. Transgenics. Genetic manipulation techniques that allow the transfer of genes
from a wide range of sources, including across species. This can be used to
introduce desirable characteristics that are either not possible through
conventional means or with a greater degree of precision. This could be disease
or drought tolerance, or such traits as herbicide resistance. This has been the
subject of the greatest controversy in the eyes of the public particularly in view
of the ability of these techniques to transfer genes into our food from exotic
plant species, animals and even bacteria.
4. Bioinformatics. Computer-based techniques for structuring, accessing and
analyzing huge collections of genomics data (primarily sequence-based data).
It is these tools that are linking many biological disciplines that were previously
somewhat isolated and thereby driving a paradigm shift in the way biological
research and product development are carried out.
The majority of techniques for gene transfer, and many of the most widely
used genes in current transgenic varieties, are owned by private companies, mostly
the few large multinationals that dominate the field. The reasons for this relate
both to the high research costs of biotechnology which are often beyond the
resource of the public sector and, of course, the novel possibilities for profitable
business ventures that the private sector perceives to be possible as a result of
the new technologies. Almost all transgenic varieties are privately owned, again
mainly due to the extremely high cost of the biosafety testing required prior to
government approval for commercial production. Public research organizations,
including the CGIAR are, however, developing transgenic material using genes
from a variety of sources: licensed, donated or acquired from the private sector, or
generated through publicly funded research.
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Risk, uncertainty and the public debate
While the arguments concerning the ability of biotechnology to provide agricultural
technology for the world’s poorest are well rehearsed in the specialist literature,
there are also well recognized risks and uncertainties that are rarely given much
air time in scientific conferences. These include both those associated with the
contained use of biological processes and intermediate products in laboratories,
as well as the risks and uncertainty of the impacts of products when released
into the environment (Essebgey and Stokes 1998).
The real difficulty is that quite often there is scientific uncertainty of potential
outcomes, i.e., there is not enough prior knowledge to determine the probability of
an outcome or impact. While it has always been recognized that technological
interventions are associated with a certain degree of risk, conventional ex-ante
methods of assessing this risk, such as social cost/benefit analysis, are less useful
in the case of biotechnology. This is because scientific uncertainty, brought about
by rapid technological and institutional change of the evolutionary type associated
with biotechnology does not have the stable parameters required to make ex-ante
judgments dependant on a set of reliable assumptions and probabilities.
This may seem a rather esoteric point, but its implications are at the heart of
current public controversy over, for example, GMOs. It means that the concept of
objective scientific risk assessment no longer necessarily holds true. Furthermore,
a number of high-profile incidents that have called into question scientific
objectivity, have further undermined public trust (Tait 2001). Another perspective
in this debate maintains that the public in general has little comprehension of
the relative risk of, for example, walking down the road, or catching malaria whilst
on holiday as compared to developing a life-threatening condition from eating
transgenic food. This line of reasoning maintains that powerful lobbies with wide
media coverage have convinced the public that they must be given absolute
guarantees regarding the safety of transgenic food. Interestingly, if the same
biosafety testing was applied to conventional foods, a very large proportion would
probably be banned.
While some of the public debate has also been ignorant of existing scientific
evidence, it has raised ethical objections which quite reasonably need to be factored
into the decisions of risk and acceptability.
This concern over risk and uncertainty is embodied in the precautionary
principle of the Rio Earth Summit Declaration (ref principle 15, the World Summit
on Sustainble Development, 26 August – 4 September  2002, Johannesburg, South
Africa). Little advice, however, is provided on ways of implementing it. Clark et al.
(2002a) argues that specific decision tools are unlikely to play a useful role.
Alternatively support is growing for the solution proposed by Tait (2001) who calls
for a constructive dialog among all interested parties so as to clarify issues and
reach a social consensus on all the underlying problems. While this is a useful
suggestion ways of finding a common language to communicate issue in mixed
groups of scientists and non-scientists remains a significant challenge.
The whole concept of risk is highly contextual, with society or groups in that
society choosing what it wishes to identify as risk. This is further complicated by
the presence and effectiveness of organized lobbying groups generating awareness
of different risks and promoting different agendas based on various ideological
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positions and other motivations. Examples of this in other contexts in North
America include the tobacco lobby and the Pro-Life anti-abortion lobby. The Dark
Green movement and the multinational corporations play a similar role in the
context of biotechnology.
The way forward is therefore to help negotiate the choice societies make when
facing uncertainty in response to the perceived risk to biotechnology. There will
still be a need to manage the competition between different groups of stakeholders
in their efforts to define risk according to their own world-views and to build trust
in the regulatory process (Newell 2002). Instead of abandoning science, this
consensus-building approach implies the need to recognize the limitation of
science (as a decision tool) in a technological field that is evolving very rapidly. In
addition, there is a need to define a more facilitative role for public policy in the
regulatory process, strengthening links between science, society and the policy
process. To make the same point differently there is no magic bullet solution to
these dilemmas. What is required instead is a public policy response that creates
a process which builds consensus between groups with different view points, and
helps make transparent choices that can accommodate the diversity agendas
that exist.
Winners and losers
There is a long history of analyzing the equity implications of technologies from
international agricultural research (reviewed comprehensively by Lipton and
Longhurst 1988). The debate surrounding the Green Revolution pivoted around
those who saw the main task as one of increasing food production and those that
saw the task as one of better access to that increased production and the
contribution of agriculture to wider livelihood goals. Tripp (2000) argues that
opponents of agricultural biotechnology for development have mainly been NGOs.
The core of their opposition concerns their perception that: (i) there is a need for
more emphasis on distribution of resources (mainly food) rather than creating
better production technology; (ii) potential environmental and health risks
associated with transgenic material through gene escape, toxicology and allergenic
problems, and the potential increase in the use of agri-chemicals (through
herbicide resistance for instance); (iii) an increased dependence on seed companies
and a threat to farm-saved seed through new intellectual property regimes; and
(iv) an abandonment of traditional techniques and biodiversity that have served
farmers well in the past. Tripp argues that NGOs have little evidence to support
their advocacy for low-input agricultural techniques, nor its appropriateness to
evolving livelihood aspirations. Furthermore the advocacy on both sides of the
debate seems to be founded on little empirical evidence of farmers’ and consumers’
perception about biotechnology in developing countries – although this is changing.
A citizen’s jury approach recently used in India (see Pimbert and Wakeford 2002),
that purported to demonstrate farmer resistance to GMOs was dismissed by the
director of one of the (UK) organizations involved as methodologically flawed.
Public–private sector partnerships
There are a number of credible concerns over the equity implications of the
dominant private sector involvement in biotechnology (see for example Scoones
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2002b). It is, for the reasons of prominence and ownership of technologies that
the public sector will have to increasingly court private partners. This is
particularly so for public plant breeding research which must increase interactions
with the private sector in sharing biotechnology techniques and materials, most
of which have been developed in the private sector (Tripp and Byerlee 2000). Hall
et al. (2002) and many others argue that the public sector’s relationship with the
private sector needs to expand on a number of fronts that include, but go beyond,
access to technology. This will include a range of relationships including: private
distribution of public technologies; private purchase of public research services
and technologies; public use and purchase of private materials, methods and
services; and public–private research collaboration involving cost and resource
sharing, including genes and protocols, business incubation, and various kinds
of product and profit sharing. The complementary nature of the two sectors’ assets
is summarized in Table 1.
Source: Byerlee and Fischer 2002
Table 1. Assets of public and private sectors in agri-biotechnology research
National level
research
organization
Key assets
Regional and global
level organizations
Key assets
Public sector
National agricultural research systems
(NARS)
Local diverse germplasm
Local knowledge
Breeding and evaluation programs and
associated infrastructure
Access to delivery systems including
extension
Upstream capacity (in more-effective NARS
only)
CGIAR international centers
Diverse germplasm
Breeding and evaluation programs and
associated infrastructure
Global germplasm exchange and evaluation
networks
Economies of market size
Up-stream capacity in a few centers
Mostly positive public image
Private sector
Local seed companies
Local knowledge
Breeding programs and
infrastructure
Seed delivery systems
Marketing network
Global life science companies
Biotechnology tools, genes, and
know-how
Access to capital markets
Economies of market size
Skills in dealing with regulatory
agencies
Flexibility and speed in decision
making
Capitalizing on complementary assets and new types of arrangements will
require new capabilities in partnering to help rapidly develop a range of public–
private sector partnerships. Fischer (2000) suggests that regional networks of
public research organizations may be required to strengthen their bargaining
position and skills. These developments also raise a series of questions concerning
the changing role of public research organizations and ways of ensuring that the
developmental mandate of the international agricultural research centers (IARCs)
is maintained. Tripp and Byerlee (2000) caution that while there is significant
pressure to partner with the private sector as a resource mobilization strategy,
this in itself will not improve the effectiveness of agricultural research unless it is
guided by specific and relevant opportunities that private partners can provide.
101
Intellectual property management
The combination of the proprietary nature of much agricultural biotechnology
and the related need to engage in new forms of partnership with the private sector
means that public research organizations are going to have to deal with intellectual
property (IP) issues. For example, Cohen et al. (2002) in a survey of CGIAR centers
recorded 166 applications of proprietary research inputs. These included: selectable
markers (44); promoters (35); transformation systems (29); insect-resistance genes
(19); disease-resistance genes (11); genetic markers (10); diagnostic probes (3);
others (15). The CGIAR as a whole adopted guiding principles in 1996 reaffirming
that resources maintained in gene banks should be freely available and that
legal protection (so called defensive patenting) of innovations would only be used
where necessary to ensure that developing countries have access to new
technology.
IP management expertise was established in the late 1990’s on a system-wide
basis within the CGIAR through the creation of the Central Advisory Service on
IPR. Around the same time individual centers began to develop similar in-house
expertise, with each center developing its own policy governing its products and
the use of those of others. This is an area in which the CGIAR recognizes it will
need to invest more resources as a response to the growing importance of legal
issues in agricultural science (Tripp and Byerlee 2000). While Cohen et al. (2002)
argue that the costs involved in developing a management capacity suggest a
systems-wide approach there is evidence that individual centers are developing
their own capacities and purposing a range of IP strategies to suit their own
contexts and agendas. It is quite clear that IP is set to become an integral
component of the use of biotechnology for development.
Capacity development in biotechnology
IARCs have historically played a large role in capacity-development efforts in their
counterpart programs at the national level. This has included research
infrastructure development and particularly training and human resource
development. A capacity-building agenda also needs to accompany biotechnology.
However these efforts need to be different in three respects. Firstly, biotechnology
is likely to be more generic than previous scientific paradigms, where basic
research capabilities will be relevant in both health and agriculture sectors.
Secondly, capacity will be in both the public and the private sectors (currently
more so in Asia, less so in Africa) and will involve both national companies and
multinational corporations and NGOs. This raises challenges for conventional
approaches that relied heavily on advanced training (often in developed countries)
for public scientists.
The third difference concerns more fundamental questions about capacity-
building approaches and the desirable characteristics of technological competence
in national and international settings. Arnold and Bell (2002) and Velho (2002)
argue that increasingly capacity development in development assistance programs
needs to be thought of in total systems terms. That is to say that what is important
is not the individual blocks of scientific expertise per se, but rather the way this
links together and integrates with users of technology, including consumers,
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markets, private industry, and policy processes in specific national contexts. This
approach suggests that South–South partnerships will be an increasingly
important aspect of capacity building – i.e., networking together local scientific,
technical and entrepreneurial resources. The East African Bio-Sciences Initiative –
a cross-sectoral clustering scientific organization related to agriculture and
health – is an emerging example of this model. Developing total system capacity
has its own challenges – even within individual organizations. Haribabu (2000),
arguing that the problem can be as basic as getting molecular biologists to interact
with plant breeders, suggests that divergent cognitive empathy is to blame.
Clark et al. (2002b) exploring a case of agricultural biotechnology capacity
development in India, demonstrate the way these systemic capacities build up
slowly over time. The role of the donor in this successful case was to provide the
professional space to allow scientists and others to experiment with new
institutional arrangements that promote learning and innovation in the area of
biotechnology. In another exploration of this theme, Clark et al. (2003, in press)
argues that developing countries often have well trained scientists, but lack the
links with the policy process causing biotechnology policy in many countries to
be extremely weak. Consequently enabling frameworks such as bio-safety and IP
regimes develop slowly. This is revealed in the unduly cautious approach of some
countries and this is restricting the rapid deployment of biotechnology advances
(Paarlburge 2000).
Again this suggests that stronger connectivity between science and research
users including policy makers is required. But it also requires an expansion of
the professional mandate of both scientists and administrators in ways that
promote a broader understanding of science. This needs to be tackled at many
levels starting with the curriculum of tertiary education so that disciplinary
expertise is coupled with an appreciation of the wider context of science in society.
The CGIAR centers could play an important role in this more holistic vision of
capacity development.
Frameworks for promoting new architectures of
innovation
Linear and systems architectures of innovation
At the heart of the challenges that the CGIAR and ICRISAT face with respect to
biotechnology is the implied need to embed technology and capacity development
in a much broader set of relationships and contexts. The CGIAR is no longer the
primary source of new knowledge in this field. Neither can it continue to rely on
old architectures wherein which it independently develops research products that
can then be usefully transferred to others. The challenge facing the CGIAR is to
find new architectures to structure its relationships with a range of novel and
conventional partners and stakeholders. And to do so in ways that best exploit
frontier science for the good of society and particularly the poor.
This challenge is not unique to the CGIAR. Science and technology policy in
many sectors around the world has faced the need to redraw conventional
approaches to promoting economic and social development in an era of rapid
technological and institutional change and increasingly complex techno-economic
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systems. In response an important policy shift has been an increased emphasis
towards promoting innovation rather than focusing on research alone. As distinct
from research and invention, innovation is a much more complex process often
requiring technical, social, and institutional changes, and involving the interaction
of organizations across the conventional knowledge producer–user divide.
Emerging as a useful way of thinking about this is the concept of an innovation
system (Table 2 presents the way innovation systems thinking has emerged and
the way the innovation policy with its focuses on the systems and processes of
change has overshadowed the earlier science and technology policy preoccupations
of resource allocation).
Innovation systems thinking
The origin of innovation systems thinking can be traced to the idea of a national
system of innovation proposed by Freeman (1987), and Lundvall (1992). The
concept brings together thinking from a broad set of theoretical debates4  that
view development and change in systems terms. More importantly it is based on
empirical observations of ‘good practice’ in different countries and technology
sectors. At its heart lies the contention that change – or innovation – results from
and is shaped by the system of organizations and institutions (in the rules, norms
and conventions sense) in particular locations and points in time. This system
includes organizations involved with research and the application and adaptation
of research findings, as well as intermediary organization that promote knowledge
transfer. Lundvall (1992) identifies learning and the role of institutions as critical
components of these systems. He considers learning to be an interactive and
thus socially embedded process, which cannot be understood without reference
to its institutional and cultural context, usually in a national setting.5
This has many analytical implications: the need to consider a range of activities
and organizations related to innovation and how these might function collectively
as a system; and the need to locate research planning in the context of the norms,
culture and political economy in which it takes place, i.e., the wider institutional
context. Similarly it is no longer useful to think of institutional and organizational
arrangements for research and innovation as fixed or optimal – clearly these
must evolve to suit local and changing circumstances. In the same way, the
evaluation of innovation performance also becomes much more context-specific
relating to the perspective of stakeholders and current imperatives, rather than
either scientific peer review or economic justification alone. Douthwaite (2002)
believes that these types of perspective hold true in technological contexts ranging
from rice drying in South Asia to wind turbines in Europe and North America. He
shows how innovative success is a complex process of learning and adaptation.
The innovation systems concept is now widely used in the policy process in
developed countries, but has only recently started to be employed in relation to
research policy in the South (see for example, Hall et al. 2001; Byerlee and
Alex 2003).
4. Edquist (1997) provides a useful review.
5. Gibbons et al. (1994) makes a broadly similar point in their much cited discussion of mode
one and mode two production of knowledge.
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4 Table 2. Innovation systems under changing paradigms
1. This periodization is based on Gaillard (1998)
Source: Vehlo 2002
Who produces
scientific
knowledge
The Scientists
(Republic of
science)
The scientists
(but they must
be directed and
put in contact
with the
demand)
Scientists
directly
influenced by a
complex
network of
actors and its
interests
Actor network
composed by
scientists and
non-scientists-
configuration
varies according
to each event
Model of
technological
change
Linear relationship:
basic research, applied
research, technological
development,
innovation, diffusion,
economic progress and
social welfare (science
push)
Linear relationship
(the same as above,
but demand–pull)
Complex –includes
several actors, a
diversity of institutions
and processes
(Technological
trajectory subjected to
lock-in – somewhat
deterministic)
Complex multifaceted
(technological
trajectories reversible
according to social
choice)
Policy framework and
policy tools
Focus on science policy:
large-scale science funding;
allocation of resources
through institutional
normative mechanisms,
scientific merit
Science policy and
technology policy emphasis
in resource allocation in
terms of priorities (often by
sector of activity)
Science had to find a way
to be used by technological
development
Emphasis on resources
administration and
allocation to strategic
programs, interdisciplinary
and collaborative research
(national, institutional
and disciplinary level)
alliances
Technology policy
Emphasis in co-ordination
and management.
Accountability,
maintenance of an
independent scientific
basis.
Innovation policy
Policy analysis and
research
evaluation tools
Peer review (sooner or
later the good science
finds out its practical
application.
Input indicators
Peer review plus
output indicators
(basically bibliometric)
studies: role of S&T in
economic growth;
history of technology
innovation at firm
level
Intensification of the
peer review process,
program assessment
(concern with the
impacts), prospective
and foresight
Peer review + direct
public participation
(emphasis given to the
process), scenario
building with ample
social participation -
foresight
Period/
paradigms
Post-war
period
until
beginning
of 1960s
Science as
an engine
for progress
1960s and
1970s
Science as
solution for
problems
(and also as
cause of
problems)
1980s and
1990s
Science as a
source of
strategic
opportunity
21st
Century
Science for
the benefit
of society
(back to the
Baconian
ideal)
Conception
of science
Historically
and socially
neutral,
follows its own
internal logic
Disputes
about the
neutrality of
science
Science wars
(dispute
between
realism and
relativism/
constructivism)
Socially and
culturally
constructed,
national styles
Model of North/South
Cooperation1
Problem-solving phase:
find quick solutions to
development problems
through the use of
human and financial
resources of the Northern
countries
Developing indigenous
capacities of individuals
(problem-solving and
research capacities) in
the recipient countries
Generate new
collaborative
partnerships that benefit
both sides, from supply-
driven to demand-
oriented (involvement of
stakeholders by using
participatory methods)
Learning in a sytems of
innovation (SI)
framework
Co-ordination of donors,
competitive funds for
research and technology
development (RTD)
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Applying innovation systems concepts
The innovation system concept therefore provides a framework for: 1. exploring
patterns of partnerships; 2. revealing and managing the institutional context
that governs these relationships and processes such as learning and change; 3.
understanding research and innovation as a social process of learning; and 4.
thinking about capacity development in a systems sense. On this last point, Velho
(2002) observes that national systems of innovation, made up of actors that are
not particularly strong, but where links between them are well developed, may
operate more effectively than another system in which actors are strong but links
between them are weak.
Increasingly emphasis is being placed not only on knitting together different
elements of national innovation systems, but also on embedding the planning of
such endeavors in a wider constituency than only key scientific stakeholders.
While these undoubtedly do include the private sector both as an entrepreneurial
agent as well as an R&D player, it also includes stakeholders representing wider
society. As a result the innovation systems approach treats such issues as
biotechnology not only as an issue of nurturing technical and entrepreneurial
innovation, but also as developing an institutional and policy environment that
mediates between or regulates the potentially conflicting agendas of the constituent
stakeholders including society at large. While one could argue that national
governments in developed countries have not always been entirely successful in
their innovation policy efforts – witness the continuing polarization of the
transgenic debate in western Europe – there is also evidence that such approach
have potentially large economic advantage (OECD 2000).
Institutional learning and change and organizational
culture
One of the important points that the innovation system concept makes is that
institutional learning and change are key characteristics of organizations in
effective innovation systems. This allows systems to reconfigure in an iterative
way as organizations and their partners build up knowledge about ways of dealing
with constraints or exploiting new opportunities. The emergence of biotechnology
is a good example of an instance where institutional learning and change are
required to reconfigure the relationship between different players in the innovation
system – particularly between public and private sectors, but between science
and society more generally.
Institutional contexts and cultures within organizations are an important
determinant of the ability of organization to respond effectively to emerging
challenges. Research managers planning the transition to new technological fields
where multidisciplinary and partnership modes of working are required – such
as biotechnology – need to pay much greater attention to the culture of their
organization and the incentives it provides for the change process and new ways
of working (Feller 2002). A key challenge is lowering barriers between disciplinary
units, particularly where these have been the focus of measures of professional
performance. Often the primary shift required is that from an inward-looking
hierarchical mode of management that emphasizes administrative control, to one
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characterized by ‘adhocracy’ that emphasizes flexibility in reporting relationships
and external orientation (Cameron and Quinn 2000). Feller (2002) provides a
useful typology (see Table 3) to help research managers assess their organizational
culture and the possible changes required.
In the next section we shall see how the organizational culture of the CGIAR
and the values that it implies have been a critical area of concern during its
attempts to reconfigure itself into a new architecture of innovation more suited to
the contemporary context of international S&T.
The evolution of international agricultural science
The history of the emergence of organized agricultural sciences in the form of
national research programs and subsequently in the form of the international
centers is well known. However the main points from this history are repeated
because the patterns of institutional development explain many of the issues we
are facing today.
To a very large degree the establishment of the early CGIAR centers reflected
the prevailing political and ideological context of the time.6  Anderson’s (1991)
discussion of the establishment of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
usefully demonstrates this. The origins of IRRI (and the International Wheat and
Maize Improvement Center [Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo,
CIMMYT]) stemmed from the funding of agricultural research by The Rockefeller
Foundation and later the Ford Foundation. It was closely associated with an
America foreign policy that saw that food security problems, particularly in Asia,
could lead to political instability and the spread of communism.
The Rockefeller Foundation took the decision that the drive to increase food
supply should be technology-led with yield per hectare as the key dependent
variable. Complex issues associated with farm size, access to inputs, applicability
and socio-economic relevance were placed to one side in order to focus thinking
and resources on the one key objective, transforming agricultural productivity by
means of improved germplasm. The focus was on so-called isolable technical
problems7 – isolable in the sense that they could be isolated from the socio-
economic context of farmers and the political context of target countries. This
dictated to large degree the central strategy of the early CGIAR centers. The strategy
was science-led, with mission success depending on narrow-goal specification
combined with rigid adherence to the best technological means of achieving the
goal as quickly as possible.
The other notable feature of the of CGIAR centers was that they were set up at
a time when it was quite reasonable to assume that the public sector would play
the dominant role in supplying developing-country farmers with yield-enhancing
technologies embodied in improved crop and livestock varieties. Indeed this belief
was implicit in the relationship that many of the centers had with the NARS in
the countries in which they were hosted. The CGIAR’s primary partner was seen
6. For detailed discussion see Anderson (1991); Anderson et al. (1991); Reece (1998).
7 . Anderson (1991) quotes the term isolable from contemporary Rockefeller Foundation archive
material.
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Table 3. The organizational culture profile
(appropriately at that time) as the national public sector and the relationship
conformed to a linear hierarchy by which research led to technology, which in
turn was passed down from the international centers to national programs, then
extension services and finally to farmers. This greatly restricted the diversity of
partners involved in CGIAR research notably farmers, private industry and NGOs.
Furthermore, as these assumptions replicated themselves over the years, the
organizational culture of the CGIAR centers continued to reflect some of the
institutional hangovers from the earlier years (Hall et al. 2000). While slowly over
the intervening years things did start to evolve, a stereotype of this organizational
culture at that time might include the following:8
8. Based on the authors’ experience, this would have probably been typical 5–6 years ago.
Clan Culture
A very friendly place to work where people
share a lot of themselves. It is like an extended
family. The leaders, or heads of the organiza-
tion, are considered to be mentors and
perhaps even parent figures. The organization
is held together by loyalty of tradition.
Commitment is high. The organization
emphasizes the long-term benefit of human
resources development and attaches great
importance to cohesion and morals. Success
is defined in terms of sensivity to customers
and concern for people. The organization
places a premium on teamwork, participation
and consensus.
Hierarchy Culture
A very formalized and structured place to
work. Procedures  govern what people do.
The leaders pride themselves on being good
coordinators and organizers who are
efficiency-minded. Maintaining a smooth-
running organization is most critical. Formal
rules and policies hold the organization
together. The long-term concern is on stability
and performance with efficient, smooth
operations. Success is defined in terms of
dependable delivery, smooth scheduling and
low cost. The management of employees
is concerned with secure employment and
predictability.
Adhocracy Culture
A dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative place
to work. People stick their necks out and take
risks. The leaders are considered innovators
and risk takers. The glue that holds the
organization together is commitment to
experimentation and innovation. The
emphasis is on being the leading edge. The
organization’s long-term emph-asis is one of
growth and acquiring new resources. Success
means gaining unique and new products of
services. Being a pro-ducer or service leader is
important. The organization encourages
individual initia-tive and freedom.
Market Culture
A results-oriented organization whose major
concern is with getting the job done. People
are competitive and goal-oriented. The leaders
are hard drivers, producers and competitors.
They are tough and demanding. The glue that
holds the organization together is an empha-
sis on winning. Reputation and success are
common concerns. The long-term focus is on
competitive actions and achievement of
measurable goals and targets. Success is
defined in terms of market share and
penetration. Competitive pricing and market
leadership are important. The organizational
style is hard-driving competitiveness.
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Source: Feller 2002
108
• The main task was increasing food production. This could best be achieved by
focusing on increasing yield per unit area under optimum conditions and this
was the central criteria for judging success
• Public good research should be undertaken by the public sector unsullied by
any commercial interest. The corollary being that interaction with the private
sector is highly suspect and should be avoided
• Technologies developed were good and that it is the failure of others to transfer
these to farmers that was the cause of weak farm level adoption
• The NGO sector was at best scientifically suspect and perhaps even anti-science
particularly latterly in its attitude to biotechnology
• Research priorities should be set, with the help of economists, by scientist
themselves. Analysis of economic rates of return to research investment being
the method of choice for assessing research performance
• Impact on the poor and development more generally, is a presentational problem
and that main role of social scientists is to legitimize through impact assessment
the good work done by scientists.
We deliberately polarize these points for illustrative purposes. Organizations
and their cultures have changed. It is important to recognize, however, that it is
this broad position from which many CGIAR centers are moving forward. It is also
the stereotype carried around by many of CGIAR’s critics and potential partners,
including the private sector and NGOs. The centers are thus double-burdened as
they strive towards a new architecture of innovation.
The evolving culture of science at ICRISAT
Historical perspectives on organizational culture
ICRISAT, established in 1972, with a mandate for crops of the semi-arid tropics
was typical of the second wave of CGIAR centers. Although it clearly had a very
strong eco-regional focus it was established primarily as a commodity improvement
center for its five mandated crops – sorghum, pearl millet, chickpea, pigeonpea,
and groundnut. The institutional model of ICRISAT was very much of its time. In
India the partner organization was the Indian Council of Agricultural Research
(ICAR), which was also the main conduit for technology transfer and access to
farmers. The private sector (input supply and food and feed industries) was seen
to operate in a separate domain in which it had comparative advantage. The
Institute adhered, at times quite strictly, to the role distinctions that this design
implied – often encourage by the Governing Board who felt the need to conform to
memoranda of understanding with host governments.
It can therefore be seen that organizational culture of ICRISAT conformed to a
linear model of innovation whereby technology is developed and then passed to
others for further development and transfer. An area of discourse in the
organization that illustrates this is the perennial references to the technology
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shelf – the mythical repository for research products that are yet to be adopted.9
In 2001, Hall et al. (2001) found that despite the continued discussion of this
concept as the rationale for establishing new partnerships, interviews with private-
sector seed companies revealed that they were less interested in partnering to
gain access to technology alone, but instead wanted access to expertise and
research infrastructure. In their words it highlighted that there was a need to
match what ICRISAT had to offer with what its new partners wanted. This implied
the need for a totally different type of relationship that was more consensual and
where agendas and priorities were negotiated bilaterally.
Early partnerships with the private sector
Indeed it was against this backdrop of a rather conservative public-research sector
organization that in 1997 a new Director General10 joined the Institute with mission
to introduce a much more entrepreneurial forward-looking culture. The new
Director General, found, however, a number of institutional restrictions to
implementing new ideas and, frustrated by the slow process of change, he left.
During his short time as Director General, this visionary character had seeded
the need for change in the organization, although there was still a long distance
to travel before this vision could be implemented. Thus in 1998 two of the Institute’s
plant breeders, encouraged by the then Head of the Genetic Resources and
Enhancement Program, began their 2-year struggle to establish the first research
initiative funded by the private sector. The two breeders knew that the Institute
had to move on from the paternalistic support that it had been providing to the
emergent private-sector seed industry and that a type of contract research was
the way forward. However what they found was that not only were there
uncertainties over intellectual property rights (IPR), but that there was also an
uncertainly as to whether the Institute was actually allowed to enter in to such
an arrangement at all. As such there was hesitation on both the part of the private-
sector seed companies and the Institute.
The seed companies’ main concern was that of gaining exclusive rights on the
products they were to fund ICRISAT to develop – improved inbred parental lines of
sorghum and pearl millet for production of commercial hybrid varieties. ICRISAT
IP policy allows free access to all germplasm through a materials transfer
agreement, thus disallowing an exclusive arrangement. This was finally resolved
in two ways. Firstly, the funding was organized through a consortium, thus
lowering costs for companies involved, making exclusivity less of a concern.
Secondly, the companies were assured that although there would be public access
to improved hybrid breeding lines, the companies could take ownership of
subsequent materials that came from crossing these with their own lines.
The next hurdle was to get this arrangement approved by ICRISAT management
and Governing Board. The details of this process clearly indicate that there was a
great deal of uncertainty over whether this was something that was appropriate
for the Institute (see Reddy et al. 2001). It was passed on to ICAR for their comment
9. The origins of this terminology may have emerged from an External Programme and Management
Review that commented on unadopted technologies.
10.Dr Shawki Barghouti
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before being passed back to ICRISAT where it was rejected – mainly because the
sums of money where felt to be insignificant. Possibly one of the most significant
points of departure in this story was the change in attitude that took place with
the assignment of an Acting Director General11 who quickly pushed the issue
through, commenting that the financial magnitude of the seed consortium was
less important than the value of the partnerships it was establishing. It is the
vision and conviction of this one individual that marked the beginning of ICRISAT’s
liberalization with respect to developing partnerships with other organizations.
His decision was fully endorsed by the incoming Director General who signed the
agreement with the private consortium.
A more recent hurdle that the Institute has faced concerned the principle of
partnerships with the private sector, involved creating joint ventures with the
private sector and hosting commercial companies within a proposed Agri-Biotech
Park (ABP). The new Director General is firmly behind this concept, but there
were difficulties in doing so in relation to the Institute’s founding agreement with
the Government of India. However, a shift has taken place via interest from the
local State government for ICRISAT to host the agri-biotech wing of the state-
sponsored Genome Valley Science Park, thereby legitimizing the Institute’s desire
to work intimately with a wider array of private-sector partners through an income-
generating model.
Institutional changes and opportunities associated ICRISAT’s
applied genomics facility
While ICRISAT had been working on a number of aspects of molecular biology
since the mid-1990s, the Institute’s biotechnology capability was substantially
increased through US$ 1 million dollar capital investment in genomics during
2000–02. The Institute was given a substantial grant from the Asian Development
Bank to establish marker-assisted selection systems in sorghum, groundnut and
chickpea in collaboration with the NARS of Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan
and Vietnam. A scientist from the commercial plant-breeding sector in Europe
was recruited to establish and manage this facility and the integration of its
activities into plant breeding programs in Asia and Africa. Three internationally
recruited post-doctoral fellows were also employed to coordinate the high throughput
genotyping facility. The manager of the facility began a series of initiatives (with
mixed success) that involved developing a new relationship with the private sector,
including out-sourcing, collaboration, and joint ventures.
The first innovation was to initiate out-sourcing of research to biotech
companies in India and Europe. The rationale for out-sourcing was to save time
and to free up ICRISAT staff to concentrate on more conceptually challenging
genomics research; to evaluate a range of national and international service
providers in a consistent manner and to relay this information to the plant
breeding community. While it was recognized that in the beginning, out-sourcing
may not offer substantial time and cost/benefits, it was considered an important
contribution to capacity-building in the region. A similar initiative has also been
11.The then Head of the Genetic Resources and Improvement Program
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established for alternative suppliers of training such that ICRISAT staff could
become trainers of trainers and thereby release more time for intensive research
activities.
Again this was the first time that this type of arrangement had been used at
ICRISAT and perhaps not surprisingly it took around one year (during 2000–01)
to pass through the Institute’s approval system and finalize the contractual terms.
The scientists driving this initiative bore the brunt of the work, preparing contracts
and negotiating with the company (mainly on IPR issues) and, later on, monitoring
and backstopping the progress of the research. However, one of the outcomes was
that ICRISAT learned a lot about contracting the private sector that it had not
previously known. This in turn led to a broadening of private-sector interaction
and an appreciation within the Institute of the need to establish dedicated in-
house capacity for IP issues; and thus, in 2002, an IP Management Office was
created in ICRISAT.
A full-time administrator is coordinating the IP Management Office with
technical backstopping from the Deputy Director General and the Global Theme
Leader for Biotechnology To help him adapt to the new role he followed a part-
time diploma in patent law. At the time of writing, the Institute is now investigating
means of recruiting a full-time lawyer to lead this Unit. A great deal of specific
legal activities can be effectively out-sourced in India. Nevertheless, the presence
of a minimum critical mass of in-house expertise is considered essential to enable
the Institute as a whole to evolve a much more strategic perspective toward IP
management. In addition, as most legal experts focus entirely on legal issues
from a commercial perspective, it is critical to establish an institutional capacity
to approach these issues from the perspective of a non-profit institution. Part of a
longer-term vision here is that IPR may become one of series of expert services,
along with bio-safety support, innovation, and partnership policy and strategy,
which the Institute can offer to others – either with a view to capacity building
under donor support or on a cost-recovery basis. These skills are clearly co-
products of current institutional developments taking place at ICRISAT, emerging
as the Institute’s role and competencies evolve.
ICRISAT’s Technology Innovation Center
The Technology Innovation Center (TIC) at ICRISAT is part of the overall vision
associated with enhanced linkages and capacity development of the Indian
national agricultural industry. Initially, in 2001, it was envisaged to establish an
Agri-Biotech Incubator, however, the Indian Department of Science and Technology
(DST) approached ICRISAT with a proposal for a broader initiative that was
subsequently named Agri-Business Incubator (ABI). Although the ABI has several
potential biotech components, it is also involved in many other agricultural
technology issues (see next section for further details). On this basis, the ICRISAT’s
emphasis in turn moved to a bigger initiative for biotech that is now encapsulated
in the Agri-Biotech Park (ABP) which has gained favor with the State government
who plan to include it as a wing of the spatially decentralized Genome Valley
Science Park (see section on ABP below for further details). With such a rapid
evolution in initiatives driven both internally and externally, it was decided that
an umbrella structure should be created to form a single point of access and
vision for all private sector partnership initiatives at ICRISAT.
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In order to handle the anticipated cluster of partnership arrangement that
the ABI is expected to bring with it, ICRISAT has established what it refers to as a
Technology Innovation Center (TIC). In fact, not only ABI activities will be handled
through the TIC, but also a number of other partnership-based initiatives ranging
from biotechnology to rural development. In time this will also include the science
park initiative. The purpose of the TIC is two-fold. Firstly, to provide a special-
project institutional environment where such different working norms as income
generation can be pursued independently of the rest of ICRISAT. Secondly, to act
as a clearing house for proposals and establishing principles – and to this end a
committee has been constituted in ICRISAT.
Agri-Business Incubator (ABI). The related idea of an ABI has, crystallized.
Whereas the science park mainly concerns capacity development and collaboration
on pre-competitive research,12  the ABI sits firmly in the domain of commerci-
alization. The rationale here is that ICRISAT and its public partners have a range
of existing technologies that can be exploited by private companies if the combined
efforts of entrepreneurial and scientific skills are incubated. The origin of this
initiative was an approach by the DST requesting ICRISAT to apply for a scheme
under its National Science and Technology Entrepreneurial Development Board.
The scheme provides a grant that ICRISAT had to match. This grant is then used
to support private companies in their attempts to develop and commercialize
promising technologies.
The ICRISAT scientists involved in making the application (a molecular biologist
and a bioinformatics specialist with extensive previous experience in physiology
and agronomy) had for a number of years seen the need for and opportunities
associated with working with the private sector. However in the past they had
found that there was no framework for negotiating a working arrangement with
the private sector. The ABI provided that framework, normalizing an arrangement
whereby the Institute could recover costs associated with a joint venture that
promotes the development and uptake of ICRISAT science, while at the same time
provides a profit-making opportunity for the private sector. The framework also
makes provision for ICRISAT to have equity holding in the companies involved.
Bureaucracy has been kept to a minimum, with the Director General of ICRISAT
having authority to approve any new initiative he sees fit under the ABI.
An example of this arrangement was a gene gun developed at ICRISAT. The
equipment had a lower performance than commercially available equipment, but
could be made for a fraction of the cost. An ex-ICRISAT employee (previously a
technician involved in the gun’s development) has set up a company to
manufacture this equipment. Under the ABI ICRISAT scientists helped modify
the design and made it a viable and cost-effective choice for the Indian market.
ICRISAT was paid for the additional research expenses and it also gains goodwill
from its involvement.
The ABI is still at an early stage, having had funding approved at the time of
writing. Once again, this is new territory for ICRISAT and will require new tasks
and norms to make it work. One new task will be to match technologies with
12.Research in which the private sector alone may not invest, either because of entry costs or
because research products initially may not sufficiently ‘near market’
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private-sector partners wishing to commercially exploit them. ICRISAT is
approaching this with two innovations. Firstly it plans to recruit a manger for
ABI. This will be somebody with a business management background whose task
will be to identify partners, negotiate terms, develop business plans, assess viability
of product options, and provide support to the company during the incubation
phase. While ICRISAT has done some of these things before, it has never employed
a professional in this area. This is therefore another important departure in the
evolution of science culture at ICRISAT – specifically, that it (formally) recognizes
the complimentary importance of science, business acumen, and skills relating
to negotiation and relationship building.
Agri-Biotech Park (ABP). Biotechnology-based companies in India are being
encouraged to establish ventures at ICRISAT. A primary driving force was the
substantial excess of capacity currently available at ICRISAT headquarters in
India. At the same time it was realized that almost no plant breeding programs in
India can muster capital investment to the level dedicated at ICRISAT for high
throughput genotyping in support of plant breeding. Indeed, ICRISAT had invested
in capacity beyond its own immediate need, in order to be able to lease this excess
capacity to NARS and private-sector breeding programs to provide a low-cost entry
point in to this new paradigm of plant breeding.
The idea here was that a broad range of companies would be attracted to
establishing biotech activities at ICRISAT. These might be start-up biotech
companies, breeding companies wishing to move into biotech activities, or
international companies interested in expanding their out-sourcing activities.
The availability of laboratory, greenhouse and field facilities and ready access to
ICRISAT expertise were expected to be a major points of attraction to all these
ventures.
An organizational culture in transition: decisions on the
road ahead
The organizational culture of ICRISAT has quite clearly changed in recent years,
with an increasingly liberal policy towards partnerships with the private sector. A
variety of fundamental changes in the way science is conducted have flowed from
this policy shift. For example, there has also been an expansion in the legitimate
professional skills that need to be part of modern scientific endeavor. This has
particularly been so in the area of legal and business development issues. But
also in terms of the type of relationship scientists have with the private sector
and others from outside the Institute.
The change process
Implicit in many of these developments has been the recognition that the culture
of the organization had to change to accommodate new ways of working. So, for
example, underlying the idea of the agri-science park was the hope that the
presence on campus of young dynamic professionals from the bio-/agri-enterprise
sector would expose ICRISAT scientists to different perspectives on science and
way of working. This in turn was viewed as supportive of agricultural technology
development in an emerging paradigm of R&D that involved much greater
collaboration between public and private sectors.
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As part of its wider agenda of change, ICRISAT believed that it could also
support the positive evolution in national programs through opening its doors to
three-way partnerships (ICRISAT–NARS–private sector). This approach has been
cautiously received by scientists within ICRISAT and the international donor
community. However, the very positive response from private-sector companies
and State government suggests that it may be successful if appropriate and
sufficient changes in public-sector mindsets can be achieved in a short time. For
this reason, pilot projects with limited IPR concerns have been chosen for proof-
of-concept initiatives.
Viewing the private sector as an important partner and critical conduit for
impact has not always been readily accepted by all stakeholders from national
public research programs. Thus the need for an international public goods
organization to be involved in capacity building in the private sector becomes an
even more daunting prospect. Finally the catalytic value of proximity and intimate
relationships with product-driven researchers has been a particularly difficult
rationale for some stakeholders to appreciate.
The learning process
The creation of the TIC at ICRISAT has been a powerful learning by doing process
for the Institute’s Governing Board, management, scientists and stakeholders.
Again this learning process as been part of the task of changing the culture of the
organization. Perhaps one of the most pervasive lessons that have been learned
during this time, is the critical importance of process and the great difficulty that
scientific organizations experience if institutional change is not driven and
reinforced at the right level, in the right order, and at the right pace. However, not
only are these issues highly intangible, they are also highly contextually specific.
Inevitably this means that a successful process can rarely be designed (beyond a
standard framework) but must evolve through a dynamic iterative process that is
both time and emotionally intensive for all concerned. Thus although the rewards
may be substantial, the investment is equally significant. Clearly scientific
organizations and their staff must be entirely convinced of the need and value of
this investment if their collective goal is to have a reasonable probability of success.
The transition process
The transition in ICRISAT has not been easy for anyone – too slow for some yet too
fast for others. The time delays discussed above reflect the degree to which change
has been contested. But note also that change is gathering pace as scientists
and administrators become more comfortable with the new organizational culture
that is emerging. Of course this acceptance has not been evenly spread across
the staff at the Institute, with some disjunction between the Institute’s professed
policies and the personal attitudes of some of its scientists and administrators.
Some view the private sector as the ‘smash and grab’ partner overly concerned
about exclusive agreements, while others feel reluctance to enter the rapidly
changing world of the private sector and the complexities of, among other things,
negotiating IP issues. What is clear is that as biotechnology becomes a more
pervasive force for change, ICRISAT will be increasingly drawn into relationships
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with new partners, not just those in the private sector but with a range of
developmental stakeholders. New skills gained through building relationships
with the private sector will be equally valuable for building partnerships with
NGOs and civil society groups.
Decisions on the road ahead
Discussions with scientists reveal many opportunities and challenges. For
example, stemming from the recent approval of Bt cotton in India, many smaller
seed companies have recognized the importance of value-added products in a
highly competitive market and are approaching ICRISAT for transgenic services.
In turn, with greater investment there is an increasing eagerness to protect the
value return and new interest in DNA fingerprinting services and strengthening
of variety protection regulations. Thus companies are approaching ICRISAT for
molecular fingerprinting services for plant variety protection (PVP). It is expected
that in due course they will move on to needing molecular fingerprinting services
for distinctness, uniformity and stability (DUS) testing and marker-assisted
selection (MAS).
Should ICRISAT pursue these opportunities to develop a cost-recovery service
that could perhaps cross-subsidize core research while at the same time bringing
them closer to the end-users? As mentioned earlier ICRISAT is building up new
types of expertise in IPR and partnership development and management. How
can it best take advantage of this? This dilemma will not go away and in the
future the private sector will continue to approach ICRISAT with an increasingly
diverse array of demands. While this offers opportunities, these will be only
exploited if both sides develop the skills needed to build partnerships. Scientists
observe that it is difficult to establish dialog, often because there is little
understanding of what either side wants, or is able to do. Here definitive contract
development, although initially time-consuming, becomes critically important to
offset subsequent wasted time or complete collapse of the partnership.
Frameworks for choices
Over and above these concerns, however, in an increasingly scarce funding
environment it is all too easy to lose sight of the reasons the Institute is pursuing
these new types of relationship. Resource mobilization alone cannot be the deciding
factor. What is the framework for making decisions on these matters, particularly
in terms of setting priorities that abide by the overarching goals of poverty reduction
espoused by ICRISAT and the CGIAR in general? The science park and perhaps to
a lesser extent the ABI raise these question most profoundly. So while the Institute
faces the challenge of developing ways of partnering with unfamiliar players, it
also has the task of establishing new mechanisms to govern such arrangements
and provide a framework for making informed choices relevant to the Institute’s
mission. In other words it needs a way of identifying those new opportunities that
truly strengthen its position and unique mission and filtering out those that don’t.
The fact that the main thrust of these partnerships will be in the area of
biotechnology also suggests that existing mechanisms for setting research priorities
by scientists and economists will be inadequate. The reason for this relates to the
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on-going tensions between advocates and critics of biotechnology. While much of
the debate is ill- informed, scientific defensiveness is likely to confound consensus
building and agreement on ways to move forward. Developing broader acceptance
of biotechnology, defusing public concerns, and building trust in the decision-
making processes of ICRISAT will be needed if ideas such as a science park are to
gain the widespread legitimacy they deserve. The key question therefore concerns
how this can be achieved and what are the implications for the evolving culture of
science at ICRISAT?
From patronage to partnership: towards a new
architecture of innovation
In order to discuss ways to move forward we now review some of the international
experience in dealing with some of the issues that ICRISAT is facing. We focus on
the two main questions: how to build linkages, and how to develop consensus
across a broad range of scientific and non-scientific stakeholders. Returning to
our earlier discussion of innovation systems, it can be seen that the desirability
of viewing technology development and diffusion on a broader canvas of partners
and institutions is a mainstream concern in many of the OECD countries. We will
explore two mechanisms and comment on their implications for ICRISAT. Firstly,
science parks, an idea already widely discussed at ICRISAT. Secondly, foresight,
a concept new to ICRISAT but one that we believe has much to offer.
Science parks
The concept of science parks originated in United States of America where the
first science park, i.e., Stanford Research Park, was established in 1952. Industry
soon realized the advantage of site proximate to a university, and so we see the
pattern emerging in the late 1970s and 80s. The flurry of building research parks
in the 1980s represented the second wave of interest in the concept.13 MacDonald
(1987) lists the following defining features:
• A facility that allows businesses to locate in close proximity to (usually) public
science
• Formally and operationally there must be at least one ‘reservoir’ of technology
and expertise, usually universities or research institutions
• An organization which provides management support for its tenant companies.
Westhead (1997) claims that science parks reflect an assumption that
innovation requires a catalytic environment that occurs when those involved in
research interact both formally and informally with those involved in business
and profit. Many of the science parks have incubators either separately managed
or managed as an integral part of the park. An incubator is defined as a property
with small work units providing a supportive environment for entrepreneurs and
13.There is no uniformly accepted definition of science parks and there are several terms used
to describe similar development such as research park, technology park, business park,
business innovation, ‘technopoles’, science centers, center for advanced technology, technology
business incubators and similar versions of the same concept (Monck et al. 1988). The terms
‘science park’ and ‘technopole’ are used most commonly in Europe, while the term ‘research
park’ is preferred in the USA and Canada.
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investors during the start-up stage of their business. But an incubator should be
much more than just the premises; it should seek to build a culture of
entrepreneurship by providing access to a wide variety of facilities, equipment,
and expertise (if possible on a lease basis so as to off set the high capital costs
barrier for biotech start-ups). Businesses are encouraged to leave the incubator
when they have established sufficient market strength, and frequently relocate
to a science park proper where relationships may be looser and of a long-term
nature.
It is difficult to appraise the effectiveness of science parks because the
objectives of the different partners in the parks may differ considerably (Monck et
al. 1988). However, the general consensus seems to be that by virtue of its positive
effect on the economy the science park has been variously employed by different
investors, for example, by universities for transferring and commercializing
technology, by the private sector for profit (as a type of real-estate business), by
governments for: job creation, building technological capability in the private sector,
or accelerating economic growth, etc.
The concept of a science park addresses many of the issues with which ICRISAT
and the CGIAR are dealing, namely the disjunction between research and private
enterprise between technology developers and technology users. This concept is
probably more suitable for scenarios where the private sector has an under
developed R&D capability but a good understanding for the market demand for
products. A business incubator idea may also be appropriate where it is felt that
ICRISAT and its NARS partners have potentially commercializable technologies
that the private sector could adapt, refine and promote. However any initiative of
this type needs to be approached bearing in mind two major caveats.
• Firstly, neither of these ventures can be entered into lightly as significant
financial and human capital investment is required for such ventures to work
effectively
• Secondly, the concept is seductively appealing to those who view this as a
relatively simple task of transferring technologies from the ‘shelf’ to the waiting
private sector. The real significance and power of such arrangements is that
they establish long-term relationships with the entrepreneurial sector. In turn,
this opens up the possibility of jointly identifying research priorities and helping
facilitate research–client iteration that is such a crucial element of the
innovation processes. This closer relationship also holds the promise of such
further institutional innovations as joint public–private ventures and other
hybrid organizational types. While this may sound far-fetched, the close working
relationships that science parks offer opens up a space for the discussion and
negotiation of new working arrangements and related institutional innovations.
From the perspective of an international agency such as ICRISAT, partnership
with the private sector is not necessarily a good thing per se. The question therefore
remains as to what would be the most appropriate framework for governing such
an arrangement in the light of ICRISAT’s wider developmental goals.
Technology foresight
Technology foresight is an increasingly widely used mechanism for linking science
and technology more closely to the nations’ economic and social goals (needs).
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Martin (1996) argues that with the increasing pressure on government spending,
there is a move towards greater public accountability, leading to an increasing
need for alternative mechanisms to make choices effectively with the limited
resources available in science and technology. While these themes reflect national
concerns, they are familiar issues for CGIAR centers such as ICRISAT.
Yuthavong and Sripaipan (1998) state that technology foresight is a process
of looking forward, and involves interaction between scientists and technologists,
responsible for the science and technology push, and sociologists, economists,
other professionals, and laymen providing the market-pull, to produce a balanced
perspective for the planners and policy makers. They further state that it focuses
on the prompt identification of emerging technologies, still in the pre-competitive
stage of development and often requiring government support because they have
not yet reached the market stage. Technology foresight is therefore concerned
with being able to maximize the foreseen benefits and minimize losses in the
context of future societies.
The approach relies on establishing working committees and expert panels14
from a broad range of scientific and non-scientific stakeholders to make predictions
about future technology and society scenarios. It thus provides decision-makers
in both public and private sectors with the background intelligence on long-term
trends needed for broad direction-setting. By relying on broad-based participation
to develop future scenarios – and note that it concerns multiple futures not a
single vision – foresight has both product and process outcomes. Product outcomes
in the sense that the approach provides working plans that enable technology
planning to be based on wide consensus. Process outcomes not only in the sense
that they promote consensus and trust, but also because they build linkages
between different elements in the innovation system. It is in this sense that
technology foresight is a collective learning process leading to building of new
networks and ‘wiring up’ of national systems of innovation (Martin 1996).
Towards a consultative foresight process in the CGIAR
How does this concept have relevance to ICRISAT in particular, and the CGIAR in
general. In particular, how can it contribute to the CGIAR need to focus its
partnership-based initiatives for poverty reduction as a guiding principle? One
possibility is that a consultative foresight process is attached to the range of
public–private sector partnership activities clustered under, for example, ICRISAT’s
TIC. Foresight stresses the need to canvas the opinion of what is in essence a
constituency of stakeholders. For ICRISAT this constituency would certainly
include national and international scientific partners from both the public and
private sectors. But it would also include donor representatives, NGOs and civil
society organizations, farmer’s federations, and farmer-operated organizations
such as co-operatives. It could also include social commentators including the
advocates and critics of biotechnology. In other words it would bring together the
whole spectrum of interest related to science, agriculture, rural development,
14.Most foresight exercises such use techniques as expert panels, brain-storming, scenarios, or
commissioned studies from consultants rather than the Delphi surveys that were classically
used in the pioneering efforts of the Japanese (Martin 1996).
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and poverty reduction. The outcome of any discussion by such a diverse group
would undoubtedly be a compromise, but that would be the objective – i.e., to try
and make decisions about research and technology policy that were based both
on informed discussion and on consensus between science, business, and society.
While foresight in these terms could be viewed as a governance structure
dealing with accountability to stakeholders and a more consensual approach to
priority setting, the process of foresight is equally important. For ICRISAT it would
provide a mechanism for networking with a wider set of organizations than those
with whom it would normally interact. Not only would this be valuable for
developing scientific and business alliances, but it would also help breakdown
barriers and build trust with critics and adversaries. There are convincing
arguments that suggest demonstrating a shift to a culture of science that was
truly driven by stakeholder consensus would be attractive to the more skeptical
donors, as well as to private-sector sources of funding. While a foresight approach
might sound both fanciful in its conception and painful in its execution, this is a
practical approach to operationalize the rhetoric of partnership, consensus-
building and poverty-reduction that is now so widespread in the CGIAR system.
Conclusion
As a result of the new age of biotechnology, and probably as never before, the
CGIAR centers are having to revisit the underlying principles that govern the way
international agricultural research is conducted. While inevitably we are all
prisoners of our own institutional histories, the culture of science in the CGIAR
centers is evolving in valuable ways. The core of the dilemma is that while
biotechnology has much to offer, this international public goods endeavor has to
strike a new bargain with both private industry who owns much of the technology,
and society at large who remains cautious and often ill-informed. Individual CGIAR
centers such as ICRISAT are operating in specific contexts with their own threats
and opportunities. In this paper we have seen the way the approach of the Institute
is unfolding and the way the culture of science is gradually changing. The broad
message that we would like to underline is that there is no blueprint on ways to
proceed. There are, however, well established conceptual principles, particularly
regarding process, that can provide a framework for planning innovation and
change – particularly the innovation systems framework. From this school of
thought come such practical tools as the consultative foresight approach. We
recommend that scientists, administrators, and policy-makers give these concepts
and principles due consideration whilst planning the future of CGIAR science.
Endnote
This paper is a joint the output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom
Department for International Development (DFID) and funding from ICRISAT under Global
theme 6 Biotechnology for the poor. The views expressed are not necessarily those of
DFID [R7502: Crop Post-Harvest Programme] or ICRISAT. The authors would like to express
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Abstract
Reviewing recent research on partnerships in the post-harvest sector this paper explains
the way the innovation systems framework was developed and used to gain insights
into the institutional context of R&D with a view to promoting good practice. Emerging
from this research is the recognition of the central importance of institutional learning
and change as a way of creating the constantly shifting links, partnerships, and
approaches that underpin innovation. Based on what is now known about the process
of innovation and institutional change, it is suggested that the next task for research is
to explore institutional learning and capacity building in greater detail. The recommended
approach is an interactive policy research methodology that ensures an action research
orientation, placing the work in real life (and real time) interactive post-harvest innovation
contexts. This needs to be linked to the development of a community of practice that
will promote consensus on the need for and direction of institutional change.
Introduction
This paper reviews recent innovation policy research in the post-harvest sector
and outlines future plans for research in this area. A joint Indian and British
research team undertook the work reviewed with support from the Crop Post-
Harvest Programme (CPHP) of the Department for International Development
(DFID). The significance of the research was that it examined the importance of
partnership in post-harvest research at a time when partnership approaches
were starting to be recognized as useful, but when little was know about promoting
such an approach in ways that strengthened pro-poor innovation. The research
focus on innovation was also significant because innovation was explored in the
broad sense of the activities and processes associated with the generation,
distribution, adaptation and use of new technical, institutional, and managerial
knowledge. This distinction is made to emphasize that the research was not about
innovation in the narrow sense of the invention of new technology in research
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and development (R&D) laboratories – although R&D is clearly important. Rather
the research was about how R&D needs to be viewed as part of a larger process
that brings about changes in post-harvest systems.
Among the many findings of this work has been the growing realization that
innovation happens when arrangements are in place that support learning and
institutional change among groups of partners and stakeholders. This means
arrangements whereby those involved in research and rural development reflect
with their partners on their successes and failures and adapt approaches and
procedures in order to achieve success. This process is referred to in a number of
ways – ‘learning by doing’, ‘failing forward’, ‘participatory learning and action’.
The term ‘institutional change’ is used here as shorthand for this concept and by
this we simply mean changing the norms, routines, and conventions associated
with the way post-harvest innovation is approached. This might mean
reconsidering who is involved in research or implementation activities; who decides
priorities and approaches; how successes are judged and by whom.
During the 3 years over which the research was conducted it was observed
that this combination of cycles of learning and institutional change is a powerful
way of bringing about post-harvest innovation that supports the livelihoods of
poor people. While we have realized the importance of institutional learning and
change, we know far less about how to encourage and promote this process in
organizations and clusters of partners. The purpose of this paper is to provide a
synthesis of the past work that has led us to these conclusions. We then go on to
discuss further avenues of research that could build on this work.
We begin with a brief discussion of the emerging importance of these types of
policy study.
The need for policy research on innovation and institutional
issues
The need for this type of policy research in a technology domain such as post-
harvest stems from widespread recognition that the institutional environment or
context of R&D plays a major role in the outcome of such efforts, governing their
success not just in terms of technical performance, but also in terms of relevance
and impact on the livelihoods of poor people (Biggs 1990; Rajeswari 1995; Hall et
al. 2001a). Blaikie et al. (1997) make similar comments in the context of efforts to
incorporate the knowledge and values of poor people into rural innovation processes
(Box 1 defines the institutional context of R&D).
By way of introducing the interrelatedness of technology, policy and socio-
economic outcomes, Box 2 presents an example of how the institutional context of
post-harvest research affects project progress and impact. The case described
highlights the nature of partnerships, as well as the rules governing partners
and their relationship with each other, as a critical area of policy that is integral
to post-harvest innovation. What is notable in the case in Box 2 is that failure to
engage with critical institutional and policy contexts of the project not only led to
failure in establishing improved post-harvest management systems (the main
technical focus of the research), but also allowed the project to proceeded for a
number of years with little hope of helping the groups of poor people that it
assumed were its key stakeholders.
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Box 1. Institutional context of R&D
The institutional context of R&D concerns the rules, norms and conventions that
govern research. In practice this means the rules and norms governing:
• How research priorities emerge, are promoted and executed
• The role of various actors involved in the production, transfer, and use of knowledge
• The relationship between these different actors and the factors that affect their
relationships
• How research performance is evaluated and rewarded (incentives), and by whom
• How R&D is held accountable to different interest groups and society as a whole
• How knowledge is built up, shared, and used
• How organizations reflect and learn.
Other aspects of the institutional context concern the wider institutional
environment. For example, it concerns the way national culture embeds in the norms
of individuals and organizations and the way this affects how they operate, interact,
and relate to each other, and how they learn and use knowledge. Therefore there can
be different national cultures of science, with norms of acceptable behavior, review,
and validation. There are also different organizational cultures and traditions in
different sectors. For example, government agencies (sometimes unfairly) are thought
of as top-down bureaucracies, whereas NGOs are usually (sometimes incorrectly)
presumed to have flatter management structures. These are all illustrations of
institutional contexts that impact on the way decisions are made, whose voice is
heard, and the dynamics of relationship with partners – all factors that impinge on
the direction and outcome of R&D.
In fact, it was the experiences of working on the projects described in Box 2
that laid the foundations for the research discussed in this paper. The research
discussed was ambitious in its scope and the donor, CPHP, was courageous and
farsighted in its decision to fund it. The original proposition of this work was that
often the institutional context of R&D was a major restriction to innovation and
thus socio-economic impact. However, it was postulated that the emergence of a
series of new types of relationship between the public and private sectors in India
was starting to alter the institutional context of innovation. Furthermore, there
was some hope that this would bring about institutional changes that were pro-
poor, the hypothesis being that these developments would build links between
the poor and sources of technology.
A critical novelty of this research was that it conjectured (probably prematurely)
that a new non-linear paradigm of innovation was starting to emerge as a result
of these partnerships. By this it was meant that the research–extension–farmer
model of technology development and transfer was starting to be supplemented
by networks of organizations and individuals with two-way flows of information
and technology. The research proposed that the national systems of innovation
conceptual framework could provide a way to understand this new paradigm and
explore ways in which it could be capitalized on and promoted.
The main attraction of the innovation systems framework was that it brought
into the analysis of R&D project performance the broad range of actors and
institutional contexts that shape research and techno-economic change. It also
recognized that learning was important in dynamic systems and thus introduced
this as an issue to be investigated. These were all clearly important dimensions
for post-harvest research as it spans the interests of many research, development,
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Box 2. Interaction among multiple agencies in the horticultural supply
chain in India
Between 1996 and 2001 CPHP supported the development of mango exports by Vijaya,
a Fruit Growers Association and the Agricultural Processed Products Export Develop-
ment Authority (APEDA). The main focus was on the development controlled atmos-
phere (CA) container sea-shipment protocols. APEDA set up a series of contract
arrangements with relevant organizations from both the Indian Council of Agricultural
Research (ICAR) and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) as
well as with the Horticultural Department of the local State agricultural university.
These organizations then worked with Vijaya to develop and test the CA protocol. The
ICAR institute dealt mainly with pre-harvest pest management issues; the CSIR
institute undertook experimentation on CA storage regimes; and the university depart-
ment advised on packhouse management.
Trial shipments took place over a period of 3 years. However, consistent problems
with the quality of fruit exported led to an evaluation of the export protocol and
technical backstopping provided. Individually the quality management recommenda-
tions were technically robust. However it was observed that there was limited inter-
action with farmers in the development of recommendations and this was part of a
broader concern over the client focus of the contracted agencies. Typical of their
organizations, the scientists involved had little experience in working with farmers or
in a commercial environment, and were usually not encouraged to do so. It was also
observed that quality management measures were not devised and implemented in an
integrated way across the supply chain. This resulted from relevant technical expertise
being located in organizations governed by two different research councils, with
scientists contracted independently to work on components of the quality management
problem. Vijaya was then left (unsuccessfully) to ensure that these component
technologies and practices operated effectively together. This was particularly apparent
with attempts to deal with anthracnose, a quality-related disease that needs to be
tackled with an integrated pre- and post-harvest approach.
The notable feature of the Vijaya case is that even where interactions with the
public sector can be developed through contracting arrangements, the ability of
individual research institutes to assist is limited by current institutional arrangements.
Not only is there strong disciplinary segregation, but different research council
affiliation also tends make integration difficult. The nature and rigidity of organiza-
tional culture – a key institutional arena – also makes the development of more inte-
grated and responsive working practices amongst scientists difficult.
But if innovation in a general sense was restricted, what were the prospects for
pro-poor innovation? In this case even though mango growers were (rather
euphemistically) referred to as poor farmers, the reality was that those involved in
the export shipment trails were inevitably large-scale, non-poor producers. It was
this group that dominated the farmers’ association involved, even though the majority
of members were genuinely poor households whose livelihoods depended on mango
production. The key stakeholders in this intervention were willing to continue the
rhetoric of pro-poor focus, as this was a stipulation of the donor supporting the
work. Dominant (and perfectly legitimate) stakeholder agendas included: mango export
promotion; accessing high-value export markets; accessing technical expertise;
developing (and having ownership) of new post-harvest technology and other research
products. Stakeholder agendas were not investigated until much later in the research
process, by which time it was probably too late to make any difference. By ignoring
this important institutional context, not only was innovation in a general sense
impeded (different agendas and roles were never negotiated and resolved), but more
importantly it was almost a forgone conclusion that pro-poor innovation would not
take place.
Source: Hall et al. 2003b.
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marketing, and production actors. In addition, it is an arena where the poverty
focus is always going to be contested by a large number of stakeholders with
diverse and competing interests and hence institutional issues are of central
importance. When this policy research approach was proposed (see Hall et al.
1998) and adopted in 1999 it was the first application of the national systems of
innovation framework in the agricultural sector of developing countries – bar
none.
The origins and features of the innovation systems
framework
The attraction of the innovation systems framework stems from the way it engages
with the political, economic, and social dimensions of knowledge production and
its use at a time when these concerns are occupying a central position in
development practice. Current debate is broader than research as a basis for
scholarship and the development of new technologies – although both ultimately
remain important. The term innovation – used in the sense of new creations of
wider socio-economic significance – helps us to break away from these confines,
and allows a more nuanced discussion of the process of development and change.
The origin of innovation systems thinking can be traced to the idea of a ‘national
system of innovation’ proposed by Freeman (1987) and Lundvall (1992). At its
simplest, this concept states that innovations emerge from evolving systems of
actors involved in research and the application of research findings. Lundvall
identified learning and the role of institutions as the critical components of these
systems. He considers learning to be an interactive and thus socially embedded
process, which cannot be understood without reference to its institutional and
cultural context, usually in a national setting. The innovation systems concept is
now widely used in the policy process in developed countries, but has only recently
started to be employed in relation to research policy in the South (see for example,
Hall et al. 2001a; 2001b).
Another way of making a similar point is proposed by Gibbons et al. (1994) in
their much-cited discussion of ‘mode one’ and ‘mode two’ production of knowledge.
In mode one, knowledge is generated, often with government assistance, by a
research community accountable to its disciplinary peers. The Gibbons’ thesis is
that institutional changes in western societies (particularly where the market
has started to eclipse the state as the primary decision-maker) have forced science
to become more socially embedded and less hierarchical, thus defining the mode
two type. The important point is that as societies and economic systems become
ever more complex, the mode one type of production of knowledge becomes less
able to respond to rapidly changing user contexts. Only by assuming the features
of mode two production of knowledge can systems be designed to cope with
complexity and rapid change.
The innovation system concept therefore provides a framework for: 1. exploring
patterns of partnerships; 2. revealing and managing the institutional context
that governs these relationships and processes; 3. understanding research and
innovation as a social process of learning; and 4. thinking about capacity
development in a systems sense. On this last point, Velho [2002] observes that
national systems of innovation, made up of actors which are not particularly
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strong, but where links between them are well developed, may operate more
effectively than another system in which actors are strong but links between
them are weak.
Six principles of the innovation systems framework
• Firstly, it focuses on innovation (rather than research) as its organizing
principle. The concept of innovation is used in its broad sense of the activities
and processes associated with the generation, production distribution,
adaptation, and use of new technical, institutional, and organizational or
managerial knowledge
• Secondly, by conceptualizing research as part of the wider process of innovation
it helps identify the scope of the actors (including public, private, research,
enterprise, and technology-users sectors) involved and the wider set of
relationships in which research is embedded
• Thirdly, because it recognizes the importance of both technology producers
and technology users and that their roles are both context- specific and
dynamic, it breaks out of the polarized debates of ‘technology-push’ versus
‘demand-pull’ theories. Instead that it recognizes that both processes are
potentially important at different stages in the innovation process
• Fourthly, it recognizes that the institutional context of the organizations involved
and particularly the wider environment governs the nature of relationships,
promotes dominant interests, and shapes the outcome of the system as a whole.
This aspect is enormously important for introducing a poverty focus. The
framework provides a lens to examine and reveal which agendas are being
promoted, highlighting the arena in which the voice of the poor can be promoted
• Fifthly, it recognizes this as a social system. In other words, it does not just
focus on the degree of connectivity between the different elements, but also
the learning and adaptive process that make this a dynamic evolutionary system
• Sixthly, it is only a framework for analysis and planning, and as such it can
draw on a large body of existing tools from economics, anthropology, evaluation,
management and organizational sciences and so forth
Overview of work to date
Where have the last 3 years lead us, and what have been the outcomes? The
research conducted under the project has firstly given us confidence that the
innovation systems framework is a valuable way of conceptualizing the institutional
context of post-harvest research and innovation. A great deal of time has been
spent in thinking about what the concept means in terms of its application to
agricultural innovation in a developing-country context and how it might be used.
The research has also used the innovation system framework to analyze a
series of case studies of partnerships initiatives related to post-harvest innovation,
including some of the CPHP’s portfolio of projects in South Asia (Box 3 lists the
case studies that have been conducted). Part of the work has concerned general
analysis of the nature of Indian agricultural innovation systems (see Box 4). This
empirical work has lead to a number of broad conclusions.
Firstly, our initial announcement of the death of the old linear technology
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transfer paradigm was exaggerated! Our case-study work has certainly given us
examples of instances where institutional change is starting to take place as a
result of new forms of partnership. But, time and time again we found that in
many areas, particularly (but not exclusively) in the public-sector research system,
much institutional change is required before systems approaches to innovation
can be adopted. Partially this is an issue of integrating and linking research
organizations into the wider context of other sector stakeholders including the
private sector, non-government and community-based organizations (Boxes 4
and 5). With this task in mind, our research has led to a number of lessons on the
nature of the partnership process and ways partnerships and linkages could be
promoted (see Box 6).
While the creation of new partnerships will be needed if innovation systems
are to be strengthened, the institutional change required also concerns changing
the ‘rules of engagement’ that would govern this integration and the relationships
that stem from it. In particular conventions and arrangements that put poverty-
reduction criteria firmly on the agenda of innovation efforts are still an area that
needs much greater attention in many parts of the innovation system. Similarly
the need to break down many of the hierarchies that currently characterize
agricultural research and rural development interventions need to be replaced
by more consensual approaches with broad-based (and genuine) participation of
the diverse range of stakeholders involved in the sector.
Box 3. Case studies of partnership and post-harvest innovation
CPHP projects
• Developing a quality assurance system for mango export in India. (Experiences of
trying to develop export protocols through the collaboration of the export
development authority, public research organizations and a framers’ association)
• The sustainable retailing of post-harvest technology in India. (Experiences of
developing and supplying a new packaging technology for tomatoes using a
partnership-based approach)
Others
• Contrasting research arrangement in the public, private, and co-operative sectors
using the illustration of the sugar sector in India
• Kerala Horticultural Development Programme, an example of a learning-based
approach to developing research partnerships and linking farmers to markets
• Public–private sector partnership in the Indian seed industry
• Partnership-based approaches to commercialization of sorghum and pearl millet
in southern Africa
• New institutional arrangements for developing pro-poor biotechnology capability
in Andhra Pradesh
• Agro-processing and local markets through People’s Technology Initiatives In India
• Mango processing by tribal communities in Gujarat
• The pomegranate innovation system in Maharashtra
• Building local capacities for traditional agro-processing: the case of indigo in Andhra
Pradesh
• Food system innovations and the role of civil society organizations: the case of
Spirulina technology in India.
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Our research suggests that partnerships, while making an important
contribution towards this goal, need to be accompanied by the recognition that
institutional change is needed in some of the fundamental areas that relate to
the governance of agricultural science and technology. Our research has also
shown that without institutional change the relevance of formal research
organization reduces over time as they have no way to adapt their focus and
activities to match the constraints and opportunities faced by technology users
and society as a whole. It is for this reasons that institutional learning assumes
such importance in strengthening innovation system performance (see Box 7 for
definition of institutional learning). Table 1 provides a comparison between old
and new, system-friendly institutional arrangements for research using an example
from ICRISAT’s partnership-driven approach in South Africa. Table 2 contrasts
technology transfer and innovation systems models of innovations, illustrating
Box 4. India’s agricultural innovation system and challenges its faces
In India it is apparent that many of the elements of an effective agricultural innovation
system are emerging. There is a strong and extensive public research system. There is
a vibrant private sector. There are large numbers of skilled and committed rural
development agencies in both the public and non-governmental centers and increasing
efforts been made to foster linkages between different sectors. However the system is
challenged, particularly with regard to the way that scientific organizations relate
both to each other and to user sectors including the poor. The result is that scientific
expertise remains locked up in research organizations. This will not be resolved until
all the elements of the innovation system are able to work effectively together. This
will require significant institutional reform.
Some of the issues to be addressed:
• Disciplinary segregation between different research areas relating to cross-cutting
economic themes such as post-harvest
• Administrative segregation of research relating to agriculture and research relating
to industrial development, including food science
• Hierarchical cultures within science, between science and social science, between
research and knowledge transfer and use, leading to linear flows of information
and technology, restricting joint learning and consensus building
• Organizational cultures in research establishments that discourage learning and
only encourage the reporting of ‘successes’
• Co-opting of participatory methods to camouflage existing behaviors and roles of
scientist and poor technology users
• Research priority setting and evaluation by scientists and economists using
principles of excellence in science and economic efficiency criteria. Weak
accountability to society
• Lack of wide stakeholder participation in the agricultural research planning and
implementation process
• A disconnect (underpinned by professional hierarchies) between the learning from
science and development initiatives in the civil society sector and the priorities
and practices in the formal research establishment
• A disconnect between research and policy, including a disconcert between policy
advocacy for poverty reduction and policy advocacy for agricultural research, but
also weak linkages between science, society, and policy in such regulatory areas as
food safety, IPR, and biotechnology.
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the institutional issues that need to be analyzed when assessing the nature and
effectiveness of innovation systems.
The task at hand is therefore two-fold, concerning: 1. the need to link up
parts of the innovation system; and 2. ensuring that institutional arrangements
allow the different parts to work in a systems fashion that is simultaneously pro-
poor, provides incentives for broad based participation from diverse stakeholders
and responsive to evolving development priorities and opportunities.
In terms of enhancing post-harvest innovation and its poverty relevance, a
number of generic points emerge from our work over the last 3 years.
On the nature of post-harvest innovation
• Innovation in the post-harvest sector involves dealing with issues in complex
systems that have both technical and socio-economic parts and often involve
producers, market chain actors and consumers (Hall et al. 2003b)
• Both technical and institutional innovations are important (Hall 2002b)
Box 5. Public–private interaction in India’s agricultural innovation
system
Private distribution of public technologies. The seed industry benefited from earlier
policy liberalization and a successful private seed industry has emerged. Strong and
positive interaction exists between the public sector and small-scale private seed
distribution companies. However larger-scale seed companies, now an important source
of new varieties and hybrids, feel that they suffer from a more competitive relationship
with the public sector.
Private purchase of research services. In the horticultural sector contract research
is starting to increase interaction between public and private sectors. However there
are still significant institutional constraints that need to be addressed before such
arrangements can become more widespread. These constraints concern contractual
accountability, bureaucratic procedural norms, and institutional segregation among
public agencies. Case studies of the sugar industry demonstrate how such concerns
not only act as a disincentive for the private sector to engage with the public sector,
but also how they greatly reduce the relevance of the technology and related services
that the pubic sector can provide.
Public–private research partnerships. Collaborative research partnerships between
the public and private sectors are still uncommon. The reasons why such patterns
have yet to become widespread include a long history of separation and mutual mistrust
between the sectors. Underpinning this problem are sharply contrasting views on the
role of science and the way to apply it in a problem-solving context. This is made
worse by a public administration system designed for a centrally-planned state where
delays are frequent and the possibility of sudden policy changes can cause much
uncertainty. This institutional environment is poorly suited to commercial working
styles. Case studies also suggest a basic misunderstanding on the part of the public
sector about the demand of the private sector. Whereas the public sector feels that its
‘shelves’ of un-adopted technologies are its greatest asset, the private sector is equally
interested in public research expertise and infrastructure. This suggests that the
nature of partnerships to exploit this synergy needs to involve knowledge sharing and
developing technologies jointly, rather than simply transferring public products to
the private sector
Source: Hall et al. 2002a.
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Box 7. Institutional learning
The concept of institutional learning concerns the process through which new ways
of working emerges. It concerns learning how to do things in new ways. It asks the
question ‘what rules and norms have to be changed to do a new task or to do an old
one better?’ (e.g., how has our research approach changed in response to the need to
improve the poverty relevance of our work and what else needs to change? What can
we learn from activities that did not have expected outcomes?). A key aspect of this
learning may involve learning how to learn better, a concept that the management
and organizational theory literature refers to as ‘double-loop’ learning. The learning
process is very context-specific and consequently institutional learning can lead to
great diversity in approaches, partnerships, and strategies. Institutional learning is
an inevitable and intuitive process, a fundamental property of all social systems.
Where programs have explicit, systematic learning objectives and procedures, research
management strategies can evolve and progress rapidly.
Source: Hall 2003a; Horton 1999
Box 6. A dozen things we know about partnerships
1. Partnering is a pragmatic response to the need to accomplish complex tasks that
cut across disciplinary, organizational, and sectoral mandates. Joint task
identification and definition builds partnership. Forced partnerships and ritualistic
partnerships have no value and will not be sustained
2. Partnerships should only last as long as there is a shared task to be accomplished
and should not be viewed as a permanent linkage
3. Not all organizations have the appropriate skill to be good partners
4. While the clear definition of roles for all partners is important, it also needs to be
recognized that the roles of partners change during the innovation process, with
different partners assuming greater importance at certain times
5. Partnering helps sharing of resources, skills, and knowledge and thus is critical to
learning and innovation. Not all organizations have a culture of learning. This
restricts both their ability to partner and generate institutional innovations
6. Rigid institutional and organizational structures, particularly those with
hierarchical designs tend to stifle learning and the development of iterative
relationships with broader sets of partners
7. While it is easy to stereotype public–private and NGO organizations, and the
organizational culture that goes with them, there is a need to examine these more
closely in the analysis of project partnership viability
8. Successful partners have intuitive ways of identifying each other that relate to
shared values, trust and complementarity. Shared history built up over previous
partnerships obviously contributes to this. To promote partnership it is necessary
to provide opportunities for this trust to develop
9. Partnership skills are part of a range of capabilities that help organizations innovate,
and that are learned through interaction with partners and networks
10.How organizations learn and build up these skills is not yet entirely clear
11.The strengthening of learning processes in project partners appears to be a key
area of capacity development
12.Activities that widen the interaction of organizations with other partners and
networks are likely to be an important way of building up innovation capabilities,
both in individual organizations and in wider national systems.
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Table 1. Key features of the research management and technology
promotion in contrasting institutional settings: SMIP1 task
networks and conventional agricultural research arrangements
1. SMIP is the Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program of ICRISAT. This 20-year program has aimed to
develop sorghum and millet improvement capabilities in southern Africa and promote the uptake of
research products.
Guiding agenda
Relationships
involved
Partners
Selection
Role
Research priority
setting
Work plans and
activities
Mandate for
research/task
approach adopted
Technology
development and
transfer approach
Knowledge
produced
Performance
indicators
Responsibility for
achieving impact
Capacity building
Conventional agricultural research
arrangements
Scientific
Narrow, hierarchical
Scientists in other public agencies
Predetermined by institutional roles defined
by the arrangement of the research system
Fixed. Predetermined by institutional roles
defined by the arrangement of the research
system
Fixed. By scientists
Fixed at beginning of project
Fixed by institutional norms of the
research system
By scientists and extension staff
Technical/ scientific
In scientific terms to other scientist
Other agencies dedicated to extension and
technology promotion
Trained scientists and research
infrastructure
SMIP task network
Developmental
Diverse, consultative
Scientist, entrepreneurs, and
development workers, from the
public and private sectors
Coalitions of interest. Determined
by the nature of task, national
institutional context and skills
and resources available
Flexible. Determined by the nature
of task, national institutional
context and skills and resources
available
Consensual. By regional
stakeholders and by needs of task
network
Flexible, iterative
Negotiated through coalitions of
interest
Participatory technology testing
with farmers and agro-processing
enterprises.
Use of farmer groups for
technology promotion
Technical/scientific and
institutional
In development terms to donors.
In terms of fulfilling role in task
network to other partners
SMIP scientists and their partners
in task networks
Collective capacity of task
networks, social capital,
partnership skills
134
Table 2. Opposite end of the continuum: Models of agricultural innovation
compared
Features
1 System
features
1.1 Actors
involved
1.2 Patterns of
relationship
1.3 Sources of
institutional
innovation
and learning
2 Role of
different
actors
2.1 Technology
users/farmers
2.2 Private
enterprise
2.3 NGOs
2.4 CBO
2.5 Public
research
organizations
Transfer of technology
Mainly public research and
extension organizations
Hierarchical arrangements
with linear flows of
information
Centrally generated, blueprint
model
Static
Technology adoption
Technology transfer
Technology transfer
Technology transfer
Conducting research.
Identifying research priorities
and evaluating research
performance
Passing technologies to
specialist technology transfer
organizations
Agricultural innovation system
Diverse combinations of actors from public,
enterprise, NGO and CBO sectors
Flatter more consultative relationships to exploit
complementary resources and joint learning.
Partnerships and alliances important
Through experimentation by partners
Evolving and dynamic
Source agro-ecological and socio-economic
knowledge
Undertaking research and adaptive testing
Technology adoption
Identifying research priorities and evaluating
research performance
Technology transfer
Knowledge of inputs and output markets and
demands of technology users
Source of research funding
In-house research expertise
Advocacy for policy change
Evaluating research performance
Technology transfer
Implementing research and development initiatives
Market studies, enterprise development.
Facilitating linkages between farmers and other
agencies
Facilitating the development of farmer organizations
Advocacy for policy change
Evaluating research performance
Identifying research priorities
Technology transfer
Community based research and development
initiatives
Agro-ecological and socio-economic knowledge
Evaluating research performance
Identifying research priorities
Partner providing research services, technology and
technical backstopping
Creating regulatory framework
Linkage with international scientific community
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Table 2. continued....
2.6 Policy bodies
2.7 Donors
2.8 International
agencies
3 Governance
of R&D
3.1 Scope of
participation
3.2 Accountability
3.3 Scope of
vision and
goals
4 Wider context
4.1 Relationship
with wide
institutional
and political
context
5 Capacity 
building
5.1 Focus
5.2 Composition
of capacity
6 System 
performance
impact
6.1 Criteria
6.2 Method of
evaluation
6.3 Indicators
Resource allocation.
Passive recipient of policy
research recommendations
Sources of funds
Limited
Limited to peer review
Scientific
Disconnected
Research capacity of the
existing research organization
Research personnel and their
scientific skills, research
infrastructure, level of
research funding
Scientific and economic
outcomes
Peer review by scientists and
economists
Citation analysis, technology
adoption rates
Economic rates of return to
research investments
Strengthening the enabling environment of
innovation systems
Active partner in the research process
Clients and partners in the research process
Program management and oversight
Linkage to source of funds
Technology supply
Research services
Linkage facilitation
Consultative with many partners, including farmers
and technology users
Collective and to society and technology users
directly
Developmental focusing on livelihood security
Embedded
Evolutionary capacity of entire agricultural
innovation system
Individual capacities of different organizations
collective capacity of temporary coalitions and
alliances
Longer term capacity arising from development of
partnering skills and joint learning
Developmental outcomes and institutional or
behavioral changes in the system
Expert review by public and private sectors, science
and non-science stakeholders
Changes in livelihoods and other socio-economic
outcomes
Evidence of new partnerships, consensual
approaches and other processes that promote pro-
poor innovation
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• Formal R&D is only one of a series of related tasks required to bring about
post-harvest innovation. It requires collaboration between different scientific
disciplines, between researchers and technology users and between public
and private sectors. It is sometimes useful to involve an organization to act as
a catalyst facilitating this pattern of broad-based collaboration. (Hall et al.
2001a; Rasheed Sulaiman and Hall 2002; Clark and Mugabe 2003)
• The institutional context of these collaborations or partnerships is a key
determinate of their direction and outcome (Hall et al. 2001)
On institutional change
• There is a generic concern relating to the need to build stronger and more
consultative linkages between public-sector science and other actors in the
innovation system. There is a need to address a broad range of institutional
features of the current agricultural innovation systems that prevent these
linkages developing. Static and compartmentalized roles, combined with a poorly
developed learning culture are institutional issues that need specific attention
(Hall et al. 2000; 2001a; 2002a)
• Supporting institutional change requires long-term commitment on the part
of donors and policy agencies. This is particularly so because successful
institutional change is observed to emerge indigenously, through trial and
error in response to local circumstances (Clark et al. 2002; Hall and Yoganand
2003)
• Transferred institutional models or blueprints rarely succeed (Hall et al. 2000;
Rasheed Sulaiman and Hall 2002).
On partnerships
• Successful projects have been those that have focused specifically on
establishing coalitions of local actors around a particular problem area or task.
These actors include scientific ones, but not exclusively so and not necessarily
as the leading actors. Similarly, roles may evolve over time (Reddy et al. 2001;
Clark et al. 2003, in press; Hall 2003; 2002)
• The selection of the most appropriate grouping of partners is very often an
empirical question that cannot realistically be answered at the outset of a
project. Projects should allow for this with inception phases and mechanisms
that allow the introduction of new partners or replacement of old ones (Rasheed
Sulaiman and Hall 2002; Hall 2003; 2002; Clark et al. 2003, in press).
On institutional learning
• There is a tendency, reinforced by the output-oriented, problem-solving
framework of the conventional project cycle, to under report process or
institutional innovations and lessons associated with technological success
(or failure.) These lessons are often complementary innovations to the new
technical knowledge and its application. This institutional learning should be
part and parcel of technical projects and their outputs (Hall et al. 2002b; 2003a)
• If institutional or process lessons and innovations are to be fostered as a
research output, an action research approach should be used. To implement
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this approach self-reflection and process monitoring and documentation skills
will need to be developed in project teams. This is particularly so where team
members come from formal scientific research organizations where the learning
culture is poorly developed (Hall and Rasheed Sulaiman 2003; Hall et al. 2003a;
2003b)
• Institutional learning and change is often highly contested. It rarely succeeds
if it is driven by only one or two individuals, particularly if they are relatively
junior in an organization. Institutional change can be prevented or legitimized
depending on the support or otherwise of key senior figures, particularly
directors of organizations, or senior bureaucrats in donor and policy bodies
(Reddy et al. 2001; Clark et al. 2002a; Hall et al. 2003a)
• Organizations that are willing to experiment and learn are the ones that
succeed. Often successful approaches develop and evolve along the way. Projects
and organizations that encourage continuous institutional learning seem more
likely to succeed (Clark et al. 2003, in press; Hall et al. 2003b)
• Research approaches that support institutional learning and change (as
arguably all do to varying extents) need to be recognized for their contributions
to developing the capacity of innovation systems. This needs to be considered
when planning monitoring and evaluation procedures, as it is behavioral
changes within the innovation system that will indicate progress towards such
longer-term goals as poverty reduction. (Hall 2002; Clark et al. 2003, in press).
On poverty focus
• The relative degree of poverty focus is related to the agendas of different project
partners and the dynamic that determines how these agendas are promoted
in the project. To succeed projects often have to introduce specific institutional
changes or arrangement to achieve this poverty focus; for example, deciding to
work only with landless groups or tribal communities (Rasheed Sulaiman and
Hall 2002; Hall and Rasheed Sulaiman 2003; Abrol 2003)
• Needs assessment and participatory approaches, while valuable, have been
much less important in ensuring a poverty focus than the agendas of the
stakeholders involved in a given project These stakeholders include both
members of the research team as well external individuals and organizations
(Underwood 2002)
• Revisiting during the project key assumptions about, for example, roles of
partners and technology users, relevance of project outcomes to livelihoods,
and the changing agendas of different stakeholders, helps maintain a poverty
focus in projects (Underwood 2002)
• There are still unanswered questions about the way organizations build up
skills that allow them to participate in the innovation process in pro-poor ways
and how these types of behavior and practices can be introduced into innovation
systems (Hall 2002).
Emerging issues
During the course of the research it became apparent that the question of how
organizations engage in institutional learning, and how this can be promoted
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was central to developing post-harvest innovation systems capacity. Take, for
example, the case of the IDE(I) tomato packaging project (see Clark et al. 2003, in
press for detailed discussion). This project had developed an important institutional
innovation in technology identification, adaptation, and supply using a market-
based total-systems approach that was relatively pro-poor. The project was
particularly notable for the way it developed a range of partnerships with different
organization during the course of the project. The roles of the different partners
evolved over time (see Table 3), with IDE(I) playing facilitative role allowing the
project and its partnerships to evolve in useful ways. The project was very
successful in establishing a pilot commercial system to supply 30,000 cardboard
cartons to small-scale tomato producers by the end of the third year of the project.
At best the only way to describe the learning (and implementation) process
was as ‘intuitive’ and it was unclear what practical advice could be given to other
organizations or groups of partners who wanted to evolve their own approach
through a similar process of institutional learning and change. This does not
Table 3. Who does what and when: Multiple partners and evolving roles
from the case of IDE(I)
Partners/
roles in each
phase
Lead
organization
NGO
Scientific
research
organization
Farmers’
groups
Market
actors
Manufacturers
Problem
definition
Consulting,
collating,
negotiating
Facilitating local
consultation
Advising on
problem definition
Advising on
marking systems
Technology and
partners search
Identifying
technology and
facilitating
partnership
development
Advising on
available
knowledge and
technology
Advising on
available
knowledge and
technology
Technical
development and
testing
Coordinating
activities of different
partners and
managing
relationships
Facilitating farmer
participation in
adaptive testing
Researching
technology
performance
Testing technology
advising on
technology
performance
Testing technology
advising on
technology
performance
Modifying technology
Establishing
product and
supply system
Coordinating
activities of different
partners and then
withdrawing
Facilitating farmer
groups’ access to
credit to pre-finance
technology
production
Publishing
Pre-financing of
technology
production
Adoption of
technology
Distributing new
technology
Producing technology
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detract from what IDE(I) achieved, it just highlights that there is obviously much
more that needs to be known about how R&D organizations learn through their
activities and through the partnering process. Another case examined was the
Kerala Horticultural Development Programme and its efforts to link producers
with both markets and technology (see Rasheed Sulaiman and Hall 2002 for
detailed discussion). Again a learning approach underpinned its success and
informed its partnership strategy, but how it actually did this is less clear.
A similar example can be found with the case of the efforts of Dastkar Andhra,
a civil- society organization attempting to reintroduce production, processing and
use of indigo to weaving communities in Andhra Pradesh (see Box 8). In the Dastkar
Andhra’s own words, it developed an approach through experimentation, failing
and learning, recognizing that there was an important formative role for
organizations that were willing to fail. What is less clear is precisely the nature of
the process through which the organization learned and built up its learning
skills and what practical tips another organization could borrow from this example.
Emerging from this is the conclusion that while institutional learning and
change has clearly underpinned the successes of some of our successful examples
of post-harvest innovation, ways of promoting this remains an empirical question.
Before we discuss ways of approaching this question it is useful to pause and
reflect on what has been the outcome or impact of this work on post-harvest
innovation systems and the novel application of the national systems of innovation
framework. We reflect on this is at this point because our success to date in
promoting institutional change through our work holds lessons for future ways of
exploring this issue.
What has been achieved
The research reviewed in this paper has lead to a significant number (approxi-
mately 30) of publications. Almost half of these are peer-reviewed articles, the
rest being policy briefs, network papers, book chapters, international conference
papers, and workshop proceedings. We point out this achievement, as it was an
import component of our strategy of making innovation systems analysis of post-
harvest R&D a credible and visible approach. In addition to publishing this material
we have mailed hard copies to an Indian and international audience. But what
has been the impact of all of this? Have we actually changed research management
strategies? One of our targets was the DFID research programs (of which CPHP is
one). While acknowledging the efforts of others we feel that our research on
innovation systems played an important role in paving the way for the adoption of
innovation systems as a core principle of the coalitions approach of CPHP (this is
discussed in detail in Hall and Sulaiman 2003). We also had success with DFID’s
Livestock Production Programme (LPP) and we were set to use the innovation
systems approach to explore the design of LPP’s ‘dissemination’ strategy in
India – but this was unfortunately thwarted by the diversion of funds within DFID.
In the Indian agricultural science community, and notably among agricultural
economists, the innovation systems term has entered the lexicon of policy debate.
For example, a recent conference of the prestigious Indian Academy for Agricultural
Science convened to discuss agricultural research policy, not only concluded with
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 Box 8. The re-introduction of indigo: a case of experimentation and
learning
This case involves the reintroduction, over a 10-year period, of indigo production and
processing technology. Central to this was the role played by Dastkar Andhra (DA), a
civil-society organization providing research and consultancy services to the artisanal
sector. The intention has been through three distinct phases. The first concentrated
on introducing the indigo crop. This was generally viewed as unsuccessful. It revealed,
however, that information on indigo, indigo processing, and its quality and price,
while widely documented in the specialist literature, was almost nil amongst weavers.
DA learned that an indigo-growing project needed to be formulated as an experiment
as well as a commercial feasibility study. Similarly, the process needed to be driven by
an independent interest group emerging around indigo products and that this would
require the intervention to be rooted in strong local partnerships.
The next phase took place a number of years latter. Through its role of marketing
the handloom products of a number of cooperative societies DA recognized that there
was a demand for indigo-dyed cloth. Building on past experience DA realized that
growing indigo would need to be supported by other activities. A key intervention was
seen as the introduction of indigo dying vats amongst weavers who never dyed their
yarn and had become separated from the dyeing process. A dyer with knowledge of the
vats was brought to live in a weavers’ village in order that he could set up a vat. A
series of village-level seminars was subsequently held as a way of disseminating the
technology in context. The seminars brought together a number of different groups,
among who were indigo growers, indigo traders, weavers, designers, natural dyeing
experts and buyers of the final product – indigo-dyed cloth.
The third and more recent phase approached the tasks in a much more integrated
fashion building on the lessons from the earlier experiment with indigo growing which
was seen as having failed primarily due to the lack of strong partnerships at the field
level. The project entitled, ‘Action Research in Indigo in Andhra: Growing, Processing
and Dyeing’ involved three components: 1. the use of archival research to reintroduce
practices of indigo cultivation, 2. to fuse this with experimentation in the field, which
would demonstrate cultivation, processing and dyeing of indigo is a viable occupation,
and 3. to link these activities with weavers and to establish a market for end products,
i.e., indigo cakes and indigo fabric. In other words an interest group for the product
was developed simultaneously with activities on indigo production and processing.
Re-forging links between growers of indigo, dyers, and weavers was an important
aspect of this project.
DA recognizes the following key lessons:
• The first phase while unsuccessful was important because it was an experiment
that nobody else was willing to make and the only knowledge that existed resided
either in books or amongst few individuals of communities who were no longer
producing indigo. The insights gained and the ideas developed laid the foundation
for subsequent steps and placed the private knowledge of a few in the public
domain
• In order to take the first steps beyond identification of needs and begin addressing
them through experiments or programs, strong partnerships in the field are needed
• While the NGO can initiate the process of knowledge or innovation rooting in
local contexts the success or failure of this attempt seems to depend on the
participatory networks that it is able to create and sustain. The same is true for
the dissemination phase where networks and partner are seen as key
• There is an apparently value to DA’s role of linking various players – farmers,
traders, weavers, the market, government agencies, and research organizations.
A generic point is that none of this could take place without DA approaching this
task experimentally, while undertaking learning jointly with stakeholders thus
determining what would be the next step. In other words to make the intervention
successful it was necessary for the external agencies to engage in an evolutionary
process where the way of approaching the reintroduction of an agro-processing activity
was the central empirical question that needed to be pursued over many years.
Source: Seemanthini Niranjana 2003
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an expression of the need for institutional change, but it also recognized that the
innovation systems approach is a suitable way to proceed. We presented our work
on partnerships and innovation systems in the post-harvest context (Hall et al.
2002c) and our participation in this conference had a significant impact on this
debate and its outcome (see Raina and Abrol 2002).
Those of us working in the Indian agricultural research system are increasingly
receiving requests for information on innovation systems. The concept has been
presented at a number of important conferences and workshops and is again
attracting attention, particularly among mid-career professionals to whom it is
all too clear that a practical way of engaging with institutional issues is the need
of the hour. As part of the India science community, with our intimate knowledge
of this institutional context, we believe that the institutional edifice is starting to
crumble. There are people with alternative perspectives on innovation, but they
lack a collective voice and mutual support systems.
We have also had some impact on the Consultative Group on International
Agriculture Research (CGIAR) system. An external review of economics and policy
research at International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT) concluded that the work on innovation systems was one of only three
significant methodological developments to have been achieved by ICRISAT in the
last 5 years. Our work on innovation systems has created interest at a series of
CGIAR international conferences. It is starting to have an impact on the way
impact assessment work in the CGIAR is being discussed (for example see IFPRI
2003) and our research team has been closely involved an proposal to attract
donor support for institutional learning and change backstopping for a number
of the CG centers.
Its also important for us to acknowledge that the emergence of the innovation
systems debate in the agricultural research sector has had a number of sources,
but we are clearly one of those sources (Coincidently, DFID has used the innovation
systems approach in its recent research policy review). Similarly, innovation
systems are one of the key themes on which the reformed International Service
for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) will focus its work. Our work may not
yet be impacting on the conduct of post-harvest innovation directly in a general
sense (nor would it be expected to have done so by this stage), but it has certainly
impacted on the debate surrounding agricultural innovation policy.
Where we have failed and what we have learned
We also acknowledge the shortcomings in the work we have conducted so far. In
this regard we are grateful to Dr Stephen Biggs (University of East Anglia, UK),
who pointed out to us that we failed to heed the advice we were promoting as
policy researchers, i.e., the need to develop our own coalition of partners around
the promotion of the innovation systems framework as an alternative approach to
post-harvest R&D in India. The idea of developing an informal network or
community of practice is an approach that has been used to great effect elsewhere
– a good example is the advocacy associated with participatory approaches to
development and the subsequent spread of these. A similar case is the way
powerfully placed agricultural economists within the CGIAR system have managed
to advocate the use of certain types of impact assessment methodology despite
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the existence of other forms of evaluation preferred by other professional groups.
We now recognize that without the creation of such a network of support and
advocacy, a policy research project stands little chance of creating a new consensus
that can challenge the normative organizational culture of R&D establishments
and the institutional context that this implies. This is particularly true with regard
to large public agencies responsible for post-harvest and other areas of agricultural
R&D, but the same applies to other organizations and stakeholders in the
innovation system who need to be part of the institutional change process. We
also now realize how important it is that the coalition or community of practice
advocating systems approaches will require the involvement of poor people if the
system approach is going to lead to institutional change for pro-poor innovation.
Exploring ways of engaging in local knowledge systems is an important element of
this task.
A rationale for interactive policy research approach to
institutional learning and change
Flowing from the above are three major concerns that further research in this
area must address. Firstly, and as already stated, the main thrust of enquiry
needs to be on understanding how institutional learning and change takes place,
and how it can be strengthened and promoted. Secondly, ways of exploring how
learning takes place is an empirical question in itself. Furthermore, a research
question of this type would lend itself to an action research approach whereby
ways of building learning and change capabilities are investigated in real time
and supplemented with case histories from wider experience. Thirdly, the research
and capacity-building action research activities need to be embedded in a bigger
task of developing a community of practice that simultaneously builds consensus
and advocacy as well as linking research into the range of stakeholder interests
(farmer to policy-makers) associated with how innovation is organized and
promoted. To make the same point differently, this suggests an approach whereby
research is used to feed training and facilitated institutional learning and change
activities which themselves then form the basis for the development of a network
or community practice. This is very much a shift in direction away from the formal
policy research that we conducted in our earlier work, where the approach was to
develop broad principles and recommendations for research managers and
planners.
This mixed approach to policy research that we suggest should be referred to
as interactive policy research signifying the iterative, systems nature of the
approach and distinguishing it from the conventional linear policy approach
critiqued by, for example, Sutton (1999). In addition to the conclusions we draw
from our earlier research, advocacy for such an approach can also be seen in
recently published reviews of the organizational development literature (Ticehurst
and Cameron 2000) and the evaluation and capacity development literature
(Horton 2002; Horton and Mackay 2002; Stein 1997). These sources stress the
need to design, negotiate, and implement change (e.g., new policies and
institutional arrangements) with the full participation of the stakeholders involved.
Beijer and Holland (2001), for example, provide an example of how this interactive
143
policy approach has been used to develop agricultural extension policy in Albania.
Horton (2002) provides a useful definition of capacity development that highlights
the reason we give such importance to an interactive policy research perspective:
‘the process by which individuals, groups, and organizations improve their ability
to perform their functions and achieve the desired results over time.’
This institutional learning and change agenda also concerns the need for
research teams to learn how to operationalize this interactive policy approach.
This in itself will be a key source of institutional and methodological lessons. The
perspective of removing the (notional) distinction between the researched and
the researchers is emerging as central to much of the debate about good practice
in development (e.g., Abbot and Guijt 1998; IDS 1998; IDS 2001) and there is
considerable literature on ways of pursuing such approaches (Lusthaus et al.
1995; Bainbridge et al. 2000; Lawrence et al. 2002). Of course, the innovation
systems framework attaches similar importance to these learning mechanisms.
Indeed, as this perspective notably recognizes, relationships and interactions
between agents have to involve non-price relationships and that while the
transaction costs theory of institutions (for example North 1990) cannot explain
the dynamics of such systems, an interactive learning theory of institutions can
(Lundvall et al. 2002).
Practical considerations
How could these ideas be operationalized in the practical sense of a research
project? The conventional case-study methods will still be important in
understanding learning. The novelty of the interactive policy research approach
that we are suggesting here, however, is in the use of this case-study material to
illustrate in training and capacity development exercises the different ways of
supporting pro-poor, post-harvest innovation. The form of this capacity
development is a well recognized approach. Again we draw on a recent review of
several decades of work on capacity development (Horton 2002) that concludes
that learning by doing, or experimental learning, lies at the heart of capacity
development. Horton suggest that a balanced approach that includes small
amounts of formal training should be accompanied by facilitating change processes
in pilot-case organizations and using the learning from this pilot work to feed a
network generating and applying knowledge on institutional innovation.
Conclusions
By way of conclusion we would like to make three points. Firstly, policy research
on institutional change and innovation has to be at the heart of efforts to exploit,
in pro-poor ways, such technology domains as post-harvest. The involvement of
the poor as part of the social process of learning and innovation requires
complementary streams of technical and institutional knowledge that not only
tell what can be done, but also how this doing can be achieved.
Secondly, the progress and outcomes of our research to date demonstrate
that policy research can make an impact on the praxis of post-harvest innovation,
although we acknowledge that there is much work still to be done. A significant
task in this regard is to strengthen ways of developing capacity for pro-poor
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innovation through institutional learning and change.
Thirdly, based on our research findings and what we now know about the
process of institutional change, we suggest that the next task for research is to
explore institutional learning and capacity development in greater detail. We also
suggest that an interactive policy-research methodology should be employed to
ensure an action research orientation, placing the work in real life (and real
time), interactive, post-harvest innovation contexts. This needs to be linked to
greater efforts in developing a community of practice promoting consensus and
change.
Endnote
This paper is the output from a research project funded by the United Kingdom Department
for International Development (DFID). The views expressed are not necessarily those of
DFID [R7502: Crop Post-Harvest Programme].
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Institutional learning and innovation: origins
and implications for future research and
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Abstract
There is a growing realization in the Consultative Group on International Agriculture
Research (CGIAR) that impact assessment approaches need to expand their scope to
include an institutional learning and change (ILAC) perspective. This paper summarizes
a presentation made at a recent workshop to discuss how these perspectives might be
promoted. It is suggested that an innovation systems conceptual framework is a useful
starting point for thinking about the institutional context of research and the process of
change. This context is often overlooked and there are many examples of hidden histories
of research where valuable institutional lessons are not learned in a systematic fashion.
A broad implication of this way of thinking is that ILAC will need to be supported by
action research approaches and that this will involve a large degree of capacity
development with scientists developing new skills and ways of working. The scope of
these activities should not be confined to CGIAR centers alone, but rather to the whole
range of actors relevant to contemporary agricultural innovation systems.
Introduction
This paper summarizes a presentation made at a recent Consultative Group on
International Agriculture Research (CGIAR) workshop held at the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in February 2003 to discuss the need for
institutional learning and change and to consider options for taking this agenda
forward. The context is a growing appreciation that while impact assessment
exercises have a useful accountability function, the approach is not an appropriate
way to stimulate learning and/or institutional and organizational changes, and
thus improve impacts on poverty. This realization stems from a number of sources,
particularly a recent poverty impact assessment exercise conducted by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and its partners. This study
was novel in that it examined poverty rather than economic impact and that it
employed tools to explore the wider livelihood context of the poor. These so-called
wave I studies not only revealed the complexity of rural livelihoods to the research
teams, but also that the issue of technology impact was related to process and to
institutional issues associated with research and technology promotion
procedures. The preliminary findings of this work presented at a CGIAR conference
in January 2002 in Costa Rica had many parallels with a series of presentations
1. University of Greenwich, UK, seconded to International Crops Research Institute for the
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), Patancheru 502 324, Andhra Pradesh, India
2 . National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy Research (NCAP), PO Box 11305, Library
Avenue, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012, India
3 . National Institute of Science, Technology, and Development Studies, K S Krishnan Marg,
New Delhi 110 012, India
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by another small group of CG scientists who had concerns about the effectiveness
of impact assessment as a way of strengthening the poverty impact of research.
The outcome of these events was that a decision was made by IFPRI to refocus
its second wave of poverty impact studies, adopting an institutional learning and
change (ILAC) orientation. Over the last 12 months support from the Rockefeller
Foundation has been used to organize and hold a 3-day workshop to explore what
an ILAC orientation might mean in a second wave of studies, and how these could
be implemented and supported.
This paper outlines some of the concepts and origins of ILAC and draws some
preliminary conclusions about the impactions of adopting such an approach. We
begin with some definitions.
Institutional learning and change (ILAC)
Definitional clarity
The terms institution and organization are sometimes used to mean different
entities and sometimes refer to the same entity. Different meanings are assigned
to these concepts in different professional and disciplinary contexts, but there is
a tendency within the CGIAR to use them interchangeably. This inconsistency
can lead to misunderstandings. The term institution in this paper is being used
to mean norms, routines, habits, ways of doing things, or behavior and not as a
synonym for organizations.
Learning is used here to refer to adaptive, interactive processes of changing
norms through new knowledge on ways of doing things. Learning is viewed as a
way of creating new behaviors as well as new knowledge.
Institutional learning is about the process through which new ways of working
emerge. It is therefore central to any discussion about ways of improving the
impact of agricultural research.
It would be helpful to the advancement of ILAC within the CGIAR if the current
ambiguous or loose use of terms were addressed, thus allowing greater clarity in
the communication of concepts and approaches.
Multiple disciplinary origins
There is a long and disciplinary-diverse history associated with the theory and
practice of learning. Some of the influences come from:
• Evolutionary economics (implicit in pre-neoclassical economics and remerging
in the 1980s)
• Organizational learning (1970s)
• Systems thinking (1930s, but remerging in the 1980/90s through the work of
Checkland4  and others)
• Action research (1960/70s)
• Capacity development (1980s)
• Program evaluation (1970s)
4. Checkland P. 1983. System thinking and systems practice. Chichester, Sussex, UK: John
Wiley and Sons
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• Participatory learning and action and participatory monitoring and evaluation
(1980/90s)
• Agricultural research management perspectives that recognize the multiple
sources of agricultural innovation (1990s)
• Innovation systems (1980/90s)
All of these perspectives implicitly and explicitly recognize the evolutionary
nature of social systems. These systems are characterized less by the pursuit of
an optimal blueprint or model and more by adaptive behavior and slow, cumulative
change. Learning is therefore not only a fundamental property of such systems,
but it is also the driving force for dealing with changing circumstances and
improving performance and effectiveness.
Innovation systems perspectives
Since our perspective as presenters is that of innovation systems, we will explain
in brief how this conceptualization deals with institutional learning and change.
We believe its value to the ILAC initiative in the CGIAR is that it deals directly and
explicitly with the institutional context of research and recognizes the evolutionary
nature of the systems in which research is embedded. It thus provides a more-
nuanced, fine-grained account of the way techno-economic change takes place,
providing insights into ways of improving this as a process. The following 7 points
provide a useful introduction to the principles of innovation system thinking.
1. It focuses on innovation (rather than research) as its organizing principle. The
concept of innovation is used in its broad sense of the activities and processes
associated with the generation, production, distribution, adaptation, and use
of new technical and institutional and organizational or managerial knowledge.
2. By conceptualizing research as part of the wider process of innovation it helps
identify the scope of the actors (including public, private, research, enterprise,
civil-society organizations, and technology-users sectors) involved and the wider
set of relationships in which research is embedded.
3. Because it recognizes the importance of both technology producers and
technology users and that their roles are both context-specific and dynamic, it
breaks out of the polarized debates of technology–push versus demand–pull
theories. Instead it recognizes that both processes are potentially important at
different stages in the innovation process.
4. It recognizes that the historical and institutional context of the organizations
involved and particularly the wider institutional environment governs the
nature of relationships, promotes dominant interests, and shapes outcomes of
the system as a whole. This aspect is enormously important for introducing a
poverty focus. The framework provides a lens to examine and reveal which
agendas are being promoted, highlighting the arena in which the voice of the
poor can be promoted.
5. It recognizes this as a social system. In other words, it does not just focus on
the degree of connectivity (partnerships) between the different elements, but
also on the learning and adaptive processes that make this a dynamic
evolutionary system. Institutional learning (learning to do things in new ways,
or learning to do things more effectively) is therefore a central process that
policy and practice interventions can focus on strengthening.
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6. Collective learning among partners or by coalitions of interest breeds a cycle of
advocacy (about new ways of doing things), the emergence of new demands or
priorities and new learning (new practices or methods). Learning and change,
therefore, must take place concurrently at the innovation system level and at
the level of the organizations that make up the system.
7. The innovation system concept is only a framework for analysis and planning,
and as such it can draw on a large body of existing tools from economics,
anthropology, evaluation, management, and organizational sciences and so
forth.
ILAC: the concept
There is no hard and fast definition of ILAC. The concept emerges from a number
of policy and practice fields including innovation policy, participatory approaches,
and modern evaluation procedures, all of which stress the importance of learning
and change. ILAC encompasses both output and process elements – i.e., information
and behaviors that promote an ongoing process of reflection, learning and change
as a way of better achieving goals. It is premised on a number of widely
acknowledged observations:
• Those involved in research do not necessarily have adequate information and
perspectives concerning the livelihoods of poor people and the agendas of other
actors in the innovation process
• There are norms and routines (institutions) and structures (organizations)
that shape research procedures in ways that can make it difficult for the
perspectives of the poor and other actors to contribute to, for example, problem
definition, technology development and testing, the evaluation of outcomes, or
to be part of a collective learning process associated with innovation
• Innovation requires a continuous process of learning whereby method, and
institutional and organizational arrangements can adapt to deal with changing
contexts, demands, and opportunities. This learning has to be interactive and
driven by self-reflection
• Research that includes capacity development in terms of strengthening learning
skills can contribute to institutional change, thus enhancing research
effectiveness. Modern evaluation procedures give the same emphasis to learning
• Experience with participatory approaches to development practice more
generally is suggesting the importance of mutually supportive changes in
personal and professional behavior, attitudes and methods, and in organiza-
tional and institutional arrangements.
Hidden histories of science and the legitimate narrative
Technical and institutional innovations co-exist, but whereas the former are
generally reported, the latter tend not to be. This practice of selective reporting
can lead to superstitious learning. Such is the case with the reporting of the
Green Revolution in India being about improved varieties of rice. In practice, the
links between Indian research programs and international NGOs such as The
Rockefeller Foundation also played very a important role and represented a new
way of doing science in India. Similarly institutional innovations in marketing
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systems, input subsidization and price support and procurement arrangements,
were a major change that helped promote the new varieties.
We raise this point in the context of ILAC partly to draw attention to the
importance of more holistic accounts of innovation and the perspective this gives
of the role of research and new technology in this wider process. But we also raise
this point because scientists and social scientists are learning, developing new
competencies, and innovating with new approaches as a routine outcome of their
research and their interaction with partners and colleagues. The question then
arises as to why these learnings and institutional innovations do not spread,
diffuse, and influence wider practice.
Two stories serve to illustrate this learning process:
1. International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics’
(ICRISAT’s) Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program in southern Africa.
This 20-year program was established to build capacity in sorghum and millet
research in public agencies in southern Africa and to develop and release new
varieties. The scientists’ own concerns about the effectiveness of this public
agricultural research and extension driven model led them to experiment with
partnerships with private enterprises and civil society organizations. Even
when this approach was (successfully) employed more widely to achieve the
impact targets specified by the donor, monitoring and reporting of the
achievement of the program neglected to explore and report the underlying
institutional changes that were taking place. Success tended to be reported
(partly at the instance of the donor) in terms of spread and adoption of varieties.
Only relatively recently has ICRISAT invested in an investigation of the
institutional learning emerging from this experience.
2. Watershed research at ICRISAT. The narrative discussing this work in formal
settings in ICRISAT concentrated on disciplinary details of soil, water science
and agronomy, but it substantially ignored the institutional learning that took
place in and around partnerships. Triggering this was the need for scientists
to move their on-station work to a more participatory on-farm approach. This
forced them to seek new partners and to engage in the realities and complexities
of rural situations. The presenter suspects that the scientists involved hold
enormous amounts of knowledge on processes and approaches that have
relevance to improved impact, but which rarely see the light of day in a scientific
organization.
These stories help to illustrate what might be called clandestine learning about
institutional change – changes in the norms and routines governing research
and inter-organizational relationships – as opposed to those sanctioned by the
legitimate narrative which is about the technical and scientific aspects of projects.
Similarly it concerns the way project outcomes are reported and what is viewed
as a legitimate (variety adoption rates and so forth) and the perceived value outputs
concerning intuitional innovations.
Impact to learning: the road traveled and the baggage we bring
The history of impact assessment in the CGIAR has caused us to focus on a
particular type of impact assessment. This type of impact assessment is arguably
more about measuring than it is about learning; more about accountability than
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changing the way things are done. A pertinent question is ‘For whom and why is
impact assessment carried out?’ These questions are all the more pertinent
because even scientists agree that the credibility of impact assessment is not
high. In light of that limited credibility, we need a more nuanced account of impact.
Beyond measuring outcomes to research we need to focus on learning how impacts
are brought about by the interaction of research and production technologies
and changes in institutional behavior. Moreover, all the impacts need to be
examined – not just those on the poor, but those that affect the scientists involved
as well. The stories above amply demonstrate that scientists are impacted by the
research they do and by the relationships they build in this process, and that
this causes them to learn and innovate in the way they conduct research.
We believe the agenda of impact assessment is moving on to raise new and
important challenges. The fundamental question facing us is: How can the impact
assessment process be made more pro-poor, and how can we go about gaining a
better understanding of how learning and change take place? The technology
pipeline – where all that is believed to matter is how much comes out of the end of
the research pipe – does not correspond to reality. We need a different mental set.
To continue the metaphor, we need to ask: ‘What is the pipe made of?’ and ‘How
does the pipe change during the innovation process?’ Ultimately, we are all part
of the pipe! And therefore we need to reflect back upon our own norms and
procedures and how we conduct our research.
Where are the scientists? and the new role of social scientists
In the past, social scientists, particularly economists, have been assigned the
role of legitimizing scientific practice and behaviors. The new focus on learning
about how agricultural research can contribute better to poverty alleviation
suggests a change in this role. It encourages social scientists to examine the
nature of the research and innovation process. However it also suggests that if
this is a task concerning learning and devising new ways to work effectively towards
impact on the poor, the social scientists cannot act as surrogates for the scientists
who will actually have to change their professional behavior. The role of the social
scientists therefore needs to expand to including facilitating learning, i.e., a much
more proactive role in the ILAC agenda.
The authors’ own personal experience is that writing research papers on
institutional change while perhaps important for a disciplinary audience, cuts
very little ice with the day-to-day practice of science. The authors’ other experience
is that scientists from his own organization actively seek his assistance to help
them think about partnerships and ways of making their own research more
relevant. The authors’ richest professional experiences have emerged from these
types of interactions.
While this all suggests that all scientists in CGIAR organizations need to be
part and parcel of any ILAC initiative rather than the social scientists alone, the
innovation systems concept introduced earlier suggest that learning has to include
others from outside our home organizations. Ways have to be found to reflect and
learn in consensual ways with our partners. It clearly makes no sense to reflect
on ways of working with the private sector without including the private sector in
the discussion. Equally, discussing ways of making research more pro-poor without
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involving representatives from poor communities stands little chance of success.
Social scientists have an important role in ensuring that learning activities take
account of different perspectives, agendas, and interpretations of what is effective,
useful, and desirable.
Real-time learning and the need for an interactive methodology
To summarize some of the impactions for ILAC that emerges from this paper:
1. ILAC marks a distinct departure from impact assessment as it is generally
conceived in the CGIAR. It implies a different conceptualization of the innovation
process that is characterized by broad-based partnerships and evolutionary
process. It concerns learning to change and do things in new ways in response
to changing circumstances and demands. And it is not another form of
accountability to donors. A central implication is that institutional lessons
that routinely emerge from the research process, but are often not exploited,
recorded, synthesized, or promoted, have been under-valued as a way of
improving the impact of agricultural research.
2. There is a role for documenting institutional innovation as one way of promoting
institutional learning. Important questions exist about how partnerships emerge
and evolve and how learning takes place through these arrangements.
Answering these questions through research on the research and innovation
process is valuable both for our disciplinary understanding of how learning
takes place, as well as in helping develop general principles that can promote
institutional learning and change.
3. However, there is a caveat and indeed a fairly fundamental one. Namely that
being taught is not a substitute for learning. Learning is a real-time event
arising though the process of becoming, through learning by doing. Certainly
it can be facilitated. And certainly there are skills, policies, and institutional
arrangements that will promote learning and change. It needs, however, to be
highly contextual – organizations and groups of partners need to work out how
to change to suit local circumstances, histories, skills and opportunities. Pro-
forma organizational change, e.g., structural changes in the organization, can
camouflage the perpetuation of old behaviors so we need to pay attention to
broad principles and beware of ‘magic bullet’ blueprints.
There are three critical implications of this for initiatives that seek to pursue
and promote ILAC in the CGIAR.
• Firstly, research and other ILAC initiatives need to be carried out in such a
way that there is a strong capacity-development emphasis. In particular such
initiatives should strengthen the individual and organizational process of
learning to learn, and monitor this capacity development through behavioral
change indicators.
• Secondly, these ILAC initiatives need to take place not just within organizations
in isolation, rather learning capacities have to be developed at the innovation
system level. In practical terms this means that any learning and reflection
exercises need to include the participation of all the stakeholders relevant to
the conduct of a research and innovation task, including those involved in its
outcomes.
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• Thirdly, traditional approaches for information dissemination are probably less
valuable to ILAC initiatives as it is the learning process that needs to be promoted
along with lessons and principles. We would argue that a more useful way of
promoting ILAC is through networking and the development of coalitions of
interest around new forms of behavior and practice. Clearly conventional
information dissemination is still important. However one advantage of
networking or building a community of practice is that it builds momentum, it
broadens the constituency of ILAC, increases ownership of new practices and
approaches, and, if managed effectively can aid the communication of these
ideas between practice and policy. This last point might be particularly
important in legitimizing ILAC in a system such as the CGIAR where
institutional and organizational changes have tended to be driven from the
top. An ILAC philosophy suggests something quite different!
Endnote
This paper, an output of DFID [R 7502:crop post harvest programe] was originally presented
at a Workshop on Institutional Learning and Change in the CGIAR held at the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington DC, 4–6 Feb 2003. A J Hall
acknowledges the financial support of IFPRI and The Rockefeller Foundation to attend
the workshop and make this presentation. The opinions expressed are those of the authors
alone.
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